The true nature of reality

Moving from the above criticism [cf. previous page] the opponent raises a fresh objection about the use of the scripture for eliminating duality. They ask how can the scripture, if it cannot make us understand the true nature of the Self (which is non-duality), free our mind from the idea of duality? The meaning of this objection is as follows:

Scriptures can be applied only to the sphere of duality. In the absence of duality, scriptures cannot function. In your opinion duality consisting of birth, death etc, does not exist. Therefore the scripture is also an illusion. The scripture cannot remove duality and lead us to the realisation of non-duality or the Self.

In reply to the above objection Śaṅkara says that there is nothing problematic here. Just as a snake is superimposed on a rope, similarly duality is superimposed on ātman due to ignorance (avidyā). This fact of superimposition is manifest in all the states of false experiences such as ‘I am happy, I am unhappy; I am ignorant; I am born; I am dead; I am worn out; I am one with a body; I am seeing; I am manifest; I am unmanifest; I am a doer; I reap the reward of my deeds; I live with those I love; I have been separated from them; I am decaying; I am old; I am theirs and they are mine’. These identifications reflect some of the states of falsity that get superimposed on the Self through ignorance. The ātman persists in all these various states, because no such idea can ever be conceived of without the notion of ātman. It is like the notion of the rope which persists in various ideas like the snake, the water -line etc. This being the case the ātman which is the substratum for all these imaginary attributes, is established as self-evident and therefore the scripture has no function to accomplish in proving the existence of ātman. The function of the scripture is to accomplish that which is not accomplished yet. And the scripture does not serve as a proof or authority for establishing that which is already established. The fact is that the ātman does not realise its own nature on account of the specific impediments like the notions ‘I am happy’, ‘I am unhappy’ etc., which are superimposed on ātman due to ignorance. Realisation of the nature of the non-dual ātman is the real beatitude.

The scriptures declare that the ātman has nothing to do with the predicate of the happiness. In other word the scripture removes the idea of the attributes of happiness (in ātman) etc, by producing the conviction that the attributeless ātman is “not happy”, etc., through the Upaniṣadic statements like ‘not this, not this ‘(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.4.22^[1]) and ‘not gross, nor fine’ ‘(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad III.8.8)^[2] etc. Even though the presence of ātman is felt as persisting (in all states of consciousness) still along with this presence its attributeless nature is not felt when there are false notions like “having the attributes of happiness” etc.. If such attributeless nature was also felt along with the mere presence of ātman, then that specific false notion in the form of “being happy”, etc., which are superimposed on ātman would never arise–just as coldness can never be associated with fire whose specific quality is heat. The truth therefore is that specific attributes like “being happy “, etc., are only imagined on attributeless ātman. The scriptures describing ātman as “non-happy”, etc., are intended to remove the false specific notions of ātman having the attributes of happiness, etc. Similar is the case with other attributes. The knowers of scripture say that the validity of the authority of the scripture is established as it proclaims non-existence of duality and negates all specific positive attributes which are superimposed on attributeless ātman.

Bhattacharya quotes here a kārikā from Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamikakārikā, and comparing it with Gaudapāda‘s kārikā (32) says that: “This is what is the essence of Buddhism”^[3]. The obvious parallel here is the ‘anirodham anutpadam’ from the opening kārikā of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamakakārikā. He says: the term ‘utpattir ‘is of course completely parallel in meaning with Nāgārjuna’s chosen term, ‘utpadam ‘

Gauḍapāda in kārikā 33 says: This (the ātman) is imagined both as unreal objects that are perceived as the non-duality. The objects (Bhāvas) are imagined in the non-duality itself. Therefore, non-duality, (alone) is the (highest) bliss.

Śaṅkara in his commentary says, Gauḍapāda in this kārikā states the reason for what has been stated in the previous kārikā. He explains that: The false cognition of a rope as a snake, as a line of water and as a stick or the like has two constituents: the existent rope as such and the non-existent snake, the non-existent line of water and the non-existent stick or the like. In the same way, false appearances of the (Self) ātman too have two constituents: the Self as such and the infinite number of phenomena in terms of which it is imagined, things like prāṇa and others. These objects which are imagined on the Self are all unreal, non–existent. They do not exist from the standpoint of the ultimate reality. They are unreal because they appear only when the mind is active; when the mind ceases to be active, they too cease to appear.It is these objects which depend for their being on the activity of the mind and have no being of their own, these objects are superimposed onto the Self, the Self without motion and activity.

