The “Space in Pots” Analogy

The third chapter of the Māṇḍūkyakārikā is known as Advaita Prakaraṇa. It contains 48 kārikās. According to Gauḍapāda the ultimate truth is Advaita or ‘non-duality’. The word ‘Advaita’ means the non-dual. The ultimate knowledge beyond which there is nothing more to know is the knowledge of the Self, the only Reality of Advaita Vedānta. The central theme of this prakaraṇa is to establish the non-dual nature of the Self. Non-duality does not fall within enumerative numbers such as one or two, for the notion of one can imply the possibility of a second. The enumerative numbers are relative for as mentioned above they imply other numbers, but when we talk of the truth as non -dual we clearly steer ourselves away from this relative understanding. In this chapter, Gauḍapāda provides arguments for the truth conceptualized by the Advaitins as non-duality, and also the central Gauḍapādian doctrine of ajātivāda that this non-dual Self is never ever born. The author proficiently uses the scriptural texts to support his doctrine. This doctrine of ajātivāda culminates in the discipline of asparśayoga and this is also analysed in this chapter.

The commentator Śaṅkara, raises a question as to whether it is possible to understand the notion of non-duality from claims of the scriptural statements or using tarka/ reasoning. He concludes that the latter is possible and that this prakaraṇa aims at establishing the truth of non-duality by means of reasoning. In the introduction to this chapter Śankara says: The Āgama Prakaraṇa mainly deals with the determination of the meaning of aumkāra. While explaining the meaning of the word aum, it was stated as a mere proposition that “ātman is the cessation of the phenomenal duality, blissful, and ever one without a second”. It is also further stated that “when ātman is known, duality does not exist” (1-18). In the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa, duality has been shown to be mere illusion, using the illustrations of dream, illusion, castle-in-the air etc., one can see the distinct trend of using unique reasoning based on grounds such as ‘the duality is perceived (dṛśya)’, ‘the being finite’ and the like which has already been elaborated in the previous chapter. In this context as mentioned above if some one were to ask as to whether non-duality (advaita) can be established only by the scriptures (Śruti) or it is possible to establish it by reasoning as well,Śaṅkara affirms that the truth of non-duality can be known through reasoning as well. It is for this purpose that the chapter on non-duality (Advaita Prakaraṇa) is being commenced. The Vaitathya Prakaraṇa (chapter on illusion) ended with a stunning conclusion that all differences whatsoever implied in acts of devotion are mere illusion and the only reality is the non-dual Self^[1].

Gauḍapāda begins the kārikā 1 of the Advaita Prakaraṇa with a term upasanā i.e. relation between the upāsaka and upāsya. He says that: ‘the jīva betaking itself to devotion (upāsanā) thinks itself to be related to the Brahman that is supposed to have manifested Himself. He is said to be of narrow intellect because he thinks that before creation all was of the nature of the unborn (Reality)’^[2]. He imagines that before creation he was one with the unborn non-dual Brahman. But after his death; by virtue of devotion, he will attain liberation by again re-merging in that unborn Brahman. Such a seeker (sādhaka) has erroneous knowledge and therefore he is regarded as pitiable and of narrow intellect (kṛpanah smṛtah) by the Knowers of Brahman.

Śaṅkara in his commentary on this kārikā explains that: The jīva resorts to worship because he believes that devotion will liberate him from rebirth. Such a seeker (or jīva) ever draws a line between himself and the Brahman he worships. He believes himself living in the born, the conditioned Brahman. He also believes that devotion to the conditioned Brahman will enable him to attain to the unborn Brahman after death. For him, all this world was the unborn Brahman before creation and so was he. Even though now he is living in the manifested embodied Brahman (saguṇa Brahman or personal God), he will, through devotion, attain to what he was before creation. For this reason he (the jīva) is an inferior knower of Brahman. Those who see the eternal and unborn Brahman in every state, be it of creation or of non-creation, consider such a man a miserable, small being (kṣūdrabrahmavit). This is corroborated by Śruti passage such as the Upaniṣad of the Talavakāra Śākhā of Sāmaveda (Kena Upaniṣad) which says: “That which is not expressed through speech but that by which speech is expressed; that, verily, know thou, is Brahman, not what (people) here adore” (1.5)^[3].

The occurrence of the term dharma in this kārikā has been interpreted by scholars differently. Bhattacharya takes dharma to mean ‘duty’. Śaṅkara takes dharma to signify a worshipper (upāsaka/sādhaka). Karmarkar agrees with Śaṅkara’s view^[4]. He says that Brahman is unborn (aja) and advaita (non-dual). The existence of the ‘one to be worshipped’ and the jīva ‘worshipper’ (upāsya-upāsakabhāva) are possible only when duality (dvaita) is produced. The jīva who believes in upāsanā as a means of reaching Brahman, (even though he is really Brahman) has surely an intelligence only to be pitied.

