Various views of nature of reality

Gauḍapāda in kārikās 20-28, describes various possible misconceptions of reality (vikalpas) during his time. It is interesting to note that he gives forth a number of views and I have used Anandagiri, the tikākāra, Bhattacharya and Karmarkar, the modern scholars on Maṇḍukyākārikā to unfold the various views. Ātman, the source of creation is imagined variedly. Gaudapāda now discusses various views on reality.

Karmarkar lists thirty-five groups^[1] of thinkers while dealing with the other schools of thought.

(20) {1} There are some with name prāṇavādins^[2] who believe that breaths/ prāṇa is the source of everything. Ānandagiri^[3], the Tikākāra (glossator) says that Vaiśeṣikas and worshippers of Hiraṇyagarbha etc., are referred to as prāṇavādins. They uphold the view that prāṇa as Hiraṇyagarbha is the cause of the universe. Ānandagiri further adds that this view is a mere imagination of the mind. There is no rational proof of the reality of an extra-cosmic god namely Hiraṇyagarbha.

{2} The school called the bhūtavādins believe in that the combination of five elements through the process of Pañchikaraṇa or Trivritta-Karaṇa (Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.2.3-4) is the cause of the universe. The materialists like as ‘lokāyata’ (Cārvākas) believe that the four gross elements (bhūtāni) like earth, water, fire and air combine in a certain proportion to generate the world.

{3} Ātman is imagined to be guṇas by some of the Sāṅkhyas who postulate three guṇas (sattva, rajas and tamas) as the three constituent out of which everything is constituted. According to the Vedāntins, this theory cannot be sustained for when the guṇas are in equilibrium, dissolution will result and if the equilibrium is disturbed creation will begin. To start the creation one has to imagine reason as to how the equilibrium gets disturbed. If there is some other entity causing this disturbance, a cause for that entity has to be sought and so on which will lead to the fallacy of infinite regress.

{4} The theologians explain the tattva as the source of creation. Tattva is interpreted to mean three namely ātman, avidyā, and the Lord like Śivā etc. Ātman is imagined to be tattvani, by the Saivas who say that ātman, avidyā and Śivā are the three tattvas (or categories) which create the universe. For, if Lord like Śivā is considered to be other than ātman, then he becomes an object like a pot. But the Supreme being cannot become/ transform into an object like fire, air etc.

(21) {5} Another school, imagines the source of universe as pādas (quarters). Ānandagiri says that pādas are Viśva, Taijasa, Prājña etc. of ātman imagined for worldly dealings but that is not Reality as ātman, being without parts is unrelated, and cannot be really divided into quarters. Prof. Karmarkar remarks that Gauḍapāda who dilates upon these four pādas of ātman in the first chapter is not likely to intend Viśva etc, as pādas here and therefore suggests that pādas may mean prakāsavan, anantavān, jyotisman and Āyatanavān as in (Chāndogya Upaniṣad. III. 5.5-8) where Sātyakama is instructed a bull (ṛsabha) as the pādas of Brahman.

{6} There are some who are only familiar with sense-objects and they consider Self as a sense-object (viṣaya). Hence they (viṣayavādins) consider enjoyment of the objects of sense (sound, colour etc,) as the highest goal of human life. Perhaps this may be the theory of the sensualists like Vātsyāyana, the author of Kāmasutra. The objects, on account of their changeable and negatable nature, cannot be the ultimate reality.

{7} The Knowers of heavenly abodes, imagine those abodes (lokās) to be ātman, the truth. The Paurāṇikas says that Lokās like Bhūḥ, Bhūvaḥ, and Svaḥ are the ultimate reality. Karmarkar remarks that the lokās may refer to Devaloka, Varuṇaloka, Prajāpatiloka etc., and these believers aspire to secure residence in them. According to Karmarkar, it is better to understand, the various abodes on the Devayāna path, rather than Bhūḥ, Bhūvaḥ, and Svaḥ for Lokā. This is also accepted by Ānandagiri, the tikākāra, that very few would choose Bhuḥ and Bhuvaḥ for their goal. This view is perhaps held by the Mīmāṃsakas who are the followers of Vedic rituals.

