Part 12 - Nyāya view of Pratyakṣa (perception)

According to Naiyayikas, perception denotes a pramāṇa that leads to direct and valid knowledge. They hold that the valid knowledge arises out of the sense-object-contact (indriyārtha-sannikarṣa-utpanna). In other words, sense-object-contact is the specific cause of perception. This specific cause is the distinguishing feature of perception. It distinguishes perception from the other means of valid knowledge like inference etc. Sense-object-contact gives an immediate knowledge of an object. Hence, sense-object-contact is the distinguishing property of perception.

Gautama defines perception as—

indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānaṃ avyapadeśyaṃ avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam.^[1]  

That means that cognition which is produced by the contact of the objects with the sense-organs, which indescribable, which is not erroneous and which is well defined is called perception. Vātsyāyana also says that perception consists in the action of each senseorgan on a particular object.^[2] Uddyotakara takes the literary meaning of perception as that which is related to the senses.^[3] Later Naiyāyikas like Viśvanātha and Annaṃ Bhaṭṭa defines pratyakṣa as the knowledge resulting from sense-object-contact.^[4] Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, the founder of Navya-nyāya school states that perception is the immediate awareness.^[5] Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana points out that the perceptual cognition is the knowledge to which no other knowledge is instrumental.^[6] Keśava Miśra holds the term sākṣātkāra to denote the perceptual knowledge and reserve the term pratyakṣa for the means of perceptual knowledge.^[7]

The definition of perception given by Gautama has been explained threadbare by the subsequent logicians. Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra and later on Jayanta Bhaṭṭa have discussed the different terms involved in the definition at great length. Interpreting the attributes in the definition of perception given by Gautama, Vācaspati Miśra faces a problem. Gautama does not differentiate between pratyakṣa as pramāṇa and as pramiti. But, Vācaspati Miśra differentiates between the source of knowledge (pramāṇ a) and knowledge (pramā). He tried to overcome the difficulty by supplying an additional word yataḥ and thus interpreted the aphorism as: pratyakṣapramāṇa is that form which the knowledge based upon the sense object contact arises.^[8] The commentators of Nyāyasūtra interpreted this definition in different ways. Some of them maintain that—indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānaṃ avyabhicāri pratyakṣaṃ forms the definition and the term avyapadeśyaṃ and vyavasāyātmakaṃ refer to the indeterminate and determinate types of perception.

According to Gautama, pratyakṣa is brought about by the sense-objectcontact. Analyzing this term Vātsyāyana points out that the sense-object-contact is not the only cause of perception. All perception pre-supposes the sense organs, the objects, the manas and the self and their mutual contact. The self comes in contact with the mind, and then the mind with the sense organs and the sense organ with the object and then only perception arises.^[9] Perceptual knowledge is not possible unless the manas comes into contact with the sense organs. But the manas being unconscious can not act unless the self comes into contact with the manas. The manas is thus, the mediator between the self and the sense organ. Vātsyāyana also points out that whereas the self-mind-contact is common to perception, inference etc., and the senseobject-contact is the peculiar characteristic of perception.^[10] Uddyotakara also explains the cause of perception elaborately. According to him also, perception is that knowledge which is brought about by sense-object-contact.^[11]  

He has also explained the term sannikarṣa (contact) involved in the definition and enumerates six kinds of sannikarṣas which are accepted by all the later Naiyāyikas.^[12]

These are: 

1. saṃyoga (conjunction),
2. saṃyukta-samavāya (inherence in what is conjoined), 
3. saṃyuktasamaveta-samavāya (inherence in what inheres in what conjoined),
4. samavāya (inherence),
5. samaveta-samavāya (inherence in what inheres) and
6. viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇatā (the relation of qualification and qualified).

Vācaspati Miśra first of all justifies the term sannikarṣa found in the definition. He says that the Sūtrakāra has included the term sannikarṣa instead of saṃyoga or samavāya in order to include all types of relation. If saṃyoga had been included samavāya would have been precluded, and similarly in the case of adoption of samavāya, saṃyoga would have been excluded. Vācaspati also points out that the term artha (object) is also quite purposeful.^[13] By the term artha the Sūtrakāra means that the object of perception should be knowable in their nature. In case of paramāṇu (atom) and ākāśa (ether) though saṃyoga etc, is possible, they are not knowable as such and hence are not perceptible.^[14] Regarding the term utpanna, Vācaspati Miśra is of the view that it is indicative of the fact that the contact of sense with the object is instrumental is bringing about perceptual knowledge.^[15] As such that which is conjoined with a conjunction is not perceptible. Otherwise a cloth etc which is behind a wall but is conjoined with the eye will be perceived.^[16] Vācaspati Miśra then proceeds to explain the different types of sannikarṣa involved in perception. He also provided us example of these sannikarṣas.