Thus the Self, the reality, the Being, that remains itself in those appearances, is imagined in two ways: as unreal things like prāṇa and others, and as it is its real being, as the non-dual reality. The Self is imagined as the non-dual reality because without this supposition the fact of the appearance of unreal things as real cannot be explained. There has to be the ground/substratum of those appearances as the rope is imagined as the ground / substratum of the illusion of the snake. For, no illusion is ever perceived without a substratum. Though the Self is of the nature of pure existence and one homogeneous, those appearances like prāṇa, etc., are imagined by the non-dual Self Itself, and therefore they appear as if they are real.

Those appearances, the prāṇa and the like, too are imagined as the non-dual, as the reality that is the Self of all perceived objects. They are imagined as the non-dual Self because it is that reality they are appearance of, as there can be no appearance without a real, ontological ground. And since that non-dual reality is the ontological ground of all appearances and since it never deviates from itself therefore that alone is auspicious. Even in the midst of the evil of the world of appearances, the non-dual retains its goodness. All appearances, indeed, are the cause of misery. Appearances are the cause of fear as the rope-snake is, the non-dual alone is the secure state. It is for this reason non-duality is free from fear and is called ‘good’, auspicious.

Karmarkar remarks,

“The Advaya Ātman is responsible for imagining himself to be all sorts of things that are really non-existent, and likewise for the imagined things themselves. Ātman is always the same, unchangeable and serves as the adhiṣṭhāna for all imaginations (kalpanās). All kalpanās are asiva: the advaya alone is śiva”^[4].

According to Bhattacharya, the word advaya ‘non-dual’ means one free from both the perceiver and perceptible (grāhyagrāhakarahita). He says that: It is the advaya through which there are both the imaginations, the imagination of ātman as different things, and the imagination of things themselves. Thus advayatā ‘the state of non-duality being real is blissful’^[5].

Gauḍapāda, in this kārikā, disregards even the concept of ‘non-dual’ from the absolute standpoint. He also makes an important point which is that an unreal appearance must be grounded in the real, for there can be no unreal appearance without a real substratum. The idea seems to be that word “non-dual”(advaya) is relative to the idea of duality, and once duality is negated, the ātman (the Self) cannot be designated even as “non-dual”. This is same with other words commonly used to describe Brahman / ātman, such as “substratum” (adḥiṣṭhāna), because an adḥiṣṭhāna is relative to what is supported (adhiṣtheya). Even the words ātman (Self), Brahman (expansion) and Turīya (Fourth) acquire their meanings in relation to what is nonSelf, what is finite, or in the case of Turīya, to the three conditions i.e., the wakeful, dream and deep-sleep. Therefore the absolute reality, Brahman, per se (as it is), is without name and is neither dual nor non-dual (dvaitādvaitavilakṣana)^[6] .

If we interpret the kārikā in the above way, the idea that is expressed here is reminiscent of Nāgārjuna who argues that all concepts can be shown to be interdependent and are therefore “empty” (śunya) of any inherent nature. But Gauḍapāda is saying something different from Nāgārjuna, for he says that it is the absolute reality, the ātman (referred to by the pronoun “ayam” in the kārikā), that is being falsely imagined in these (prāṇa etc,) various ways. In the second line of this kārikā (33) Gauḍapāda says that things exist “just through the non-dual “(advayena–eva), meaning that there can be no appearance of the world without a substratum. From the empirical standpoint of the world there is the experience that things exist, because they have no separate existence from the Self, which is Being Itself. Therefore, from the empirical point of view, the understanding of non-duality is auspicious and not any other understanding.

In kārikā 34, Gauḍapāda refers to the relationship between the world and the Self. He says: “This manifold does not exist as identical with ātman nor does it ever stand independent by itself. It is neither separate from Brahman nor is it non-separate. This is statement of the wise.” The meaning of this kārikā is as follows:

Multiplicity which is imagined cannot be said to be identical with ātman when examined in the light of the Absolute Truth; nor can it be said to have any independent existence by itself. (being unreal) it cannot be said to either separate, or non-separate. This is what is said by those who know the reality.