{8} The theory that Devas like Agni, Indra as the creators of the universe is put forward by the worshippers of these Devatās as mentioned in the Devatākāṇḍa stated in Yāska’s Nirukta. According to Ānandagiri what is meant by Devas as creator is that they are the givers of fruits of our acts. But Ānandagiri points out that the Devas do not give fruits according to their wishes but give it only according to the nature of our deeds^[4]. Karmarkar refers to Gita 1X.25 where such worshippers are mentioned Yānti Devavratā Devān^[5].

(22) {9} Those who know the Vedas imagine the Self as the Vedas. They say, the four Vedas, Ṛg, Yajur, Sāma, and Atharva are the Realities. But Vedas are made up of sounds we hear in our empirical dealings.Words arranged in an unalterable specific order are admittedly the characteristic of the Vedas. This order is superimposed, in between speaking (vāk) and hearing (śrotras). As the Vedas are mere sounds with a superimposed order, they cannot be the Ultimate (highest) reality.

{10} The upholders of sacrifices (yājñikas) and rituals like the yajñas think that sacrifices, such as jyotiṣṭoma etc. constitute the Highest Reality. But this is also an illusion. For, according to them, the sacrifice signifies the object (dravyā) offered, the deity (devatā) and the act of offering (tyāga). Each of these three individually cannot be known as yajña (sacrifice). Again three of them, combined together, do not constitute any real entity. Karmarkar recalls Gita 3-13, 4-31, 4-23 and 4-24 in this connection^[6].

{11} According to the followers of Sāṅkhya, the puruṣas/selves are not an agent but mere enjoyers (bhoktā). However, if enjoyment (bhoktṛtva) is the nature of puruṣa then there would be no liberation. This theory is not rational; for enjoyment means some change in the enjoyer and in that case his being would be non-eternal (anitya).

{12} There are others who contend that the food enjoyed (bhojyam) is the Reality. According to Ānandagiri the same kind of food like sweet, etc. is enjoyed differently by others and hence food cannot be the Realty. Karmarkar states that Ānandagiri refers to cooks or ṣupukārās here only in a lighter vein, it might be that his real reference is to the passages in Taittirīya 111. 7-9, 2-1, II.1.2 and Ch.U I.3.6 etc., where everything is stated as established in Food (anna)^[7].

(23) {13} Some thinkers rejoice in thinking that the source of universe which is the atman is as subtle as of an atom (aṇu). But this view is again unsustainable for we feel the simultaneous awareness all over the body and it is not limited to a size. This might be reference to the atomic school of Vaiśeṣikas. Bhattacharya, another reputed scholar of Māṇḍūkya Kārikā says that the reference may be to the early Vaiṣṇavas like Rāmānuja, Nimbarka, Madhva and Vallabha who believe that ātman is described as subtle (sukṣma), like an atom^[8]. Karmarkar criticizes this view. He says that according to the Vaiṣṇavas the individual soul (jīva) is atomic (anu¤), not the paramātman. Here the reference in the kārikā is to the Highest Reality (jagat kāraṇa) and not about the individual soul (jīva).

{14} Some Lokāyatikas (Cārvākas), believe that the gross (sthula) body is the highest reality. They believe that the body is the ātman. They are called dehātma-vādins, because we feel the conviction of “I-ness” in the body. But this view is not tenable because despite the presence of the body in deep-sleep and death there is no feeling of the “ahampratyaya”.

{15} Some followers of the pañcarātra or ‘Śaivaāgamas’ believe that God descends down to the earth in various forms. They (the āgamikās) look upon Reality as having some definite sacred form (Mūrta) as Maheśvara with the trident or Viṣṇu with discus in hand. These are also imaginary.

