Nature of perception of objects in both states

In both the waking and the dream states, external objects are seen as being independently existent entities. They are thought to be real because they are seen as being real. Similarly, internal imaginary objects are seen as being internal mental creations. Because they are seen as being imaginary, they are thought to be unreal. In the dream state, the dream illusion imagined within by the mind is unreal. For, it disappears the moment that it is imagined. Further, even in dream that which perceived outside the mind, the perception of jar, etc., by means of the eyes, etc., appears real. Thus, though the entire dream experiences(imagined within and imagined outside the mind) are ultimately known in the waking state to be unreal appearances, yet they have their own distinctions of real and unreal as long as the dream lasts.

According to Gauḍapāda the objects in the waking state are no more real than dream objects. Like dream objects, waking objects have their being only in so far as they are perceived. However, it is not the final objective of the Māṇḍūkya Kārikā to merely prove that the world of the waking state is unreal. The unreality of object is demonstrated only for the purpose of showing where the reality is in our experience. Consequently Gauḍapāda anticipates a question from the opponents in kārikā 11:

If the objects cognized in both the condition (of dream and of waking) be illusory, who cognizes all these (illusory objects) and who again imagines them?

In his commentary, Śaṅkara explains the import of this question The opponent asks -if the objects of the waking and the dream states are illusory, then who cognizes these objects, those that are imagined as existing “within the mind” and those that are imagined as existing “outside the mind”? Again, who imagines them? In other words what is the substratum for knowledge and memory? Otherwise, there would be no other proof for concluding that there is the Self (the ātman).

Gauḍapāda addresses the questions in kārikā 12 of the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa. He says that: Ātman, the self-luminous, through the power of its own Maya, imagines in himself by himself (all the objects that the subject experiences within or without). He alone is the cognizer of the objects (so created). This is the decision of the Vedānta.

Gauḍapāda’s replies that, it is the absolute Self, the Turīya, pure Awareness that imagines, or apparently creates (kalpayati), the waking and dream worlds. He says no illusion takes place without a substratum and that the substratum of illusion is real. The Self which is the substratum of the illusory experience both in dream and waking is real. The eternal and self luminous Self through its own māyā/avidyā (svāmāyayā) in the empirical realm projects the dream phenomena as well as the external world. In dream as well as in the waking it can be said that the principle of mind becomes operative. One may consider māyā functioning as the mind which due to its unceasing movement projects the plurality.

Gauḍapāda explains that the very fact that there is the perception of an appearance immediately tells us that there must be the perceiver. When we examine our experience carefully, we can see that every act of perception does not establish the object. Rather, it establishes the perceiver. If we look for the source of perception in the world of objects, we will never find it. It is not the object that is necessary for perception. It is the perceiver that is essential. The reality in any experience is with the subject, the perceiver. The real value and purpose of perception and knowledge is that it presupposes that there must to the perceiver. For, as Śaṅkara says “otherwise there would be no other proof for concluding the existence of ātman or the Self”.

The perceiver is one’s own self. When I see and recognize an object, I know that the seeing and recognition are not in the object but in myself. The ātman is that inner self who is the seer. The kārikā 12 characterizes the ātman as “ātma devaḥ” or the “Divine Ātman”. That is, the Self, who is the seer, is beyond the individual body and mind because, being the seer it is the one who sees the body and mind. The body and mind are only objects seen by one’s own innermost Self. This Self who sees the body and mind can never itself be seen. It is this divine ātman, one’s innermost self who is the seer of all objects. The seer is the only reality.

There are no external objects for the seer to see. He projects/creates his own objects for Himself. He imagines them. As the kārikā 12 says, “the Divine ātman by means of his own māyā imagines Himself by Himself”. Since the only reality is the ātman, when He imagines the objects He can only be imagining Himself as the objects. And, the power or means for imagining the objects only can come from Him.

It has been shown that the seer, the ātman, is the only reality and the world of plurality appears as though it were real. How is this possible? Śaṅkara says: it is the Self that imagines the Self through the Self. He imagines Himself as the world through His māyā. The different objects are imagined in the Self as one would imagine a snake in the rope. It is the Self itself that cognises these objects. The Self alone is the support of memory and of cognition.

Śaṅkara in his explanation says that the Self appearing as the world is like the rope appearing as a snake. The rope, the adhistāna, never changes. The rope is never affected by the distorted perception of the snake on it. It is merely one thing appearing as though it were another. The Self (the ātman) merely appears as though it were the world. But in this appearance ātman itself never undergoes any change nor is the world ever actually created.

