7. The arrangement Categories in the Nyaya-sutra

The arrangement categories in the Nyaya-Sutra. The Nyaya-sutra treats of sixteen categories which are called padarthas namely, pramana which signifies the means of knowledge. Second is premeya, which refer to the objects of knowledge. The third category samsaya, having rouse a conflicting judgement about the case, the disputat in pursuance of his prayojana (purpose) cites a parallel case called, a familiar instance drstanta, which is not open to such a doubt. The case is then shown to rest on Sidhanta, tenets which are accpted by both the parties. That the case is valid is further shown by an analysis of it into five parts called Avayava or members of Syllogism. Having carried on Tarka, confutation against all contrary suppositions the disputent affirms his case with Nirnaya, cetainity. If his respondent, not being satisfies, with this process by demonstration, advanced and antithesis, he will have to enter upon vada, or discussion which will jalpa, a wrangling and 14

vitanda, failing to establish his antithesis he will employe hetvabhasa or fallacies of reasons. Chala quibble and Jati analogies the exposure of which will bring about his Nigraha stana of defeat. 2 1. Pramana (means of knowledge) Pramana is the means leading to a knowledge-episode (prama) as its end. Perception, inference, comparison, and word (verbal testimony) these are the means of right knowledge. Perception is that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, and which is determinate, unnamable and non erratic. Inference is knowledge which is preceded by perception, and is of three kinds, viz., a priori, a posteriori and commonly seen. Comparison is the knowledge of thing through its similarity to another thing previously, well known word (verbal testimony) is the instructive assertion of a reliable person. 15

It is of two kinds, viz., that which refers to matter which is seen, and that which refers to matter which is not seen. 2. Preeya (The objects of right knowledge). Soul, body, senses, objects of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, transmigration from pain and release are the objects of the right knowledge. Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, and intelligence are the marks of the soul. Body is the site of gesture, senses and sentiments. Nose tongue, eye, skin, and ear are the senses are produced from elements. Earth, water, light, air, and ether - these are the elements. Smell, taste, color, touch, and sound are objects of the senses and qualities of the earth etc, intellect, apprehension and knowledge these are not different from one another. The mark of the mind is that there don't arise (in the soul) more acts of knowledge than one at a time. Activity is that which makes the voice, and body began their action. Faults have the characteristic of causing activity. 16

Transmigration means re-birth. Fruit is the thing produced by activity and faults. Pain has the characteristic of causing uneasiness. Release is the absolute deliverance from pain. 3. Doubt (Samsaya). Doubts, which is a conflicting judgment about the precise character of an object, arises from the recognition of properties common to many objects, or of properties not common to any of the objects, from the conflicting testimony, and from irregularity of perception and non perception. Doubt is of five kinds, according as it arise from, recognition of common properties, recognition of properties not common conflicting testimony, irregularity of perception and irregularity of non- perception. 4. Purpose (prayojana) Purpose in that with an eye to which one proceed to act. An actual doubt, however, cannot by itself necessitate the required inquiry. The inquiry or the philosopher must have, it is 17

believed, some prayojana, purpose, some intended goal in mind. Philosophic inquiry according to this view, does not originate in our idle curiosity, nor is it to be regarded as a purposeless exercise. Some people believe that philosophic inquiry is aimed at the four prescribed goals dharma, artha, kama, moksa. 5. Example (Drstanta). A familiar instance is the thing about which, an ordinary man and an expert entertain the same opinion. Besides doubt and purpose an inquiry must have something to go upon. There must be observed data and other principles which could be used as premises of the argument to follow the Nyaya covers these matters under two technical terms, Drstanta and Siddanta. Drstanta is an object of perception in respect of which the observation of common people and of experts is undoubted. It is a Prameya. It has been separately mentioned on account of its importance. Both inference and revelation rest upon it without it 18

neither inference nor revelation would be possible. The application of Nyaya depends upon it. 6. Tenets (siddanta). A tenet is a dogma resting on the authority of a certain school, hypothesis, or implication. When an object is at last known in the form "such and such exists", it is called a siddanta an established tenet, a conclusion. The tenet is of four kinds wing to the distinction between a dogma of the schools, a dogma peculiar to some school, a hypothetical dogma and implies dogma. A dogma of all the schools is a tenet which is not opposes by any school. A dogmas peculiar to some school is a tenet which is accepted by similar schools, but rejected by opposite schools and ia claimed by at least one school. A hypothetical dogma is a tenet which, if accepted leads to the acceptance of another tenet. An implied dogma is a tenet which 19

is not explicitly declared as such, but which follows from the examination of particulars concerning it. 7. Members of syllogism (Avayava). The members are proposition, reason, example, application, and conclusion. Avayava (members) that is the five beginning with pratijna, are so called with reference to the concatenation of words considered as a whole, while complete the establishment of the object to be established. A philosophical argument as envisioned here is an inference based upon evidence. The full articulation of this inference consists of five steps, each step being a demonstration of different parts of the process by which a conclusion is reached. The steps are - - 1. Proposition - the hill is fiery, 2. Reason - because it is smoky, - 3. Example - whatever is smoky is fiery as a kitchen, 20