{16} The Nihilists who are proponents of Buddhism have declared that the Reality is nothing, but sunya or the void. According to them the Highest Reality is ‘Nonexistence’ out of which all these names and forms have emerged. This is also false, as a void also should have a knower, to recognise it be so. Further the void cannot be the substratum of the positive fact of the empirical universe. Karmarkar remarks that “void” is not the natural meaning of amūrta. He says, amūrta cannot mean śunya. The reference may be simply to those who deny the existence of a personal god in a concrete form.

(24) {17} The astrologers and astronomers believe that the world has emerged out of the Eternal Factor called ‘Time’ (kāla) and the world is sustained in Time and will also merge back in time. This theory is also fallacious because time itself is a measure of change and is divided into various parts as moment, minute, hour etc., Further time is an object (or thought) of the perceiving mind. Time is associated with performance of action. Karmarkar observes that Vaiśeṣikas believe that time (kāla) is eternal (nitya).

{18} Some believe “directions”, i.e. space as reality. Ānandagiri identifies them with svarodayavādins^[9]. They are well versed in reading the future and present implications of sound of birds etc., or by the movement of breath in nostrils. They watch the direction in which these sounds (svarās) reach them and they, making certain calculations arrive at predictions. To these people, direction or disā-quarters of space is the eternal reality. According to the Vaiśeṣikas space is eternal; everything that exists in space; so space is the mūlakāraṇa.

{19} Some believe in Vādas like dhātuvāda, mantravāda etc., who conjure up magic through crystals, chantings, herbs etc. Their magical art is meant here by the word vādā. Vādāh, in the kārikā is used in its technical meaning, and Anandagiri has taken it to mean the science of the alchemists and the magicians. To the alchemists their art is the only reality. In spite of mantras or charms many are seen as having no effect of them, so it is all imagination. According to Karmarkar, perhaps the tārkikas who believe in the dictum vāde vāde jāyate tattvabodhaḥ are meant here. They think that right knowledge can be derived by discussion and argumentation.

{20} The cosmologists or geographists (Bhuvana-Kosa-Vādins) who claim to know the whole universe consisting of fourteen bhuvanas (worlds).Seven higher, bhuḥ, bhubaḥ, svaḥ, maḥ, janaḥ, tapaḥ and satyam, and seven lower, atala, vitala,sutala, rasātala, talātala,, mahātala and pātāla. are only realities acceptable to them. But they are not seen by anybody and moreover there is no unanimity about their numbers or conception. This is also imagination of the mind.

(25) {21} Some section of lokāyatikas (materialists) believe mind to be the Reality, because without the mind the world of experience would have been impossible. If mind is independent then there would be no misery. If the mind is not independent, it is an object like a pot. It is only an integral organ (or an instrument) like a lamp and it cannot be the ātman, the Self. Karmarkar refers to Mano Brahma iti Upāsita.

{22} The Buddhists believe that the intellect (buddhi) is the supreme reality. This is also a wrong view of the reality. In the deep sleep state there is neither the mind, nor the intellect present. Further buddhi, is an object like a pot cognized by the perceiver.

{23} Vijñānavādins believe that citta, i.e. , Vijñāna is the reality; for, they say that the mind cognises the sense-objects and the intellect discriminates them. But if the illuminating principle, citta, does not function neither the perception nor the discrimination can be available for our experience. This theory is also not tenable. Citta is an aspect of mind and cannot be the ātman for the same reason mentioned above.

According to Karmarkar the Buddhists use manas, buddhi and citta as synonymous terms very often. He rightly observes in connection with this kārikā that Gauḍapāda, who condemns all these theorist (Vādas), could not have been himself a Buddhist. He points out “It is significant that Vidhusekhara has no remarks to offer on this point”.

{24} The Mīmāṃsakas believe that dharma (righteousness) and adharma (unrighteousness) to be ultimate realities. According to them that dharma and adharma of an individual self determines the future and hence they are to be considered as realities. But dharma and adharma cannot be the realities because one cannot be conceived without the other and they have no absolute standard. They differ according to different conditions of time and regions. They are not universally applicable in all circumstances.