Gauḍapāda continues to discuss the apparent (mithyā) nature of the creation, and in doing so he makes a clear distinction between the waking and dream states. In kārikā 13 he says:

The Lord (ātman), with his mind turned outward, variously imagines the objects (such as sound etc.), which are already in his mind (in the form of vāsanās or saṅkalpas or desires). The ātman again (with his mind turned within), imagines in his mind various (objects of) ideas.

Here, the reference to the mind (citta) as being either ‘external’ or ‘internal’ is reminiscent of the statement in Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad 3 and 4 mantras, where the waker is spoken of as one “whose consciousness is external” (baḥiṣprajña) and the dreamer as one ‘whose consciousness is internal, (antaḥprajña). Gauḍapāda says that the Lord ‘creates’ (kalpayate) the things of the dream world and the things of the waking world. ‘He first thinks’ of the objects to be ‘created’ in his mind and then becomes out ward minded and ‘fixes’ them up outside, just as a speaker first thinks about what he is going to speak and then speaks out.

Śaṅkara gives reply to the question: In what manner does the imagining Self imagine Himself? This is being stated. The Self imagines the worldly objects such as sound etc., He also imagines other non-manifest things in the form of impressions (vāsanās) arranged in his mind. He turns his mind outward and imagines steady objects like the earth and impermanent objects like the lightening which remains only for a moment. Similarly, he turns his mind inward and imagines fanciful ideas. The Lord, the Self, imagines Himself this way. The potter or weaver desirous of making a pot or cloth first produces in his mind the idea (or image) of the object and then creates it externally fit for worldly dealings. Similarly here the objects are first thought out and then projected for practical purposes.

The conclusion that waking objects are unreal just as dream objects are unreal is reiterated in a different way in the following kārikā. Kārikā 14 appears to make a distinction between the duration of these two orders of bhavas or objects of consciousness: the inward/internal is subject to the temporal order of mind (cittakālas) whereas the outward is subject to the temporal order of the two (dvayakālas). This kārikā asserts that objects/entities in both these orders of reality viz., the outward and the inward are all imagined (kalpita eva te sarve) and that no fundamental difference between the so–called outer and inner worlds can be argued on any other ground (viseso nanyahetukah)^[1].

According to Gauḍapāda, the objects of both waking and dream states are “all mere imaginations” and there is no real difference between internal and external objects.

The difference that is seen between them is a difference in the way that they are imagined. Internal objects are imagined as being “internal and limited to the time of thought”. External objects are imagined as being “external and extended over two points of time.” As Śaṅkara says, the distinction of objects being external and extended over time is not due to any cause except that they are imaginations. In this way they are like the internal objects seen in dream. The distinctions (between dream and waking) are only in the way that they are imagined. But the objects of both states are fundamentally alike because they are all merely products of the imagination.

The opponent may raise the following objection, that the waking state cannot be considered to be an imagination (kalpita) like that of dream. The objects imagined within the mind, have their existence only for a short period of time (cittakāla) for they are imagined. On the other hand the objects perceived by senses externally in the waking state remain related to a larger duration of time i.e. by two points in time (dvayakāla) and become objects of recognition (pratyabhijña) later on. But this objection is countered in the following way.

According to Śaṅkara the special feature of objects perceived externally and becoming objects of recognition are no grounds for regarding them to be real. Cittakālāḥ means objects perceived within the mind and exist so long as the thought regarding them exists. It means that they are found to exist only till the time they are imagined. Dvayakālāḥ are objects related to two points of time, i.e., they are Bhedakālāḥ, i.e., there is another distinct time also determining their period of existence (kālasya bhedaḥ) or they may be called anyonya-paricchedyāḥi. e. time that is limited by mutually determined time. Śaṅkara gives an example of a man watching the milking of a cow.The cow is milked till the man observes it or the man observes the cow till it is milked. Thus there is kind of mutual determination of one act by the other act. Śaṅkara says that the special feature of the objects perceived externally by senses and their being called dvayakālāḥ is not due any other cause except their being imagined by the mind.

Gauḍapāda, in kārikā 15, renames the subjective (internal) and objective (external) realms as the unmanifest (avyakta) and the manifest (sphuta), and once more stating that they are both simply imagined (kalpita eva te sarve) by the mind. But he is adding that there is a difference in our way of experiencing them due to the fact that the manifest or outer world is perceived through the sense organs while the inner world is imagined directly through mind. Śaṅkara says that, whereas the objects that are internal (manovāsanāmātra) are indistinct, the objects that are external are clearly evident. They are all apparently created by the Self. This means in dream there is the operation only of the mind, whereas in the waking there is the mind functioning together with the various sense-organs such as eyes etc. Looking at dream and waking experiences from the standpoint of the waking state, Gauḍapāda distinguishes between them while maintaining both equally as mental construction or imagination.