This kārikā is the refutation of the Upaniṣadic usage of ‘aja’, thereby implying that Brahman was ‘unborn’ only in that original ‘time’ before He decided to create or project the universe out of Himself. However, the central teaching of Gauḍapāda, is that no creation has ever actually taken place. The ‘aja’ or unborn Brahman is not of some pre-cosmic ‘time’, but is always present.

Gauḍapāda continues in kārikā 2: “Therefore I shall now describe that (Brahman) which is free from limitations, unborn and which is the same throughout; and from this, one understands that it is not, (in reality) born though it appears to be manifested everywhere”.

Śaṅkara in his commentary explains these two opening kārīkās as: A jīva who is unable to realize ātman as ever unborn and present within and without, and therefore believing it to be limited by ignorance (avidyā), thinks “I am born”; “I subsist because Brahman/ātman has evolved me out of itself”; “I shall become Brahman by devotion to it”. He considers himself as miserable (or pitiable). For this reason, Gauḍapāda begins to describe Brahman who is of the nature of non-miserable (akārpaṇya). The Śruti texts describe the following as being of the nature of miserable. “Where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else, that is the small (the finite), the finite is the same as mortal” (Chāndogya Upaniṣad VII.24.1)^[5]; “The modification being only a name arising from speech” (Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.1.4)^[6] etc. Brahman is just of the opposite nature. It is called Bhūmā, the great and infinite. When one realises this unborn Brahman, all limitations (i.e. kārpanya) caused by ignorance disappear.

Again, the source of the unconditioned infinite is not known and it is therefore called the ever unborn. It is always same everywhere, because in it there is no inequality caused by the presence of parts. Only a thing with parts can have disturbance in its parts and is then said to be born. But this (Brahman) is without parts and is always the same. No parts come to integrate, to manifest it. It is thus ajāti and akārpaṇya. Gauḍapāda clearly makes his point by saying that, now listen to how nothing, not even the smallest of things, is ever born anywhere even when it might appear to be born. That seeming birth is not real birth. It is a mere appearance conjured up by ignorance (avidyā) that makes reality appear something other than itself. This is like the rope appearing as snake. Things that seem to be born ever remain the birthless (or unborn) Brahman itself in every respect.

According to Bhattacharya the sameness (samatāṃ gata, samatā, sāmya) of things is owing to their common quality of non-origination (ajāti). He points out that the term ‘ajāti’ is used synonymously in Buddhist works for ‘anutpāda’ and he cites an example from the Madhyamakavṛtti (paramārthataḥ sarva dharmānutpādasamatayāparmārthataḥ sarvadharmātyantājātisamatayā) in which the term samatā or sameness is linked with the term ajāti like in this kārikā of Gauḍapāda^[7].

Gauḍapāda in kārikā 1 mentions about the wrong understanding as to the origination (jāti) of Brahman. In kārikā 2 he promises to explain the non-origination (ajāti) of Brahman. He proceeds to do so in the following kārikā by establishing the real sense of origination and non-origination.

Gauḍapāda in the following kārikās (3-9) proceeds to show the meaning of origination. Using the “space in pots” analogy, Gauḍapāda says that Brahman never really become a jīva, an individual soul, but Brahman is said to be the jīva from the standpoint of the conditioning provided by the limiting adjuncts (upādhi) of the bodymind complex. His analogy of space and something which seems to delimit space, such as a pot, has been frequently used by Advaitins. He first presents the analogy and then draws forth its implications. He says that the ātman, the Self is like ākāśa, space; it gives rise to jīva, (embodied individual souls) in the same manner as mahākāśa, (great space) gives rise to ghatākāśa (space enclosed in the jar). The ātman further rises in the form of aggregates (body, sense-organs etc.) as jars etc., are produced from ākāśa. This is the illustration for explaining the origination of jīvas from ātman.

According to Gauḍapāda the relation between the ātman in respect of jīvas and their bodies is like that of ākāśa with ghatākāśa etc., and ghata etc. Śaṅkara in his commentary says that the Paramātman, the Supreme Self, is described as space like (ākāśa), is really subtle (sukş ma), non-composite (nirāvaya) and all-pervasive. That very ātman is said to be born in the form of living beings, knowers of the field, in the form of beings burdened with object-tied consciousness. These beings rise up from the ātman as jar-spaces (ghatākāśa), spaces confined with jars, rise up from space. The ātman is compared to space (ether) because the living beings compared to jar space.