(26) {25}The Sāṅkhyas believe in twenty-five categories which together constitute the reality. They are:

1. Pradhāna as Mūlaprakrti
2. Mahat, Ahaṃkāra and five Tanmātrās (subtle elements)
3. Five organs of intellect, five organs of action, mind (manah), and five mahābhūtas.
4. Puruṣa.

{26} According to the yoga system of Patañjali, the categories are twenty six. They accept the twenty five categories of the Sāṅkhya system and add one more category called Īśvara.

{27} According to Ānandagiri^[10], the Pāśupatas (worshippers of paśupati, śiva) believe in thirty one categories. They accept the twenty-five categories of the Sānkhyas, and add six more which are (1) rāga. (2) advidyā (3) niyati, (4) kāla, (5) kalā and (6) māyā.

Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya observes that others add five more to these thirty one viz., Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśīva, Īśvara and Vidyā and make up a figure of thirty six but as rāga, avidyā, niyati, kāla and kalā are regarded as the glory of māyā (māyāvibhuti), these thirty six can be reduced to thirty one.

{28} There are some others who believe that the reality is constituted of an indefinite number of categories. The various figures about tattvas accepted and also disputed by different schools are due to ignorance about the Reality which is non-dual.

(27) {29} Gauḍapāda mentions another interesting concept of reality proposed by Loka ranjakas, according to whom pleasing others is of ultimate value. Those who know only how to please others i.e., the lokās, call the reality (tattvas) to be the “act of pleasing the world”. This view is incorrect because people have different tastes and none can please all. Karmarkar states that these are the democrats who look at the world from a practical point of view, and are not interested in metaphysics. For them the only reality is the service which makes everybody happy.

{30} Dakṣa and other smṛti-writers believe in the four āśramas (four modes of life). They are: Brahmacarya, Gṛhasta, Vānaprastha and Sannyāsa. The proper observance of the smṛti rules is conducive to the well-being of society. It also ensures salvation for the individual. According to Ānandagiri Dakṣa was the first great patriarch to introduce the systems of āśramas in the society^[11].

{31} To the Grammarians, the reality consists of correct understanding of the gender: the masculine, the feminine and the neuter.

{32} There is yet another school which considers the reality to have two facets namely the absolute and the relative called para and apara. However, Supreme entity cannot be subject to division of any sort.

(28) {33} Those who have faith in mythology consider creation, preservation and destruction to be the true facets of reality. They are sristi, sthiti and laya. The pauranikas believe either in Brahmadeva who is the creator,

Or, {34} in Mahesh (or Rudra),who the destroyer of the Universe,

Or, {35} in VişĦu who is the sustainer of the Universe.

Gauḍapāda, however attributes them all to mere imaginations.

This is the concluding kārikā (28) in which Gauḍapāda ends his enumeration of the various theories of reality which was available at his time. The Pauranikas (the mythologists) fall under three distinct groups. Some believe that the world is a continuous creation; another, that it is a continuous destruction or dissolution; yet there is some who believe that it is an intermittent sustenance. Accordingly, each group considers creation, dissolution or sustenance as the ultimate Reality.

These thirty-five alternatives (vikalpas) are all imagined in ātman. But ātman, from its own standpoint, is free from all the alternatives. It is the substratum of all these imaginations. Śaṅkara in his commentary (20-28) says that, prāna means prājña, the state of deep sleep which is the seed (bijātmā) of the phenomenal world, which phenomena and concepts the ignorant people falsely attribute to the Self. These phenomena and concepts from elements to subsistence (20-28) are merely imagined like a snake on the rope. All these distinctions are imagined (anyathāgrahaṇaṃ) because one is unable to determine the nature of the Self (agrahaṇaṃ), which is devoid of all attributes.