Śaṅkara in his commentary on this kārikā gives the reason for the question, why is the non-dual spoken of as auspicious? Or, for what further reason is non-duality auspicious? When on account of difference, one object is distinguished from another, inauspiciousness (i.e. misery, evil etc.,) may arise. This phenomenal world when looked at in terms of the absolute reality, in terms of its non-dual ātman, it does not reveal itself as manifold, does not reveal itself other than the Self. When the rope is examined in proper light, there is no snake different from the rope. Similarly, prāṇa and other things do not exist in their own form in ātman, for they are all false appearances. Prāṇa and the other things are not really separate from one another, as a horse is different from a buffalo. Nor are they non-separate from the ātman. For they have no being of their own. As all (prāṇa etc) are appearances on ātman, they are not different, one from the others, nor are they independent of ātman. The substance of this kārikā is that as it is impossible to determine in any way the reality of manifold or multiplicity, there is only the non-dual ātman. This is what the Brāhmaṇas, the knowers of the ātman, realise as the ultimate truth. The meaning is that as manifoldness is the cause of misery and is non-existent non–duality alone is auspicious.

Karmarkar points out that there cannot be any sva-bhāva, pṛthakatva or apṛthakatva for an imagined or asat entity. He says that can one ‘say that the imagined snake is many (nānā) from the point of view of rope’? The imagined snake simply does not exist; therefore no question of manifold plurality (nānātva) can arise^[7]. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya emends nānyabhāvena in place of nātmabhāvena in the kārikā, although it is not supported by any extant manuscript tradition^[8]. Because ‘ātmabhāvena’ and ‘svena’ are roughly synonymous in meaning, whereas the structure of the verse seems to call for opposite meanings. This makes the verse parallel to the dialectical criticism of the contrast between parabhāva (nature of other) and svabhāva (nature of one’s own) by Nāgārjuna, who use the phrase ‘anekārtham anānārtham’^[9] . The second line of this kārikā seems to be more dialectical than the thought expressed in kārikā 30 that the ātman appears separate (pṛthag) but is actually non-separate (apṛthag) from the countless objects (bhāvas), for here both different (pṛthag) and identical (apṛthag) are being denied.

In the above four kārikās 31-34, Gauḍapāda presents his conclusive teaching. In the kārikā (31-32) Gaudapāda speaks of the unreality, i.e. the “apparent reality” (mithyātva), of the world. Since he says that reality cannot undergo alteration (changeless), it follows that the phenomenal world cannot logically arise from Brahman. If the world cannot logically arise, yet if the world is an empirical fact, then the world has ultimately to be an unreal appearance of Brahman, analogous to a magical creation (māyā) etc. This is the meaning of kārikā thirty one.

If the phenomenal world is an unreal appearance, then there is no real origination or real destruction, there can only be an apparent origination and an apparent destruction. Accordingly, there is no one who is really bound etc... From the perspective of the ultimate truth (paramārthatā), the whole world is a phenomenal appearance like trick of the magician. This is the essential meaning of kārikā 32.

In kārikā 33, we find what appears to be a further completion of the theme of kārikās 29 and 30, including usage of the technical term bhāva to mean mental construction or entity. This kārikā states that what exists (ayam) is imagined (kalpitaḥ) in the form of unreal objects (bhavair asadbhir) by means of non-duality (advayena), for perceived objects indeed exist as non duality, as it were (bhava apy advayenaiva). Therefore all that exists is benign non-duality (advaya siva). This is the first introduction of the term ‘advaya’ to mean non-dual by Gauḍapāda.

In kārikā 34, Gauḍapāda points out that the phenomenal world does not exist as identical to the ātman (Self), for in that case no world would even be present to be experienced as something “other”. Nor does the world have an inherent existence of its own, because in that case the world would be real, it would be self-existent. But the world is not a self-existent reality; its being is reducible to the ātman. Those who know the truth know that: “nothing exists different (pṛthak) from the ātman or as identical (apṛthak) to the ātman”.