The interpretation of this analogy could be this: The ātman is born into living beings as space is ‘born’ into jar spaces. The implication is that the origination of the world that the Upaniṣads talk about is like the origination of jar-spaces from the universal space, an origination that is not real origination. It is evident from the kārikā that the origination in both of the cases is not real but imaginary. The ātman seems to produce external composites like earth and also those that constitute the individual being, namely, the body, the senses and the like. They originate from the ātman as jars-space originates from space. This is only in appearance, not in reality as a snake may be said to originate from a rope. When the Śruti with a view to enlighten the ignorant, speaks of the origination of the jīvas from the ātman, the origination should be understood only in the manner of the origination of jars and jar-spaces from ākāśa, i.e., mahakāśā.

The real import of this kārikā is that the ātman (the Self) does not undergo a process of change to appear as the embodied selves (jīva), any more than space undergoes change to become the space limited by a physical form such as a jar (pot) etc. The jīva is not something other than the Self itself, just as the space in the jar is not other than space itself. The word “jīva”, “as though/seems” in this kārikā indicates that the entire manifestation (or creation), being admitted as a fact, is from the standpoint of ignorance (avidyā). The jar-space, however, is differentiated from unconditioned space when it is considered from the standpoint of the jar. In the same manner, the individual jīva is brought about by the body-mind complex. According to Gauḍapāda’s illustration, the jar, the pot is the upādhi; it is the limiting adjunct which seems to create the individuality of a jar-space. In the same way, the body-mind complex is the limiting adjunct which seems to give rise to an individual soul. Gauḍapāda also pointed out here that the Self not only appears as the individual soul, but the Self also appears as the entire aggregate of material entities as well i.e. the body-mind complex (ghatādivat-ca saṅghātaiḥ).

Gauḍapāda, now, infers a number of conclusions by using this analogy. In kārikā 4 he says, ‘As on the destruction of the pot etc., the ether enclosed in the pot etc., merges in the akāśa (the great expanse of ether), similarly the jīvas merge in the ‘atman’^[8] . He says that just as the individual pot-space merges into universal space when the pot is destroyed, so too the individual jīvas resolve into the Self upon the destruction of the limiting adjuncts (upādhis). The origination and destruction affect the limiting adjuncts only. The creation of ether enclosed within the pot etc. is due to the creation of pot etc.; when pot etc. disappears, the pot-space etc. disappears. In the same manner the origination of jīva (jīva -utpatti) is due to the origination of the aggregate of bodies etc.. When the aggregate of bodies disappear, jīva also disappears, being merged in the ātman. The disappearance of “individuality” is therefore not the destruction of what is intrinsically real but it is the cessation of something produced by the upādhi.

Gauḍapāda in kārikā 5 uses the illustration to account for the variety of individual experiences, given the teaching that there is just one Self in all bodies. He says: ‘As any portion of ākāśa enclosed in a pot being soiled by dust, smoke, etc., all such other portions of ākāśa enclosed in other pots are not soiled, so is the happiness etc., of the jīvas, i.e., the happiness, misery, etc., of one jīva do not affect other jīvas’.

This kārikā meets an objection from the dualists, especially the followers of the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy. Śaṅkara in his commentary of this kārikā examined and refuted some of the pluralistic views. The dualists contention is that if one ātman abides in all creatures (bodies) then the birth, death, happiness etc. of one creature will mean the simultaneous birth, death, happiness of other creatures. Moreover, what one does, others too will be responsible for it and what one man reaps by way of reward or punishment for his acts will have to be reaped by others too.

To this objection Śaṅkara replies that, when there is one jar space (ghatākāśa) soiled (or associated) with dust, smoke etc., we do not find all jars or jar space covered with smoke, dust etc, because the smoke/dust is concerned with one particular limiting adjunct (upādhi). In the same way the happiness, misery etc, of one individual soul does not affect other individual souls (jīvas).

To this reply of Śaṅkara the objector says:

“Is not the Self (ātman) one for the advaitin? If there be only one Self, will it not be either happy or miserable always and everywhere”?

In reply to this objection Śaṅkara says that, this objection cannot be raised by the Sāṅkhyas. The reason is that the Sāṅkhyas do not admit/agree that the Self can experience happiness and misery, other feelings and thoughts. According to them happiness and misery etc. are inseparably associated with (or inhere) with the intellect (buddhi) which is an evolute of prakṛti. And since they consider the Self or Puruṣa to be of the nature of Consciousness or Awareness, it is not proper to assume difference therein.

