Chapter 9.3c - Niyamavidhi in Śravaṇa by the First Manner

The disciple of Śaṃkarācārya Padmapāda wrote a gloss on Śāṃkarabhāṣya named ‘Pāñcapādikā’. Prakāśātmayāti wrote another gloss on ‘Pāñcapādikā, named ‘Pāñcapādikā-vivaraṇa’, or ‘Vivaraṇa’ for short. Some followers of this ‘Vivaraṇa’ admit niyamavidhi in śravaṇa. They say that śravaṇa means the knowledge of the upaniṣadic words obtained by consideration. This śravaṇa is always the cause of realization of the eternal Brahman (ultimate being). It (śravaṇa) is not unobtained by any other manner, for in the ‘śabdāparokṣavāda’ it is well established that śravaṇa is the cause of realization of the Brahman because it takes the Brahman as its object. We generally think that the knowledge produced by the sense-organs is direct and the other kinds of knowledge produced from sentences etc. are indirect. But in the ‘śabdāparokṣavāda’ it is admitted that the directness of knowledge does not depend on its state of being produced from sense organs. But the knowledge becomes direct if it takes the object which is not invisible. The proof which produces such knowledge of a non-invisible object is called perception (pratyakṣapramāṇa). Though the verbal testimony is regarded as an indirect proof, yet the mental disposition (state of the mind) in the form of oneness between the jīvātman and the Brahman, produced from the upaniṣadic sentences like ‘tattvamasi’, ‘ahaṃ brahmāsmi’ etc., leads to the realisation of the non-invisible (aparokṣa) Brahman. So, even words or verbal testimony can be judged as direct proof.

For this reason, Śaṃkara has admitted the ‘śabdāparokṣavāda’.

Objection: By the above logical argument śravaṇa can be a proof for realizing the Brahman. But if apūrvavidhi is not accepted in śravaṇa, then it will not be the cause of the ascertainment of the real existence i.e. Brahman. In the absence of this ascertainment regarding Brahman, illusion or igonorance (māyā) will not disappear.

Reply: Investigation leads to proper knowledge on the subject under discussion. So, śravaṇa of the upaniṣadic sentences in the form of investigastion must lead to the ascertainment of the real existence (sattāniścaya).

Objection: The violation of the rules of anvaya and vyatireka is there. It can not be denied. So, the causal relationship between śravaṇa and the knowledge of Brahman is not established by worldly proof.

Reply: Not so. In the absence of the instrumental or efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa) like stick etc. a pot is not made from earth or potsherd. But it does not prove that earth or potshered is not a cause of pot. Similarly, though in the absence of the helping causes like concentration of mind etc. the knowledge of Brahman does not rise, yet it does not disprove the causal relationship between śravaṇa and brahmajñāna. So, sometimes the violation of anvaya is not condemnable. Again, there is no scope of the violation of vyatireka also, for it was very much possible for Vāmadeva to remember śravaṇa which he had performed in his former life. In this way violation of vyatireka is disproved. Otherwise, if it is accepted that śravaṇa is not the cause of the realization of Brahman from the apparent violation of the anvaya and vyatireka, then it will not be also true that the śravaṇa produced from the apūrvavidhi leads to brahmajñāna (the knowledge of Brahman).

Objection: A pot can be perceived by the organ of touch besides the eye. Similarly, there are other means than śravaṇa with regard to brahmajñāna. Vāmadeva might have realized Brahman because of his penance in his former life or because of his better life through his present birth.

Reply: Against this doubt it can be said that the violation of the method of discontinuance does not lead to any fault. Because if there are many causes of an effect and in some case if the effect is produced from any one of the causes, then it does not prove the futility of the other causes on account of the violation of the method of discontinuance (vyatireka). With reference to our discussion it can be said that even if śravaṇa was absent and if Vāmadeva had acquired his brahmajñāna from some other cause, yet śravaṇa does not become futile. Otherwise, if a pot is perceived by the organ of touch and not by the eye in some case, the eye can not be regarded as the cause of perception.

So, in the absence of any injunction also, śravaṇa is established as the cause of the realization of the Brahman.

Therefore, the śravaṇavidhi is not an apūrvavidhi, but it is a niyamavidhi. If it were an apūrvavidhi, the regulation regarding the repetition of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana would not have been made by Bādarāyaṇa in his aphorism,

“āvṛttir asakṛd upadeśāt”^[1]

(Śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana must be repeated, for scriptures have instructed it repeatedly).

Śaṃkara wrote in his commentary in the explanation of this aphorism—

“darśanaparyavasānatvāt eṣām. darśanaparyavasānāni hi śravaṇādīni āvartyamānāni dṛṣṭārthāni bhavanti. yathā avaghātādīni taṇḍulādiniṣpattiparyavasānāni, tadvat ”

(Śravaṇa, upāsanā [worship] etc. are completed when a striver identical with the Brahman sees [realizes] it or a devotee sees his God. If śravaṇa etc. which reach their completion through realization are practised repeatedly, then they create some visible results. For example, threshing etc. are completed when rices etc. are produced, viz. threshing etc. are done upto the production of rice etc.)

The result of śravaṇa, is a visible one. śravaṇa leads to brahmadarśana which is a visible result. An action producing an invisible result is performed for once. But the action which is enjoined for producing some visible result, must be performed repeatedly upto the production of the result. As the realization of Brahman is a visible result of śravaṇa etc., so śravaṇa etc. must be practised repeatedly. This is the purport of the extract of Śaṃkara, quoted above. Now, the question is what does this regulation of repetition of śravaṇa etc. indicate? It simply indicates that there is niyamavidhi in śravaṇa.

What will be the problem if niyamavidhi is not accepted in śravaṇa?

The answer is illustrated below:

Suppose, a man is looking at a shiny gem. But he may not notice some distinguishing characteristic or speciality in it. Being directed by a person he can engage himself in seeing the gem again with special care to notice or perceive that special characteristic. In the first case the speciality of the gem was unobtained to the man, but in the second case it became obtained because of the following of the direction. Here he is regulated to have special attention to the gem.

Similarly, a person may know through the culture of his mind,

“ahaṃ jīvaḥ”

(I am the self i.e. selfness is my real nature).

Then by following the injunction ‘svādhyāyo’ dhyetavyaḥ’ which is the base of all vedic injunctions, he comes across the advice,

“ayam ātmā brahma”

(This self is identical with the Brahman.)

Then he may stop his reading of Veda and he may start meditation on his own self which he has known as a conscious entity without any particulars. So, in this case vedāntaśravaṇa becomes optional to that person. He realizes that śravaṇa is not a necessary condition to the brahmajñāna. Through the cultivation of the mental disposition (cittavṛtti) he may attain the brahmajñāna. Only concentration of the mind is necessary.

Because the Veda declares,

“manasaivānudraṣṭavyam”^[2]

(The self or Brahman should be realized only through the mind),

“dṛśyate tvagryayā buddhyā sūkṣmayā sukṣmadarśibhiḥ”^[3]

(The persons of acute discernment can know the self or Brahman only through pure and sharp intelligence.) etc.

For this reason, a striver may engage himself only in manana and nididhyāsana, and he may discard śravaṇa. Here, śravaṇa becomes ‘pākṣika-aprāpta’ (a matter subject to an alternative). To prevent this undesired result, the niyamavidhi is accepted in śravaṇa to make it a necessary means to brahmajñāna.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Brahmasūtra—4.4.1.

[2]:

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad——4.4.5

[3]:

Kaṭhopaniṣad——1.3.12