The rope–snake analogy, which Gauḍapāda mentioned in kārikās 17 and 18, can help to elucidate all the points in these four kārikās. But one should keep in mind that the rope-snake analogy is an attempt to depict the relation between the Self/the ātman and the world from the point of ultimate reality. The rope should be understood as equivalent to the Brahman-ātman and the snake–appearance as equivalent to the Jagat or the world. The rope is real, i.e., changeless, it is “unborn” for it has not changed into the snake through any transformation on its part. The rope therefore is not the snake. Yet the snake does appear, and it appears exactly where the rope is. The rope is the substratum, for the appearance of the snake. The snake-appearance is not different from the rope, because it has no independent existence of its own. Again, the snake–appearance is not identical to the rope, for in that case there would only be the rope and no snake-appearance. In the same manner, (from the perspective of ultimate truth) the ātman is changeless and “unborn”, for it has not changed into the world through any transformation. But the world does appear, so the world-appearance exists, as Gaudapāda says: “As a dream and a magic are seen....” (2.31). Therefore from this perspective of ultimate reality “There is no cessation, there is no origination etc”. (2.32) for the world has no real origin, it can have no real dissolution either. The statement “just through the non-dual” (2.33) points out that the empirically evident, unreal universe is grounded in the ātman. This world is not different from the ātman, because in that case it would have an independent ontological status, nor is it entirely indentical to the ātman, since there is the empirical experience of a phenomenal world. (2.34)

In kārikās 35-38 Gauḍapāda discusses the nature of liberation and its means. He has given practical teaching at the end of each chapter. In kārikā 35 he says that:

But the wise, who are free from attachment, fear and anger and who are well versed in the meaning of the Vedas, this (ātman) has been verily realised as totally devoid of all imaginations (such as those of Prāṇa etc.), free from the illusion of manifold, and non-dual

In this kārikā, Gauḍapāda introduces the topic of the required discipline (sādhanā) for the knowledge of the Self. The knowledge which is said to be the path to perfection is not any and every piece of knowledge. It is the knowledge which is derived from a study of the Vedānta. Even this would be ineffective if it remains as a mere theoretical comprehension; it must become a matter of direct experience. When the final goal is realised, there is no knowledge apart from the Self. Knowledge and the object of knowledge, then, are non-different (jñeyābhinanna-jñāna). Gauḍapāda says that the aspirant should learn the purport of the Veda and get convinced of its truth through deep reflection. He then acquires freedom from passion like attachment, fear and anger (vīta-rāga-bhaya-krodhaḥ). Since these serve as obstacles in the way, unless they are removed, no progress towards the truth is possible. Śaṅkara says that this perfect knowledge is praised in this kārikā. The ātman is realised by sages, who are always being free from all evils such as attachments, spite, fear, anger and all other defects, who are practising contemplation, who can discriminate between the real and the unreal, who have insight into the wisdom of the Vedas. Those who realise the ātman as free from all the imagined attributes have understood the meaning of Vedānta. The ātman is cessation of phenomenal universe which consists of duality and distinctions. Therefore, ātman is called non-dual. The implication of this kārikā is that those alone who are free from all evil, and ever absorbed in contemplation/meditation on the meaning and substance of the Veda, and are men of renunciation (sannyasins), can realise ātman. Ātman is not realised by those whose minds are impure with passion etc., who adamantly adhere to their own systems like the logicians and others.

The ātman, by its very nature, is advaya, nirvikalpa and prapañcopaśama, and it does not become non-dual through the performance of any action on the part of the seeker. For this reason, knowledge is emphasised in Vedānta. What is meant by ‘Knowledge’ is the direct and immediate apprehension (aparokṣajñāna) of one’s essential nature which is the Turīya–ātman, the pure Awareness. This knowledge is indicated by the word “seen”.The sruti says that “the Self/ ātman has to be seen; it has to be heard of, reflected on and contemplated upon (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.5; 4.5.6). In this kārikā, Gauḍapāda gives two qualifications for this knowledge. The first refers to the seeker’s mental and emotional fitness, and it consists of freedom from “attachment, fear and anger”. This includes the well-known Sādhana-Catuṣtaya mentioned by Śaṅkara in his introduction of Brahma-sutra Bhasya^[10]. The praise in the kārikā is intended to create a desire in true seekers to acquire means to realise it. The expression Vitarāgabhyakrodha is found twice in the Bhagavadgīta (2.56 and 4.0) and it is obvious that Gauḍapāda is citing the Gita here. Gauḍapāda’s second qualification has to do with traditional learning. The expression “a thorough knowledge of the Veda” (Vedapāraga) is a clear statement to refer to the Upaniṣadic knowledge.

Gauḍapāda, in kārikā 36, more specifically says about the practice of contemplation.

He says:

Therefore, knowing the ātman to be such, fix your attention on non-duality. Having realised non-duality, behave in the world like an insensible object (jadaval lokaṃ acaret).