It may be stated by the Sāṅkhya that if there be no plurality of puruṣas, prakṛti’s nature of being for the sake of another puruṣas (pārāthya) would be contradicted. According to Sāṅkhya, Pradhāna/Prakṛti (Primordial Nature) evolves into the universe not for its own sake, but for the sake of providing enjoyment (bhoga) to the puruṣas and ultimately to liberate them. This view also has no leg to stand on. For what is accomplished by Prakṛti, viz. enjoyment or release, cannot inhere in the Self.

Even according to the Sāṅkhya, the puruṣa is attributeless and Pure Consciousness. The bondage and freedom do not belong to the Self (Puruṣa). Hence the theory that the prakṛti acts for others, derives its validity from the mere presence of the Self, and not from its multiplicity. Nor is there any other logical ground in which the Sāṅkhya could account for the plurality of puruṣas. Prakṛti is itself bound and is itself released; the proximity of the Puruṣa is only the occasioning cause. The postulation of a plurality of selves serves no purpose whatever.There is no pramāṇa for this.

Now Śaṅkara refutes the Vaiśeṣika's view of the nature of Self. The Vaiśeṣikas (and others) believe that the Self is a substance (dravya) having as its distinctive qualities (viśeṣa-guṇas) cognition (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (duhkha) desire (icchā), aversion (dveṣa), effort (prayatna), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma) and residual impression (śaṃskāra). According to Vaiśeṣikas, these qualities, inhere in the Self. Since the qualities are found to be of different grades in the various individuals, they presume that the Self in each body is different. According to them, there must be many selves (ātmans), otherwise the different arrangement of these attributes in one ātman/ Self cannot be explained.

Śaṅkara would like to ask the Vaiśeṣikas that do these attributes (guṇas) intellect etc. pervade the whole of the ātman (or the entire Self), like rupa (color, form) etc. are pervasive of substances in which they inhere, or do they remain in a part only, like conjunction (saṃyoga), etc.? The first alternative is not possible, for if the attributes like knowledge are pervasive of the Self and the Self is (Vibhu) all pervasive in the Vaiśeṣika system, there is the simultaneous perception of all things. In order words without any successive stages one can experience the knowledge and all other attributes. If the second alternative, viz., that the attributes inhere in a part of the Self, be considered, Śaṅkara says, it should be stated whether the parts distinguished in the Self are real or unreal (or illusory)? If the part of the ātman/ Self is real then ātman would be a product like the jar (pot) which is also a part, an effect and therefore anātman. This view is not acceptable even to the Vaiśeṣikas. If the parts are adventitious (unreal) then cognition, etc., as attributes would belong only to the parts and cannot be the attributes of the Self.

The Vaiśeṣikas believe that memory (smṛti) has its origin in the contact of the mind with ātman. But if this view is accepted then the rule that at the time when we directly perceive an object, its memory is not possible would be violated. It could be possible that the memory (smṛti) is generated by the same conjunction (saṃyoga) which is the cause of cognition. If the Vaiśeṣikas were to say that all impressions (saṃskāras) do not arise (udbuddha) at the same time and therefore all memories will not arise simultaneously, the Vedāntin replies that there is no unanimity of the opinion that saṃskāra and its arising (udbuddha) are both located in the Self. Therefore the impressions cannot be included in the apparatus by which memory arises and this being the case, all memories will arise simultaneously if the Vaiśesika’s view is accepted.

Further, the view that the non-inherence cause of cognition, etc., is the conjunction between the Self and mind. But this conjunction itself is unintelligible. Conjunction is possible between things which belong to the same class and which possess such qualities like touch etc. The Vaiśeṣika may try to reply that, just as quality (guṇa) etc., are related to substance (dravya) even though there is no sense of touch, there is no parity of class-nature, so also the Self and mind may well be related.

According to Advaita Vedānta, what is signified by the word ‘substance’ is the independent pure sat (being). There is nothing like quality, etc. They maintain that the substance alone in this sense appears in different forms. If, without accepting this position, one were to say that quality, etc., are absolutely different from substance, and so also desire, etc. from the Self, then, as between what are absolutely different and therefore independent, no relation is possible. It may be said that, as between what are inseparable (ayutasiddha) the relation of inherence (samavāya) is possible.

But how could there be inseparability as between desire, etc, which are non-eternal and the Self which is eternal? If desire, etc, were inseparable from the Self, then, they would eternally reside in the Self and there would be no release. This consequence is not acceptable even to the Vaiśeṣikas.

According to Śaṅkara the very concept of inherence (samavāya) is unintelligible. Is inherence identical with the substance or different there from? If identical, there would be left no relation to relate. If different, there must be another relation to relate, inherence to the substance, and this would lead to infinite regress. Moreover, the Vaiśeṣika hold that inherence is an eternal relation (nitya-saṃbandha). If that be so, the relata which are related by way of inherence would be eternally related, and at no time and in no space would they be separate. This, again, is not a welcoming view.