Gauḍapāda, now provides more details about the process of creation. In kārikā 16 he describes the process of imagination as beginning with the construction or projection of the notion of an individual self (jīvaṃkalpayate pūrvaṃ) and expanding from that basis into the cognition of the various external and internal objects (tato bhāvān pṛthagvidhān bāhyānādhyātmikāṃś) ^[2] . It means that due to māyā, the ātman imagines /constructs everything. He says that, first of all, is imagined the Jīva (the embodied being) and then are imagined the various entities, objective and subjective, that are perceived. As is (one’s) knowledge show is (one’s) memory of it.

Śaṅkara explains that in asking the question, what is the source of the imagination of various objects, subjective and objective, which appear to be related to each other as cause and effect?

The jīva (individuality) is of the nature of cause and effect (hetuphalātmakaṃ [hetuphalātmaka]) and is characterised by such misconceived notion as: “I am performing; happiness and misery are mine”. The actions of jīvas are causes, for pleasure, pain, knowledge, attachment etc., which are the effects. The jīva imagines himself a doer, as well as the enjoyer. The Self which is pure does not possess action etc., and is not attached to this sequence of cause and effect. However, there is a distorted perception of Himself as an individual like a misperception of a snake on the rope. Thus when the individuality is projected, the Self attaches and identifies itself with its own creation like the body, breath, mind and senses etc.

Again, what is the cause of this imagination? It is thus stated: this jīvatva or individuality imagined by the Self is now competent to make further imaginations. As the jīva understands its projection so is its memory. In other words the jīva’s memory is determined by its knowledge of objects. Hence, from the knowledge of the imagination of cause there is the knowledge of the result (effect). This is followed by the memory of both cause and effect. Memory is again followed by knowledge, which is of the nature of action, actor and the effect to fulfill that purpose. So continues the cycle. In this way the jīva imagines external and internal objects as mutually related to each other in terms of cause and effect. This can be explained in this way: If there is food and drink, there is satisfaction. From the idea of knowledge of food etc., which is the cause, follows the idea of the knowledge of satisfaction which is the effect. Next day, we get the memory of this cause and effect experienced on the previous day. Then there is the knowledge of the desirability of having that result and again we look for the means of achieving it. Accordingly for that intended satisfaction we begin the act of cooking etc., with the help of rice, fuel etc. These kinds of knowledge arise, then their memory, then acting accordingly, then its effect. In this order, imaginations are made which are the cause and effect of one another.

Karmarkar remarks that Gauḍapāda does not dilate upon this topic further as he is mainly interested in the ajātivāda^[3]. Gauḍapāda says that the jīva, being ignorant of its own true nature, the ātman that is its substratum (adhisthāna), proceeds to develop a number of mistaken views of reality. He, in kārikā 17, gives the famous example of the rope and the snake to show how the ātman appears as the world of objects. It is said:

As the rope, whose nature is not really known, is imagined in the dark to be a snake, a water-line etc., so also is the ātman imagined (in various ways).

In every experience, it is the seer who is the only reality. Objects appear only as they are seen by the seer. Yet, in perception our attention does not go to the seer, the perceiver. Our attention generally goes to the object and we think that it is the object that is real. We are ignorant of the seer, even though it is the source and background of every experience. The Self is evident but not understood.

The analogy of rope-snake is an appropriate one to show how this happens. It is only because of the presence of the rope that it is even possible to see the illusory snake. The rope is the substratum and foundation for the apparent snake; it is the reality behind the appearance. But, when we see the snake, our attention goes entirely to the appearance and we are unaware of what it really is.

In his commentary, Śaṅkara makes it clear that the illusory perception of the world is the result of our ignorance of the true nature of ātman. He says:

What is the cause of the imagination of the individual self and the world associated with it? This is explained by means of an illustration. It is just as in the world a rope whose own form has not been well ascertained, is imagined in hazy darkness to be a snake, a water line, or a stick, or many other things. All this is due to the previous absence of knowledge regarding the real nature of the rope. If previously the rope had been known in its real nature, then the imagination of snake etc., would not have been possible, as in the example of the fingers of one’s own hand. One does not misapprehend one’s own fingers this way because one knows very well what they are.