Gauḍapāda, now, concludes (in kārikā 29) the above discussion on the nature of Self or the Ultimate Reality by asserting that the student finally learns about the Self from a teacher or a trustworthy person. When the truth is pointed out to the student, he understands it as his sole essence and gets rid of all other superfluous ideas about the reality. It is as though the student is possessed by the truth and he knows it as his own nature. Gaudapāda here points out that those who are imagining any other idea about the ātman and keeping it as their goal, fail to reach the highest reality.

According to Gauḍapāda, breath etc. are not separate from the Self, even though they appear as it were separate and distinct. One, who truly realises this, alone can interpret the meaning of the Vedas without hesitation or doubt. Śaṅkara explains the kārikā (30) using the rope snake analogy. According to him, the prāṇa etc, are non-different from the ātman (the Self) and yet they appear to be distinct from the Self. The snake that is perceived on the rope is not separate from the rope, and yet, at the time of the delusion, when the snake is visible, the rope is not available for our cognition. These things, prāṇa and other objects are merely superimposed on the Self, are imagined on the Self. As the snake is superimposed/imagined on a rope is not really different from the rope, similarly, prāṇa etc, are not different from the Self. But the ignorant people firmly believe that ātman is different from these objects. Śaṅkara says that, to the knower of truth, means who can discriminate between the truth and its false appearances, all this world manifests as the Self. For them the prāṇa etc., are the Self itself, as they will find the appearance of snake on a rope as rope itself. The Śruti also says, “All ignores one who knows it as different from the Self”: “All deserts him who knows all in anything else than the Self” (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad II.4.6; IV.5.7)^[12].

Therefore, as imagined things do not exist apart from their substratum, it is only the ignorant who think that the imagined and the substratum are two distinct things. Those who know the truth do not see them as distinct. This is proved by Śruti as well as by reasoning. The reasoning is all that is perceived is illusory and therefore things perceived in the waking state are as much illusory as those seen in dream. He who, knows this truth, that the Self ever remains, untouched by anything imagined on it, such a person can without hesitation construe the meaning of the Vedas. No one, who is ignorant of the Self within, can know the Vedas truly.

Gauḍapāda, has now, logically established that the duality is unreal. This understanding that the duality is unreal is also derived from the other means of knowledge, the scriptural authority. In kārikā 31 he says that:

As are dreams and illusions or a castle in the air seen in the sky, so is the universe viewed by the wise in the Vedānta.

Dream objects and illusion are unreal and yet they appear to the ignorant as if they are real. This universe, the entire sphere of duality, is however seen to be unreal in the Upanisads. As a city in the sky (gandharva-nagara) seemingly peopled with big shops, market places, houses, palaces and habitations (villages) and bustling with activities of men and women etc., is seen to vanish in no time in to nothingness; similarly this universe is seen to vanish into nothingness with the realization of nondual Self. The perceived world is no better than a dream or a magic show -unreal and non-existent.

It is the Upaniṣads that reveal the universe (the world) to be unreal in this way. ‘There is nothing of variety here’(KathU II.1.11; Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.4.19)^[13]; ‘Indra (the Lord) goes about in many forms by his māyās (magical powers)’ (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad II.5.19)^[14]; ‘Brahman, indeed, was this in the beginning’ (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.4.10)^[15]; ‘In the beginning this (world) was just the Self, one only’ (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.4.17)^[16] ‘It is from a second that fear arises’ (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.4.2)^[17]; ‘There is not, however, a second, nothing else separate from him that he could see’. (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.3.23)^[18]; ‘But where everything has become just one’s own self, by what and whom should one see’ (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.5.15)^[19]. These are the śruti texts cited by Śaṅkara to prove the unreality of duality. He says that the wise men, those who can see the real nature of things, declare the world as of the nature of a dream or a illusion (i.e. unreal). The Smṛti of Vyasa also supports this view in these words:”This duality of the universe is like a hole seen in the ground when it is seen in darkness. It is as unstable as a bubble seen in rain water, always undergoing destruction, ever devoid of bliss, and ceasing to exist, after dissolution”.

The kārikā (31) exhibit a very close resemblance to some aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhist literature. The expressions “mirage city” (gandharvanagar) and “dream” (svapna) are found a number of times in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nagarjuna.