4. Application - so is this hill (smoky), 5. Conclusion therefore this hill is fiery. In the schema given above, the first step is called pratijna, where one states what one is going to prove. The second step assigns a reason or ground or evidence adduced and what is so be proved in the case under consideration. The most important step here is however the fourth step, which combines the second and the third to formulate what may be called the full fledged premise of the argument before the conclusion is drawn in the fifth step. 8. Confutation (Tarka) Confutation, which is carried on for ascertaining the real character of a thing of which the character is not known, is reasoning which reveals the character by showing the absurdity of all contrary characters. Which takes the form of a supportive argument but unlike the previous one, it is not directly based 21

upon empirical evidence. The real nature of Tarka (literally 'reasoning' argument) has been the subject matter of controversy among Indian philosophers throughout history. 9. Ascertainment (Nirnaya). Ascertainment in the determination of a question through the removal of doubt by hearing two opposite side. Nirnaya is tattvaguna, knowledge is truth. It is the result of the pramanas, vada (discussion) ends with it. For its maintenance are jalpa and vitanda. Tarka (hypothesis) and Nirnaya (ascertainment) help carry on the world. For this reason Nirnaya though included in the Prameya, has been separately mentioned. 10. Discussion (vada) Discussion is the adoption of one of two opposing sideswhat is adopted is analyzed in the form of five members, and defended by the aid of any of the means of right knowledge, while its opposite is assailed by confutation, without deviation 22

from the established tenets. Vada is discussion in which different speakers take part, each seeking to make good his own hypothesis, and which ends with establishments emphasize its special feature. By the use of it as so defined tattva vijnana, knowledge of truth, is attained. 11. Wrangle (jalpa). Wrangling, which aims at gaining victory, is the defense or attack of a proposition in the manner aforesaid, by quibbles, futilities and other processes which deserve rebuke. Jalpa, vitanda are verities of vada and are employed to keep up the effort in the pursuit of truth. A wrangle is activated by a desire for victory, and not by a desire for the determination of truth. 12. Cavil (vitanda). Cavil is a kind of wrangling which consists in mere attacks on the opposite side. It is said to be characterized by the lack of any attempt to prove the counter thesis. In other words the 23

debater here is engaged simply in the refuted of a position but does not give the opponent chance to attack his own position. 13. Fallacy (hetvabhasa). Fallacies of a reason are the erratic, the contradictory, the equal to the question, the unproved, and the mistimed. The fallacies are faulty reason. All fallacies of the reason, which cannot prove the existence of predicate in the subject. The erratic is the reason which leads to more conclusions than one. The contradictory in the reason which oppose what is be established. Equal to the question is the reason which provokes the very question, for the solution of which it was employed. The unproved is the reason which stands in need of proof, the same way as the proposition does. The mistimed is the reason which adduced when the time is passed in which it might hold well. 24

14. Quibble (chala) Quibble is the opposition by the assumption of an alternative meaning. A quibble (chala) consists in attacking a proposition by assuming another meaning of a word, which is not intended by the speaker. It is of three kinds, viz., quibble in respect of a term. Quibble in respect of genus, and quibble in respect of a metaphor. Quibble in respect of a term consist in willfully taking the term in a sense other than that intended by a speaker who has happened to use it ambiguously. Quibble in respect of a genus consists in asserting the impossibility of thing which is really possible, on the ground that it belongs to a certain genus which is very. Quibble in respect of a metaphor consists in denying the proper meaning of a word by taking it literally while it was used metaphorically and vice versa. 25

15. Futility (Jati) Futility consists in offering objections founded on mere similarity or dissimilarity. Futility is a sophistical refutation of an argument on the ground of mere similarity or dissimilarity without the support invariable concomitance of the reason with the predicate. There are twenty four kinds of futilities; we shall use D for disputant, O for an opponent, S for the subject or minor term. P for the predicate or major term, M for the reason or middle term, E for the example, and E for the counter example. The analogues are as follows: 1 1 Sadharmya-Sama, 2. Vaidharmya-Sama 3. Utkarsa-Sama, 4. Apakarsa-Sama, 5. Varnya-Sama, 6. Avarnya-Sama, 8. Sadya-Sama, 9. PraptiSama, 10. Aprapti-Sama, 11. Prasanga-Sama, 12. PratidrstantaSama, 13. Anutpatti-Sama, 14. Samsaya-sama, 15. PrakaranaSama, 16. Ahetu-Sama, 17. Arthapatti-Sama, 18. Avisesa-Sama, 26

19. Upapatti-Sama, 20. Upalabdhi-Sama, 21. Anupalabdhi-Sama, 22. Anitya-Sama, 23. Nitya-Sama, 24. Karya-Sama. 16. A point of defeat (nigrahastana). An occasion for rebuke arises when one misunderstand, or does not understand at all nigrahastana, are grounds of defeat in a philosophical debate. They are occasions for rebuke due to will misunderstanding or want of understanding. They consists in one's inability to refute an opponents thesis or to establish one own thesis refuted by him. There are twenty two kinds of nigrahastana. 1.pratijna-hani, 2. pratijnantara, 3. Pratijnavirodha, 4. pratijna-sannyasa, 5.hetvantara, 6. Arthantara, 7. nirartaka, 8.avijnatartha, 9. aparthaka, 10. aprapta-kala 11.nyuna, 12. adhika, 13. punarukta, 14. Ananubasa, 15.anjana, 16.apratiba, 17. viksepa, 18.matanujna, 19. paryanuyojyapeksana, 20. Niranuyojyanuyoga, 21. apasidhanta, 22. hetvabhasa. 27