In this kārikā, one is counciled to link one’s recollection to the truth of non-duality (advaite yojayet smṛtim) and ‘behave as a fool among people’ (as Bhattacharya translates the phrase, (‘jadaval locaṃ acaret’). Here Gauḍapāda prescribes two injunctions: the first is an injunction to contemplation, “fix one’s attention on nonduality”. The second is an injunction about conduct, “One should behave...... as if a fool”. As Śaṅkara says: having known this non-dual Self (Brahman) which is free from hunger etc., unborn and transcends all codes of human conduct, i.e. when he has realised that he is the supreme Brahman itself, he should behave with others as one not knowing the truth. The second injunction may mean that a realised man, on account of his being established in the non-dual ātman, does not see others as separate from him; and therefore he does not assume consciously the role of a knower (jñāni).

Kārikā 36 is addressed to those people who have understood the purport of the Vedānta, i.e., the Upaniṣads, and who may even be scholars, but who do not have a firm conviction about the non-dual ātman because of the strength of mental impressions (vasānās) pertaining to erroneous knowledge (mithyājñāna). For these people, who have some kind of mental impressions which are working counter to the Upaniṣadic teaching and their own reflection upon it, are advised to fix their attention upon non-duality. That is to contemplate upon non-duality, in order to make firm their understanding of non-duality.

Gauḍapāda, in kārikā 37 suggests a further injunction regarding the conduct of a realised person (jñāni). He says that:

The man of self-restraint should be above all praise, salutation, and all rites prescribed by the smṛti in connection with the departed ancestors. He should have this body and the ātman as his support and depend upon chances. i.e., he should be satisfied with those things for his physical wants that chance brings to him.

According to Śaṅkara what is stated in the above kārikā is the way in which an ascetic person should conduct himself in this world. He should refrain from acts of praise, salutation, indeed from all acts. He should give up all desires for external objects and accept the life of a sannyasin of the highest order (paramahṃsa), a wandering mendicant (parivrāj). The Paramahaṃsasannyasin is beyond all obligations. He has no use for praise or salutation for deities, he need not perform the śrāddha rites for the pitṛs (deceased ancestors). The word svadhā means the food for the pitṛs. In this kārikā the word ‘svadhākāra’ would mean “offering food to pitṛs”. The śruti also supports this view in the following commandments:

The Brahmanas, having known that Self, having overcome the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, the desire for worlds, live the life of mendicants. (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. III.5.1)^[11]; and also by a smṛti passages as:

With their consciousness established on that, their souls become one with that, with their intention fixed on that, with that for their goal supreme, they reach the state from which there is no return, their sins destroyed by knowledge of the Self (Bhagavadgītā 5.17)^[12].

Śaṅkara interprets the phrase “calācalaniketa” as, “having the body and the Self as the support”. He says, the word ‘cala’, ‘the moving’, refers to the body which is constantly undergoing change. The word ‘acala’ signifies the changeless ātman, the Self, for it ever abides as itself. Whenever, under the influence of ordinary activities, such as eating food etc., he forgets his own support, i.e., his essential nature, the reality of the Self which is unchanging (acala) like space (ākāśa), and thinks of himself as “I am”, then he has the changing (cala) the bare body as his support. Thus the knower of truth has both the changing and the unchanging as his support. He never looks to other external objects for his support. Such a man is asked to live on what chance may bring him. For sustaining his body he should have only the bare necessities of a few morsels of food, a sheet of cloth to cover his body, etc. which are available to him by chance. That is all he should need when he gets conscious of the body.

Karmarkar and Bhattacharya interpret calā-cala–niketa in the kārikā as without any fixed residence. Karmarkar thinks Śaṅkara’s interpretation is unsatisfactory. Bhattacharya rightly explains calācala as ‘absolutely not fixed’. But Śaṅkara justified his interpretation by saying the yati (man of self restraint) has to aspire to become a wandering mendicant (parivrajaka) and he cannot have at any time a fixed abode or residence. The exact translation of calācala-niketa would be that he may sometimes have a changing and sometimes a fixed abode, if niketa is interpreted as a place of residence. Having interpreted yati as paramahamsa parivrājaka, Śaṅkara could not think of any fixed abode for such a parivrājaka. So, he interprets niketa as āśraya or support.