Nagarjuna says:

Like a magic (māyā), like a dream (svapna), and just like a mirage city seen in the sky (gandharvanagara), so have been described origination, duration and cessations. (Māṇḍūkyakārikā 7.34)

There is a close resemblance between the language of kārikā 31 and the verse of Nagarjuna which is just quoted.

In the kārikā 32, Gauḍapāda summarises the essential philosophy of Vaitathya Prakaraṇa. This kārikā is one of the clearest and strongest statements made by Gauḍapāda on the ultimate truth or paramartha. Gauḍapāda’s famous teaching of ‘non-origination (ajātivāda) is also one of the central themes presented here.

Gauḍapāda says:

There is no dissolution, no birth, none in bondage, none aspiring for wisdom, no seeker of liberation and non liberated. This is the absolute truth.

When it is established that duality is unreal, and ātman alone is the ultimate reality, it follows that all our dealings whether conventional or scriptural are included within the domain of ignorance (avidyā). This being the case there is no dissolution. Nor is there such a thing as its origination. Thus there is no bondage or recurring births. Hence there is no one who strives for liberation, nor is there neither anyone who seeks it nor anyone who attains it. When there is no origination, no dissolution, there can be no question of anyone being in bondage. Nor, for that matter, can there be anyone striving for liberation or attaining it. This verily is the absolute truth.

A doubt can rise in the mind of the opponents as to how there is neither origination nor dissolution? To this, Śaṅkara replies by saying that there no such thing as duality. Śaṅkara quoting from several Upaniṣads asserts that it is only where duality is seen to persist, that origination etc. felt. The authority of the Upaniṣadic statements quoted by Śaṅkara is as follows:

‘For where there is duality as it were, there one smells another, there one sees another, there one hears another,...... Where, verily, everything has become the Self, then by what and whom should one smell, then by what and whom should one see”? (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad II.4.14)^[20] ‘Whatever is here, that (is) there. Whatever is there, that, too is here. Whoever perceives anything as many goes from death to death’. By mind alone is this to be obtained. There is nothing of variety here. Whoever perceives variety here, goes from death to death’. (KaṭḥU II.1.10-11)^[21]; ‘The Self, indeed, is all this (world)’ (Chāndogya Upaniṣad VII.25.2)^[22], ‘It is one only without a second’ (Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.2.1)^[23]; ‘....All ignores one who knows it as different from the Self…. This Brāhmaṇa, this Kṣatriya, these worlds, these gods, these beings and this all are this Self’ (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad II.4.6; IV.5.7)^[24]. These śruti texts and many others establish the unreality of the duality.

That which is (exist) alone can come to be born or die, can originate or get dissolved, not that which simply does not exist-for example, the horns of the hare. Birth or death can be imagined only in the realm of duality. But from the standpoint of the absolute truth duality is as non-existent as the horns of a hare. Therefore, from the ultimate point of view, birth or death is inconceivable, as neither birth nor death can be imagined of the horns of a hare or the son of a barren woman. The non-dual (ātman) can never be said to be born or destroyed. To say that the non-dual can have birth and death is a self contradiction.

It has already been pointed out in the earlier kārikās (20-28) that all our worldly experiences of duality, like imposing prāṇa etc., are only imagined, like snake is imagined on the rope which is its substratum.

That which only appears due to illusion or error in a substratum is never actually born. It is also not possible that it actually gets dissolved into that substratum. Snake being imagined on the substratum of a rope is neither born nor destroyed in/by the substratum rope. The snake is also not born or destroyed in the mind of the perceiver. The obvious reason is that the snake is seen as an external object, if the birth (origin) of a snake is in the mind, how can it appear as an external object? Further, it is not possible to say that the snake is born and destroyed simultaneously in the mind of the perceiver as also in the external substratum rope. The reason is that there cannot be simultaneously two substrata for the birth etc. of the same thing; one and the same son cannot be born simultaneously of the two mothers.