Thus, since the relation of inherence itself is not established, it is not reasonable to say that in the Self the qualities of desire, cognition etc, reside through the relation of inherence. Desire, etc., come into being and perish. If such perishable attributes are attributed to the Self, there is the contingence of the Self being non-eternal. Again, it would also have to say that the Self is a whole-of-parts and subject to mutation. Hence, the Advaitin rejects the views of the pluralists and maintain that qualities and changes do not in reality belong to the Self. These are appearances due to ignorance (avidyā).

In kārikā 6 we find a further critical explanation offered to the Vaiśeṣika’s notion of Self seen in the earlier kārikā.

Again there is expression of the relation between relative and absolute perspectives and the sense that the relative truth of plurality has some sort of ontological status.

“Forms, functions and names differ here and there but there is no difference of space (rūpa-kārya -samākhyāca bhidyante tatratatra viaākaśasya na bhedo sti). The same is the conclusion with regard to individual jīvas”^[9].

The objector says: If one and the same ātman is in all bodies how is it that worldly experiences appear to justify a multiplicity of ātman which is explained as due to ignorance (avidyā)?

Śankara in his commentary replies to this objection as: Form, functions (or purpose), and name vary in accordance with the limiting conditions. We make a difference, for example, between a jar (pot) and water bowl. They serve different ends, and the space in them is called differently as ākāśa enclosed in a jar (ghatākāśa) and ākāśa enclosed in a water bowl, (karakākāśa) etc.. But, in truth, there is no difference in space (ether). ākāśa is one. The ākāśabheda is due to the upādhibheda. Similar is the case with the Self/ ātman. The ātman appears as various jīvas on account of the different conditions of the bodies (dehopādhis) which are comparable to ether in jar (ghatākāśa) etc. According to Śaṅkara this is the conclusion arrived at by the wise.

Gauḍapāda seems to be addressing the points for the plurality of puruṣas advocated by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in his text Sāṅkhya-Kārikā. Multiplicity of puruṣas has been established because of individual allotment of birth, death and instruments of action and cognition, because of non-simultaneity of activities; because of the diverse modification due to three guṇas^[10].

According to this kārikā (Sāṅkhyakārikā:18), the differences in the individual birth, death and organs of action etc. prove the differences of the puruṣas. Further the kārikā states that because actions performed by individual that are not simultaneous.They are different. Each individual has a gradation in the guṇas too. This also proves that individuals are varied and many. Gauḍapāda counters (in kārikās 3-10) the Sāṅkhya theory of multiple selves.

By using the analogy of the undivided ether and the ether enclosed in a pot, Gauḍapāda in kārikā 7 asserts that the individual jīvas are not to be considered as neither the modification nor is it a divided part of the ultimate Brahman. He negates the idea that the individual jīvas could be considered as a part of Brahman, or as a modification of Brahman. He says: ‘As the Ghatākāśa (i.e. the ether portioned of by the pot) is neither the (evolved) effect nor part of the ākāśa (ether), so is the jīva (the embodied being) neither the effect nor part of the ātman’.

It may be argued that the variety of forms, functions etc., such as the space enclosed in the jar (ghatākāśa) etc. is in itself, real. According to Śaṅkara the differences, ghatākāśa, matākāśa etc. cannot be real. The reason is that the ghatākāśa is not a modification or actual transformation (parināma)^[11] of the real ākāśa (mahākāśa) in the way in which the gold ornaments are the transformations of gold or the foam, bubbles and ice are the transformations of water. Again the ākāśa enclosed in the jar is not similar to the branches etc., being parts of a tree. Just as ghatākāśa is not a transformation or part of mahākāśa, similarly the jīva, comparable to the ākāśa enclosed in the jar (ghatākāśa) is neither the transformation nor part (vikāravayavau) of the ātman, the Ultimate Reality, which may be comparable to mahākāśa. For this reason, Śaṅkara concludes that the empirical usages based upon the multiplicity of ātman is illusory.

According to Gauḍapāda there is no jīva as such. He makes the point that the ātman is ever pure and non-dual at all times. In kārikā 8 he says: ‘as the ether appears to the ignorant children to be soiled by dirt, similarly, the ātman also is regarded by the ignorant as soiled.

Śaṅkara explains that, as the practice of attributing form, functions and name (ākāśa)^[12] is due to different conceptions of ghatākāśa etc., similarly the experience of birth, death etc., and consequently the misery, action and their rewards and impurities are attributed to ātman on account of the different limitations (upādhis) of bodies only. They are not really associated with the ātman. They are caused by avidyā (ignorance). These experiences do not touch to the all-pervasive ātman.