In Gautama’s definition of perception, the last three attributes viz., avyapadeśyaṃ (which is indescribable), avyabhicāri (which is not contradicted) and vyavasāyātmakaṃ (which is definite) receive a lot of attention from the commentators. The term avyapadeśyaṃ means that knowledge which is unnameable. The commentators like Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra have discussed the meaning of this attribute elaborately. Vātsyāyana explained it as nonexpressible in words and pleads for its justified inclusion in the definition. He holds that every knowledge of an object arising from the sense object contact is qualified by words denoting the qualities like colour, taste etc. Hence, as these cognitions are denoted by such words, they may be taken as produced by verbal testimony. In order to refute that possibility, the attribute avyapadeśa has been added to qualify perceptual knowledge. Vātsyāyana attempted to differentiate perception from verbal testimony by maintaining that the perceived things become nameable only at the time of its being spoken of or communicated to other persons. The Bhāṣyakāra established that the apprehension of objects produced by the contact of the sense organs with them is not verbal.^[17] Uddyotakara also adopts the term avyapadeśyaṃ for unnameable but he has left it unexplained.

According to Vācaspati Miśra, the part of Gautama’s aphorism, viz., indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānaṃ avyabhicāri meaning the uncontradicted cognition produced by the sense-object-contact is the definition of perception^[18] and the other parts viz., avyapadeśya and vyavasāyātmaka indicates two types of perception as nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) and savikalpaka (determinate). The term avyabhicāri (non-erroneous) is the definition of perception which means the uncontradicted knowledge produced by sense-object-contact. Vātsyāyana states that the term avyabhicāra has been included in the sūtra to exclude erroneous perception from the domain of perception. Uddyotakara takes the term avyabhicāra in the same sense in which the Bhāṣyakāra takes it.^[19] Vācaspati has given three alternative justifications for the inclusion of the term avyabhicāra in the Gautama’s Sūtra. According to Vācaspati Miśra, the erroneous cognitions are excluded from the domain of perception on the basis of the general characteristics. However, epithet avyabhicāri is mentioned to assign an authoritative sanction to it.^[20] Moreover, it is essential for other means of knowledge like anumāna etc. also that they should be non-erroneous. Pratyakṣa being the basis of other forms of knowledge, the term avybhicāri is included to establish the fact that perception by nature must be non-erroneous. The qualification avyabhicāri is necessary in the case of perception because of the non-erroneous nature of perception to the cause of non-erroneousness of other forms of knowledge.^[21]

According to Vātsyāyana, the term vyavasāyātmaka in the definition is given in order to exclude doubtful apprehension from the scope of perception. When a man sees something arising from the earth from a distance, he has a doubtful cognition in the form ‘is the smoke or is this dust?’ Here, the cognition arises from the contact of the sense-organ with the object. Hence, this may also be deemed as pratyakṣa. In order to safeguard against this view the term vyavasāyātmaka is given in the definition. It can not be said that doubtful apprehension is produced only by the contact of soul with mind and not by the sense-object-contact. Uddyotakara says that both the ‘mind-soul-contact’ and the ‘sense-object-contact’ can be regarded equally responsible for producing a doubtful apprehension. He opines that the mind is distinct from other sense organs. He states that the difference of the mind and the sense organs does not depend upon their being non-material or material since the mind in fact, is neither material nor non-material.^[22]

Vācaspati Miśra contradicts this view. In this view, the doubtful cognition is already excluded by the qualification ‘non-erroneous’ and therefore, we should regard the term vyavasāyātmaka to suggest that it includes savikalpaka (determinate) type of perception. Vācaspati holds that the Bhāṣyakāra and the Vārtikakāra have not mentioned it since this interpretation, being very simple, does not need any explanation.^[23]

Actually, however, according to the explanation of Vātsysāyana and Uddyotakara, the definition of pratyakṣa can not include savikalpaka pratykṣa. The definition would be applicable to nirvikalpaka perception only. And in that case, the definition of perception will uphold the view of the Bauddhas only. To avoid this Vācaspati has categorically said that by the term vyavasāyātmaka Gautama has included savikalpaka perception. The credit goes to Vācaspati to argue in favour of perception. But, Vācaspati gives the credit to his guru Trilochana by whose in thence he has explained it thus. Thus, things being inseparable from their names, the perception of things must always involve the perception of the name also. Hence, there can not be perception devoid of verbal expression.^[24]