Gauḍapāda, in his concluding kārikā 38 of the second chapter gives a final advice to such a person to never lose sight of the truth. He says:

Having known the truth regarding what exists internally (i.e. within the body) as well as the truth regarding what exists externally (i.e. the earth etc.,) he becomes one with Reality, derives his pleasure from It and never deviates from the Real.

Śaṅkara explains this kārikā thus: The truth regarding the external world (bāhyataḥ) is the five Mahābhūtas–earth, water, fire, air and ether. The truth within means the body, the senses, the desiring and willing aspect of the psyche and the intellect. These phenomena within (internal) and without (external) are as unreal as a snake imagined on a rope or like a dream or magic etc.

In this connection Śaṅkara quotes a śruti passage:

‘The Modification being only a name arising from speech while the truth is that it is just clay’ (Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.1.4)^[13]. The śruti further declares, ‘ātman is both within and without, unborn without a cause, having no within or without, entire (full), all pervading like either, subtle, unchanging, without attributes or parts and without action. That is truth, that is ātman and that thou art’ (Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.8-16).

The realised man see the truth in this way, the truth about what exists without and what exists within and sees the truth as the Self. The meaning is that he should be one with that truth (Reality).This truth will be his sole delight and is not the external objects of the senses. A man who does not see truth as the Self falls from it. He believes that his mind is the ātman and with his changing mind he thinks that his ātman too is changing. He feels that he has deviated from the truth and has identified ātman with his body and thinks that he was fallen from knowing the truth about ātman. When his mind is concentrated he feels happy and thinks that he has become one with Reality.

But the knower of ātman or the realised man thinks all that exists is the Self. The reason is that the ātman is changeless and never deviates from its nature. The knower should never ever deviate from the truth that ‘I am Brahman’. The meaning is that he should never deviate from his realisation about the essence of ātman. He should be the seer of ‘samatvam’, of sameness. For this the smṛti passages say, “One who has realised the Self sees equally a dog or an outcast” (Gītā 5.18) and who sees the Lord abiding equally in all beings” (Gītā 13.27).

It has been observed that the world which seems to be tangible and real is only an appearance. This chapter, through an examination of both the waking and the dream states, reveals that the objects of both states are merely appearances and that the waking state is just another dream. When we assume that the world of waking state is real, we are making the mistake of attributing reality to a dream world. We think that the world and its objects are real only because we see/perceive them as such and attribute reality to them. As long as we think that the world is the same as it appears, we will be deluded. But when the delusion of duality is dispelled, the socalled facts of the external world will turn out to be illusory appearances.

We normally regard dream experience as illusory. The objects/entities seen in a dream are regarded as non-existent. The objects experienced in dream are not real because they are not seen on waking. As has been analysed by Gauḍapāda one feels that the objects seen in dream are unreal because objects like elephants, chariots, mountains etc. seen in a dream are confined in a limited space, i.e. within the body (antaḥsthānāt); and because they are enclosed within the mind (samvṛtatvena). Along with this fact we can say that, one who experiences the objects in a dream do not go out of the body to perceive them because of the paucity of time. Also the one, who experiences the dream, when awake, does not remain in that experienced dream place. Thus, “dream” may be described as a case of illusion, misapprehension (anyathāgrahaṇa), or the seeing of things that do not really exist.

On the basis of the above stated views, it can be said that what we normally regard as the waking state is also nothing but “dream” because in that state also we misapprehend the reality as the “external world”. It has been pointed out that the dream objects are unreal on the ground that they are perceived (dṛśyatvāt). On the analogy of dream experience, it has been argued that the objects seen in the waking state also must be considered as unreal/illusory, because they are perceived. The objects perceived to exist in dream are different from those perceived in the waking state in respect of their being perceived within the body in a limited space. This difference is felt only in the waking condition. When one is in dream, limitation of space holds no ground. The common features in both the states are the facts of “being perceived” and “being false”.

The unreality of the objects of the waking state has been supported on the principle that ‘what is non-existent in the beginning and at the end cannot be said to exist in the present’. The appearance has a beginning and an end and is therefore illusory. A mirage appears to exist when it is seen, and not earlier as well as later. That which is conditioned by time is not real. This characteristic also belongs to the objects perceived in the waking state. Just as the dream-objects are experienced in dream alone, neither before nor later, even so the objects of waking are experienced in the state of waking alone. So, the objects of the waking state are not real, i.e. they are mithyā.