Śaṅkara gives an illustration to establish the meaning of this kārikā. A thirsty animal, owing to ignorance, sees in the desert water with foam, waves etc. Similarly, embodied being owing to desire, see in the non-dual pure ātman, attachment, passion and other blemishes. As the illusory water of the mirage cannot wet a single grain of sand, so all the blemishes falsely attributed to ātman cannot make it lose its purity even in the smallest measure.

In kārikā 9 Gauḍapāda sums up the above mentioned illustration. He says: ‘ātman, in regard to its birth, death, going and coming (i.e., transmigration) and its existing in different bodies, is not dissimilar to the ākāśa (i.e. that Ghatākāśa or the ether portioned off by a jar)’. The ātman undergoes no change (avilakṣaṇa), remaining the same always like ākāśa. The ātman is said to exist in all bodies like the space within jars: stithaḥ^[13] sarvaśarīreṣuākāśenāvilakṣanaḥ. This reference to bodies as containers of ātman is strictly from the standpoint of relative truth.

According to Śaṅkara the ākāśa does not really arise, dissolve, move etc., and its origination and so forth are only with reference to the limiting adjuncts (like ghatākāśa). The ākāśa enclosed in a jar is said to be created when the jar is made, and destroyed when the jar is broken; just as the undifferentiated mahākāśa is free from creation and destruction. The ākāśa appears as divided into ghatākāśa, karakākāśa, mahākāśa etc. Similarly, the apparent birth, death, motion etc., of ātman, as seen in all jīvas, is due to limiting adjuncts.

In kārikā 10 Gaudapāda says: ‘All aggregates (such as body, etc..) are produced by the illusion of the ātman (i.e., the perceiver) as in a dream. No rational arguments can be adduced to establish their reality, whether they be equal or superior (to one another)’.

Śaṅkara in his commentary on this kārikā states that the aggregates of body etc. has its analogue in the jar etc.. Both have assemblages of parts. The aggregates of physical body are just like objects in a dream. All bodies are products of ignorance. They are like the body created by an illusionist (magician). They are like dream bodies and are not real. They are all adjuncts. These aggregates appear to have been created by the power of illusion in ātman. This power of ātman is called avidyā (ignorance) which is in the perceiver. In other words, from the standpoint of Ultimate Reality these bodies do not exist.

In order to establish their (physical bodies) reality one may argue that there are some bodies which may be superior, such as those of the gods and goddesses. Some of them such as those of birds, animals and beasts may be inferior. The bodies of all created beings are of equal status. But no rational argument can be given regarding their creation or reality. According to both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara the very idea of creation, or coming into existence, is the result of ignorance and cannot be real.

Gauḍapāda in kārikā 11 refers to the teaching of the five sheaths (kośas) in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (adhyāya II, 1-5). He says that ‘the Supreme jīva (i.e., the nondual Brahman) is the Self of the (five) sheaths, such as the physical etc., which have been explained in the Taittirīyaka Upaniṣad. That the Supreme jīva is like the ākāśa has already been described by us (in the third verse of this chapter)’.

In the Taittirīya Upaniṣad the various essences in the body have been described as sheaths. These sheaths are namely, the gross physical sheath, or the sheath of the essence of food (annamayakośa), the vital sheath (prāṇamayakośa), the sheath of mind (the manomayakośa), the sheath of intellect (the vijñanamayakośa) and the sheath of bliss (the ānandamayakośa). Śaṅkara says that, they are called sheaths because, like the sheath of a sword, they conceal ātman/ Self, which is their innermost essence. As the sheath is external to the sword, so also kośas are external to the ātman which is the Self of these sheaths (kośas). These five sheaths (rasādayaḥ) are one within the another, the gross physical sheath being the outermost, and the sheath of bliss, the innermost.

The Supreme jīva is called the living being because that alone is the source of life of each and every being. This Supreme Self has been described by the same Upaniṣad (Taittirīya 2.1) “as the real, as knowledge and as the infinite”^[14].The aggregates of the body (saṅghātas), consisting of the five sheaths (rasa etc.), appears to be created from ātman through the power of māyā like the illusory creation of objects seen in a dream or those conjured up by magic. This Self has already been described (Gauḍapādakārikā 3:3) as “The ātman is verily like ākāśa” (ātmāhyākāśa vat). According to Śaṅkara this Self cannot be known by the reasoning of a man who follows the logician’s method of argument for establishing the ātman. The meaning is that the ātman as expounded by Śruti is different from the ātman of the logicians.