Similarly, ātman has been variously imagined as jīva (individuals), prāṇa (breath) and other phenomena of the world, phenomena limitless in number. This happens when one does not ascertain for certain what it’s true nature is; when one does not know, that it is of the nature of pure Consciousness and that it is non-dual and has nothing to do with the characteristics of the world, characteristics like cause and effect. In the absence of this knowledge (i.e. the true nature of ātman is not known), the ātman is imagined with individuality; with breath and all kinds of phenomena one can neither count nor mention. This is verily the established conclusion of all the Upaniṣads.

All appearances require a perceiver. This ‘seer’ goes unrecognized when the attention is directed towards the object. Only when the Self is known, the felt object becomes a mere appearance. We do not recognize the fact that in order for the appearance to appear, it must be seen by the seer. According to Vedānta if we are to free ourselves from the illusion of objects we must turn our attention from the seen to the seer, from the appearance to the reality. As Gauḍapāda in kārikā 18 says:

When the real nature of the rope is ascertained all illusions about it disappear and there arises the conviction that it is the one (unchanged) rope and nothing else; even so is the nature of the conviction regarding ātman.

When it is ascertained that there is only a rope and that the appearance of the snake is illusory, the realization that “this is only a rope and nothing else (advaitam [advaita])” dawns. Similar is the case with the ātman. The scriptures propound the Self (ātman) as devoid of all worldly attributes as is vouched by such texts as neti, neti: not this, not this (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.4.22)^[4]. By eliminating every possible thought about the Self through the process of elimination prescribed in such texts, the scriptures give rise to the knowledge of the Self that removes all ignorance as the light of the sun removes all darkness. Again, One also come to know with certainly that all that exists is nothing else other than the Self as many ‘Śruti texts’ declare: “The Self, indeed, is all this (world)” (Chāndogya Upaniṣad VII.25.2.)^[5]. “This Brahman is without an earlier and without a later, without an inside, without an outside“(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad II.5.19)^[6]. ‘It is without and within, unborn, without breath….”(Muṇḍ II.1.2)^[7].“This is that great unborn Self who is undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless Brahman....’ (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.4.25)^[8], and “it is one only without a second” (Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.2.1)^[9].

The ignorance regarding the true nature of the rope can only be overcome when one’s attention goes from the snake to the rope. When the attention is directed to the rope, then the true nature of the rope can be seen and the illusion ceases “so also is the conviction regarding ātman.” (kārikā 18). The ignorance regarding the real nature of ātman will be removed only when we turn our attention from the world of objects to the light of experience.

This rope-snake illustration shows that when we turn our attention from the appearance to the reality, we do not destroy anything. When we see the rope we do not destroy the snake. Rather, we realize that the snake was merely an appearance and we are no longer deluded by it. Similarly, when we realize the ātman, the Self, the world does not get destroyed.In the light of this reality we can no longer be deluded by the world of appearance.

It is important here to mention that it is through this illustration Gauḍapāda is able to show how the ātman appears as the world. It is also through this rope-snake analogy, Gauḍapāda has shown how one can go from the appearance back to the reality. There is no idea of claiming a real change for the rope into a snake, and in the same way no real change can be claimed for ātman when perceived as the world. Brahman / ātman presents itself as the world, and apart from Brahman, there would be no world. Therefore, Brahman is called the material cause of the world. Brahman is the material cause in the sense that it is the source, support and the point of resolution of the world like water is the source etc., for the waves. The apparent and illusory existence of a material world requires a real substratum, which is ātman/ Brahman, just as the appearance of the snake requires the real substratum of a rope. So, the analogy of the snake and the rope expresses a unique insight of Vedānta.

If the established conclusion is that ātman is one and the sole reality, how is it that it comes to be imagined as prāṇa (breath) and other innumerable phenomena that constitute the phenomenal world? This is being replied by Gauḍapāda in kārikā 19 as: The ātman is imagined as prāṇa and other endless objects. This is due to māyā (ignorance) of the luminous (ātman itself) by which It is (as it were) deluded.

Śaṅkara explains that just as a juggler conjures up an illusion and makes the very clear sky appear covered with trees, blooming with flowers and leaves, so does the māyā of this luminous one make the formless ātman appear as though endowed with forms. This māyā seems to delude the ātman, makes it look like as though deluded.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad Gauḍapādiyakārikā (with Hindi trans.), 95.

[2]:

Ibid., 97.

[3]:

Karmarkar, Gauḍapāda Kārikā, 77.

[4]:

S. Radhakrishnan, trans. The Principal Upaniṣads, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991), 279.

[5]:

9 Ibid., 488.

[6]:

Ibid., 208.

[7]:

Ibid., 680.

[8]:

Ibid., 281.

[9]:

Ibid., 447-8.