An objection is raised regarding the definition of perception of Gautama. It is stated by the opponents that perception of an object composed of parts, like a tree, is nothing but an inference. For in that case, perception of the tree follows from the contact of the sense organ with a part of a tree. Hence, it is a case of cognition resulting from the cognition of the parts, just like an inference where the condition of fire follows from the cognition of smoke. Vācaspati Miśra makes a very important observation in this case. He mentions that there is no question of considering pratyakṣa as an anumāna at all. It is said that the object like tree cognized through perception may give rise to the proposition that pratyakṣa is anumāna is nullified by the hetu in the form of ekadeśagrahaṇānupalabdhi. Certainly, perception and inference are different because perception brought about by the contact of the sense organ with the object and inference does not proceed from any such contact of the sense organ with the object. From this reason, he concludes that perception can not be regarded as inference.

In this way, we find that Vācaspati Miśra has given the definition of pratyakṣa forwarded by Gautama to a final shape by refuting the opponents’ charges. Vācaspati’s explanation has paved the way for the Naiyāyikas to refute every objection raised against the nature of pratyakṣa.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.4

[2]:

indriyasyārthena sannikarṣādutpadyate yaj jñānaṃ tat pratyakṣaṃ. Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.4

[3]:

indriyenārthasysannikarṣād jadutpadyate jñānaṃ tat pratyakṣamiti. Nyāyavārtika, p. 28

[4]:

indriyajanyaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ. Bhāṣāapariccheda, p. 121

[5]:

pratyakṣasya sākṣātkāritvaṃ lakṣaṇam. Tattvacintāmaṇi, p. 249

[6]:

jñānakaraṇaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ. Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 122

[7]:

sākṣātkāri pramākaraṇaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ. Tarkabhāṣā, p. 5

[8]:

Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, p. 108

[9]:

ātmā mānasā yujyate mana indriyeṇa indriyamartheneti. Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.4

[10]:

yat pratyakṣajñānasya viśiṣṭakāraṇaṃ taducyate. Ibid.

[11]:

indriyenārthasyasannikarṣād jadutpadyate jñānaṃ tat pratyakṣamiti. Nyāyavārtika, p. 28

[12]:

sannikarṣaḥ puṇaḥ ṣoḍhā bhidyate, saṃyogaḥ saṃyukta samavāyaḥ saṃyuktasamavetasamavāyaḥ samavāyaḥ samavetasamavāyo viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaśceti. Ibid, pp.28-29

[13]:

saṃyogapadopādāne hi na samavāyo labhyate samavāyapadopādāne vā na saṃyogaḥ. sannikarṣapadopādānetvabhimatalābhaḥ. Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, p.109

[14]:

arthagrahaṇenārthyamānatayā jñeyasvarūpayogyatā darśitā, na cāsāvaṇvākāśādīnāmastīti satyapi saṃyogādau nāsāvarthasannikarṣa iti tadvyudāsaḥ. Ibid.

[15]:

utpannagrahaṇena ca sannikarṣasyotpādakatvaṃ sūcitaṃ. Ibid.

[16]:

anyathā kuḍyādisaṃyuktenendriyeṇa kuḍyādivyavahitasya tatsaṃyuktasya paṭādeḥ tatsamavetasya ca rūpāderapi grahaṇaprasaṃgaḥ. Ibid.

[17]:

nāmadheyaśabdena vyapadiśyamānaṃ sat śabdaṃ prasajyate, ata āha avyapadeśyamiti. Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.4

[18]:

Cf. pratyakṣasya rūpamādarśayitumavyabhicāripadopādānam. Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, p.131

[19]:

Cf. Nyāyavārtika, p. 34

[20]:

siddhe satyārambho niyamārthaḥ. Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, p. 131

[21]:

atha vā pratyakṣāvyabhicāra evānumānādyavyabhicāre kāraṇam. Ibid.

[22]:

kāryadharmāvetau bhautikatvamabhautikatvaṃ ca. na ca kāryaṃ manaḥ, tasmānna bhautikaṃ nāpyabhautikamiti. Nyāyavārtika, p. 36

[23]:

vyavasāyātmaka padaṃ sākṣātvikalpakasya vācakaṃ………….sa evātmā rūpaṃ yasya tatsavikalpakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ…………..eveti bhāṣyavārtikakārābhyāmavyākhyātam. Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, p.133

[24]:

Cf. Ranganath, S., Contibution of Vācaspati Miśra to Indian Philosophy, p. 17