According to the logicians the Self is a dravya and is inferred from its guṇas. In Vedānta the Self is neither a dravya nor it possesses any guṇa or action. Hence it is not available to perception based inference. Ātman can be known from the scriptures, arguments based on scripture and one's own experience.

Gauḍapāda in kārikā 12 refers to the Madhu-vidyā(Madhu jñāna) section of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (II.5). He says that the Supreme (para) Brahman is revealed by the various pairs which are mentioned in the Madhubrāhmaṇa portion of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. This Upaniṣad speaks of the Para Brahman in dualities just as one would speak of the same space in the earth (adhidaiva) and in the body/stomach (adhyātma).

Śaṅkara explains the passage of the Upaniṣad (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. II.5) which is referred in this kārikā. He says that: 'this earth is like honey for all creatures, and all creatures are like honey for this earth. This shining, immortal person who is in this earth, and with reference to one self, this shining, immortal person who is in the body, he, indeed, is just the Self. This is immortal, this is Brahman, this is all’^[15].

According to Śaṅkara, this exposition of Śruti is to be understood only at the stage when there is no realisation of the negation of duality (apavāḍa). The word Madhu means nectar and thus it means immortality or Brahma Vidyā. In the phenomenal world there is the same ākāśa on the earth as well as in the stomach. On the same reasoning, there is the same Brahman in the adhidaiva (Pṛthvi etc.) and adhyātma (pratyagātmā).

In kārikā 13, Gauḍapāda describes the identity (ananyatva, oneness) of jīva and ātman. He states that,

“The identity without difference (abhedena) of jīva and ātman is praised (Praśasyate) and plurality (nānātva) is condemned (nindyate) in the scriptures. Therefore that the identity of jīva and ātman is correct and rational (samañjasam)”.

The strongest parallel between Gaudapāda and Śaṅkara lies in their similar attitudes about the fundamental, root authority of Śruti. According to Śaṅkara the implication of this kārikā is that the identity of Brahman and ātman is praised and the plurality has been condemned both by Scriptures and the Seers (like Vyāsa) who have seen the entire world as their Self. And the conclusion, ‘therefore that is comprehensible’, gives testimony to the basic authority of scripture.

In this regard Śaṅkara quoted the identity (Brahmātmaikya) passages from different Upaniṣads:

“There is not, however, a second, nothing else separate from him that he could see” (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. IV.3.23)^[16];

“It is from a second that fear arises”(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. 1.4.2)^[17];

“We have, fear when we have a feeling of otherness” (Tai U II.7.1)^[18];

“....this all are this Self” (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. II.4.6;IV.5.7)^[19];

“Whoever perceives anything like manyness here goes from death to death” (KaṭhaU II.1.10)^[20] etc.

The Vedas have two major portions called karmakānda and jñānakānda. Traditionally they are together called Śruti. The karmakānda is accepted and elaborated by the Pūrvamīmāṃsā school, according to which performing action is central to man’s social existence. Here the Karmakānda presupposes the difference between the individual self which transmigrates and the Supreme Self which superintends the world, the individual selves. According to this portion of the Veda there is a clear distinction drawn between jīvātmā and Paramātmā. The Nyāya school may have used this distinction for its metaphysics, for according to them there is a nitya-bheda between the jīva and the Paramātman. The second portion of the Veda is called Jñānakānda or the Vedānta which comprises of Upaniṣads. These texts unequivocally speak about the identification of the embodied self and the Supreme Self. The self is proclaimed to be non-different from the Supreme Self. The author Gauḍapāda in this kārikā highlights the Upaniṣadic metaphysics of oneness saying that it should be treated as the mukhyārtha or the primary meaning. The karmakānda portion of the veda which makes a distinction between the jīva from Supreme Self is not actually true and hence is to be, treated as gauṇa or secondary.

In kārikā 14 Gauḍapāda defends his view from the objection that if indeed the scripture is of such fundamental authority, what about the vedic texts which frankly assert the creation of a plural universe.

He says:

‘The separateness (pṛthaktvam) of jīva and ātman which has been declared in the ritual portion of the Upaniṣad, dealing with the origin of the universe is only figurative (gauṇa), because this portion (of the vedas) describes only what is to be. This statement regarding separateness can never have any meaning as truth’.

The objector says that in several Śruti passages the creation of the universe is taught as also the existence of a plurality of things. Not all scriptural texts, however, declare non-duality (advaita). The separateness of jīva and ātman was declared earlier in the ritualistic portion of the vedas (karmakānda) before the Upaniṣadic texts dealing with the creation of the universe. The texts of the karmakānda say that the Supreme ātman had multiple desires. He created with this desire or that desire. The mantra portion of the vedas, also talk of the separateness, for they describe the Supreme Being in such terms as the following: ‘He held the earth and this heaven….’ (Ṛg veda 10:121)^[21]. Thus we find that the vedas themselves speak at cross purposes. The ritualistic portion of the vedas speak of the separateness of the jīva and the ātman and the knowledge portion of the vedas (jñānakanda) speak of their identity. In this situation, how can one possibly call the Upaniṣads, the portion dealing with revelation of the truth, alone as the true import of the scripture?