The difference between the two states cannot be made out on the ground that, ‘while the objects experienced in the waking state are practically serve a purpose, those seen in dream are not’. This is because the objects of waking experience function only in that state and not in dream; and the dream objects are useful in their own way in the state of dream. But all functions are unreal due to their having a beginning and an end.

Notwithstanding the fact one may argue that the objects of dream are strange and abnormal unlike the objects of waking. This strange and abnormal condition is known only from the waking state. In the dream state itself the objects are not realised to be strange and abnormal. From the waking state the dream objects may be seen as abnormal; but in themselves they are quite normal. In the dream state we make a clear distinction between objects we imagine in our mind and objects we perceive outside the mind. But both such internal objects (dream imagination) and external objects (dream facts) in dream are fundamentally unreal. Similarly in the waking state we make the very same distinction between objects we imagine in mind and objects we perceive outside the mind. Both such internal and external objects in the waking state are illusory as illustrated in the dream.

Therefore, from the absolute point of view the states of dream and waking are one and similar with no variation and the experiences of both states are unreal, though differences are admitted from the relative point of view.

The knowledge that the phenomenal world is merely an appearance is incomplete. We can proceed further with the enquiry and come to the reality behind the appearance. Any examination of the world of objects is merely an examination of the appearance. A complete examination of experience must also take into account the Subject, the experiencer. It is only when we turn to the subject of experience that we can leave/abandon the world of appearances.

In this context the subject of experience does not refer to the individual. The individual with his sense perceptions, thoughts and feelings goes with the world of objects. He is seen just as any other material object is seen. The subject of experience is the seer. The self-luminous ātman/ Self, through the power of its māyā, imagines in itself by itself. It alone is the perceiver of different objects. It is the substratum for every appearance. No illusion takes place without a substratum and that the substratum of illusion is real. The Self which is the substratum of the illusory experience both in dream and waking states is real. In dream as well as in the waking it is the mind that projects the appearance of plurality. The Self, being the substratum, is the illuminator of the mind. The Self is the witness of the changing states of mind. The mind projects in itself various objects in the dream and waking states. The objects perceived in both the states are in fact non-different from the mind. From the absolute point of view, mind is one with the Self and does not have independent existence of its own, though from the relative perspective it appears to be different from the Self due to ignorance. The world is unreal in its appearance and is real in its essence, the unborn Self.

The analogy for illusoriness of the world can be found even in the waking state. Just as in darkness the rope is imagined to be a snake, so also the Self is also imagined for various objects due to ignorance (māyā). When the real nature of the rope is known, the illusory appearance of a snake ceases and the rope alone remains in its non-dual nature. Similarly the Self is to be realised by removing the illusion which is superimposed on it. The non-dual Self alone is real and the world is imaginary. There is no other material (upādāna) except the Self. There is neither dissolution nor creation; there is no one who is in bondage, no one who is striving, and no one who wants to be released. The ignorance with all its effects is grounded in the non-dual, ever luminous Self.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Ibid., 279.

[2]:

Ibid., 232.

[3]:

Bhattacharya, Agamasastra, 39.

[4]:

Karmarkar, 86.

[5]:

Bhattacharya, 41

[6]:

This non-dual characteristic of the ātman is a correlative of the duality. Hence this conception of non-duality is not free from ignorance. In contrast to the changeable bhāvas, the ātman is imagined as the non–dual entity. Ātman is beyond all mental construction or kalpanā. From the ultimate point of view, the ātman, cannot be called one, if the term is used as a contrast to the many or duality. Non-duality is a negation of all thoughts of duality. Nikhilananda Swami, Trans. The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad with Gauḍapāda’s Kārikāand Śan ƒ kara’s Commentary, (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 2000), 127 fn.

[7]:

Karmarkar, 86.

[8]:

Bhattacharya, Āgama śāstra, 42

[9]:

Ibid.

[10]:

Nityānityavastuvivekaḥ samadamādisādhanasampat, Har Dutt Sharma, Brahmasūtra-Catuḥsūtr≠, (Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan, 2005), 53.

[11]:

8 S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanisa¤ds, 221.

[12]:

Som Raj Gupta, The Word Speaks to the Faustian Man, 321.

[13]:

S. Radhakrishnana, The Principal Upaniṣads, 447.