Duality is not experienced when the mind ceases to function, as for example, in yogic samādhi or in deep sleep. It is therefore established that duality is mere imagination of the mind. This means that duality is perceived when mind functions and it is not perceived when mind does not function. The existence of duality depends entirely upon the imagination of the perceiving subject. It has been well said, therefore, that duality does not exist and the ultimate truth is that there is no destruction (or birth),

I Objection:

If origin, dissolution and the like are not there, then all that the scriptures come to establish is the falsification of duality. But this does not establish the reality of the non dual. As a matter of fact, it establishes nothingness, (śunya), the very contradiction of the non-dual, the one without a second. Since the Vedantins do not give any proof in support of the existence of the Reality, their position becomes indistinguishable from that of the Nihilists, the (Śunyatāvadins) for whom also duality has no existence. In reply to this objection Śaṅkara reminds the opponent that his school is different from that of the Nihilists as the they (Vedantins) posit a substratum for all illusions. This has been reiterated by Śaṅkara several times. He says that, there is no possibility of the illusory appearance of the snake in the absence of the rope, which is the substratum of such appearance. The illusion cannot get negated without the knowledge of substratum.

II Objection:

The opponent continues with his objection that even the reality of the rope has now been denied by Vedantins, since it is also an imagined entity. The substratum called the rope is declared as an unreal appearance, a fabrication. Hence the above analogy cannot save Vedānta from the charge of nihilism.

To this objection, Śaṅkara replies that when the appearance ceases to be, the substratum will not cease to be. It will not cease to be because it did not constitute the content of what had been imagined onto it. The meaning is that, when the imagined entity disappears, the unimagined substratum is properly said to exist for the simple reason that it was not imagined. Therefore, this objection has no point.

III Objection:

It may be contended that like the imagination of the snake in the rope, it, the unimaginary substratum itself is as illusory and unreal.

In reply Śaṅkara says it cannot be so. The substratum, the ground, continues to exist even when unreal appearances have been superimposed onto it. In the rope-snake analogy, even when one ‘sees’ the snake-appearance, the rope continues to constitute that appearance–not as the form of the snake–content superimposed onto it, but as the non-imagined ground of the snake-content superimposed onto it. The rope does not spring into being when one realises the snake as an appearance. The rope has existed even before this realisation.Similar is the case with the Self, which is the ground of the appearance of all distorted perception. Further, it has been admitted that the imagining Subject, (knower or witness) has his/its existence prior to the imagination. It is therefore not reasonable to say that the Subject (knower or substratum) is non-existent.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Karmarkar, Gauḍapāda Kārikā, 78-84.

[2]:

This school was already mentioned in kārikā 1:6. Many references might be given to it. We only quote two of the most important are Taittirīya Upaniṣad. III.3 and BṛU IV.1.3. Caterina Conio, The Philosophy of Maṇḍūkya Kārikā, (Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1971), 140. fn.

[3]:

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad with Gauḍapāda's Kārikā, Śaṅkaras' Bhāṣya and Ānandagiri's Ṭikā. (Poona: Ānadāśrama Sanskrit Series, No. 10), 83.

[4]:

Ānandagiri Ṭikā, 84.

[5]:

Karmarkar, Gauḍapāda Kārikā, 79.

[6]:

Ibid., 80.

[7]:

Ibid.

[8]:

Bhattacharya, Āgama śāstra, 33.

[9]:

Ānandagiri Ṭikā, 86.

[10]:

Ānandagiri Ṭikā, 87.

[11]:

Ibid.

[12]:

Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, 198, 283.

[13]:

Ibid., 634.

[14]:

Ibid., 208.

[15]:

Ibid., 168

[16]:

Ibid., 172.

[17]:

Ibid., 164.

[18]:

Ibid., 264.

[19]:

Ibid., 286.

[20]:

S.Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, 201.

[21]:

Ibid., 634.

[22]:

Ibid., 488.

[23]:

Ibid., 447-8.

[24]:

Ibid., 198.