The reply given by Śaṅkara is that the (bheda-vākyas), the texts mentioning separateness of the jīva and the ātman are to be interpreted in a figurative sense. “The difference of jīva and ātman before creation (prāg utpatteḥ), which is declared (in texts)”, says Gauḍapāda, “is figurative (gauṇa), having regard to what is to come (bhaviṣyadvṛttyā); its primary (mukhyārtham) sense does not, indeed, stand to reason”.

Śaṅkara’s reply to this objection is as follows: The separateness declared in such Śruti passages (karmakānda) is not the highest truth. They have only a figurative/secondary meaning. It is true that the Upaniṣads contain passages regarding the creation, for instance: ‘that, verily, from which all theses being are born’ (TaiU. III.1)^[22], ‘As small sparks come forth from the fire, even so from this Self come forth all beings’ (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad II.1.20)^[23]; ‘From this Self, verily, ether arose’ (Taittirīya Upaniṣad II.1.2)^[24]; ‘It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire’ (Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.2.3)^[25]. But the creation thus described is not real from the Absolute standpoint. The separateness between the jīva and ātman implied in the creation is like the separateness between the infinite/ undifferentiated ākāśa and the ākāśa enclosed in a jar/pot. They are the result of avidyā. The space in both (mahākāśa and ghatākāśa) cases is the same. The difference is only due to the enclosed boundary of the jar.

Śaṅkara further explains that the statement regarding creation is made with reference to a future happening. This is as we say of cooking of odāna, (or “He cooks food”) cooked rice. Now, rice becomes cooked only after cooking. In the statement that ‘He cooks rice/food’, the word ‘food’ does not mean ‘food’ in the primary sense; but the rice-grains which are cooked and become food only in future, after the process of cooking is complete. So the rice-grains are called food figuratively. Similarly the scriptures speak of duality before creation with a view to indicate the future state of knowledge when multiplicity is known to be unreal. The meaning is, when scripture makes such a statement, it takes into consideration the multiplicity regarded as real by those who are still under the influence of natural ignorance (avidyā). The prime aim of the Upaniṣadic passages dealing with the creation and resolution of the universe etc., is ultimately to establish the oneness of existence or the non-duality of ātman/ Brahman.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad Gauḍapadiya Kārikā, Śaṅkarabhāsya (with Hindi trans.) 121.

[2]:

Ibid., 122.

[3]:

S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, 582.

[4]:

Karmarkar, Gauḍapāda Kārikā, 88.

[5]:

S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, 582.

[6]:

Ibid,. 447.

[7]:

Bhattacharya, Āgama śāstra, 49.

[8]:

This kārikā (3:4) is quoted by Śāntarakṣita in his Madhyamakalaṅkārakārikā extant in Tibetan. Bhattacharya, Āgama śāstra, 51.

[9]:

Bhavaviveka quotes this karika. Bhattacharya, Āgama śāstra, 52.

[10]:

Jananamaraṇakaraṇānāṃ Pratiniyamādayugapat Pravṛtteshcha PuruṣabahutvaṃSiddhaṃTraiguṇyaviparyayāchchaiva. Sāṅkhyakārikā:18.

[11]:

In this kārikā (3.7) Gauḍapāda uses the term vikāra or transformation, which the only instance of the use of a term from the Sāṅkhya philosophy in the entire Gauḍapādakārikā.

[12]:

The visible ākāśa, the sky in this instance, the grey/blue colour of the sky is not the true nature of ākāśa but is caused by such extraneous things as dust and smoke etc.

[13]:

Prof. Bhattacharya reads sthitaḥ for sthitau. However, the meaning does not differ. Karmarkar remarks that sthitau goes very well with gati-agamanayoh particularly in the locative. Karmarkar, Gauḍapāda -Kārikā, 91.

[14]:

S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, 541.

[15]:

Ibid., 201.

[16]:

Ibid., 264.

[17]:

Ibid., 164.

[18]:

Ibid., 549.

[19]:

Ibid., 198.

[20]:

Ibid., 634.

[21]:

Som Raj Gupta, The Word Speaks to the Faustian Man, 351.

[22]:

S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, 553.

[23]:

Ibid., 190.

[24]:

Ibid., 542.

[25]:

Ibid., 499.