The falsity of external objects in waking and dreaming states

The second chapter of the Māṇḍūkya Kārikā is known as Vaitathya Prakaraṇa. According to Karmarkar^[1] this prakaraṇa is usually called Vaitathya, presumably because the first word of the first kārikā in this prakaraṇa is vaitathya. The meaning of the term ‘vaitathya’ remains the same for different scholars, though they use different translations: Karl Potter^[2] uses the word ‘erroneous’ for vaitathya, Balasubramanian^[3] says that the term ‘vaitathya’ is used as mithyāby Gauḍapāda, Michael Comans^[4] also accepts that Gauḍapāda uses, ‘vaitathya’ which conveys the same idea as the word ‘mithyā’, a word that can be translated as ‘unreal’ or as only ‘apparently real’ and Richard King^[5] uses the word non-veridicality for ‘vaitathya’. Taking into cognition the above mentioned meaning of the word ‘vaitathya’, I have used the word illusion/unreal.

This chapter provides a different approach for the realization of the Self. In his introduction, Śaṅkara explains the purpose and the approach of the second chapter (vaitathya prakaraṇa). He says, the second chapter is concerned with rationally proving the unreality of the phenomenal world of duality, on the cessation of which is attained non-duality, just as the reality of the rope is attained on the elimination of the illusion of a snake, etc, imagined on it^{[6] .}

The approach of the second chapter begins with an examination of every day experience, namely the study of three states. The purpose is to prove, through reason, that any experience of duality is illusory and no more real than a dream. We are bound by the illusion only so long as we see it as real, just as we are scared of the snake as long as we see it other than the rope. This chapter proves that the phenomenal world is illusory so that we may no longer be deluded by it. The purpose of this chapter is to free us from the illusion of duality so that we may then be capable of seeing the reality which is non-dual.

Śaṅkara begins his commentary on the second chapter by showing the relationship (sambandha) between the earlier chapter āgama prakaraṇa and the present chapter the vaitathya prakaraṇa highlighting the objective of this chapter. He says that in the spirit of such śruti texts as “One indeed without a second” (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.2.1). Gauḍapāda declares that no duality remains when truth is known. (Gauḍapādakārikā 1.18). This statement was made on the authority of scriptures. The unreality of duality can also be established through reasoning. It is for this purpose the second chapter begins with vaitathyaṃ, etc. The word, ‘vaitathyaṃ’ signifies the fact of its being unreal or false^[7]. Whereas, the first chapter (āgama prakaraṇa) shows that with the knowledge of the non-dual it can be seen that there is no duality; the second chapter (vaitathya prakaraṇa) shows that when it is seen that there is no duality, the knowledge of the non-dual Self arises. The first chapter shows that with the perspective of the non-dual, the duality is eliminated. The second chapter shows that with the elimination of duality, the nondual perspective is achieved. In either case, the non-dual advaita is established.

It is now important to understand what is meant by duality (dvaita). Duality is the experience of (any) multiplicity. This implies not only to the multiplicity of the many objects of experience, but also, and more fundamentally, to the experience of the subject and object relationship. One may experience a single object, but that experience can be a duality so long as there is the experience of oneself as an individual perceiving an object as different from oneself. Again, the experience of duality is not limited to the waking state. In the dream also, many objects are experienced. The dream subject (or the dreamer) is experienced in the dream as the one who undergoes the experience of the dream and as the one who perceives the objects of the dream. The duality of subject and object, the perceiver and the perceived, is present in both the waking and the dream states. Hence, in the second chapter (vaitathya prakaraṇa), Gauḍapāda examines the experiences of both the waking and the dream states.

The vaitathya prakaraṇa begins with a consideration of the dream state and demonstrates that the objects of dream experiences are illusory. Gauḍapāda formulates his argument for the illusoriness of the world in two stages. First, he starts with the commonly accepted view that the objects of dream experience are illusory, and also provides reasons in support of this. Secondly, he argues on the basis of the dream analogy that the objects of waking experience are also illusory. This is the method that Gauḍapāda adopts in this chapter.

I begin the study of dream and the use of dream state to annul the wakeful experience by using Gauḍapada’s relevant kārikās. In the very first kārikā he says: The wise declare the unreality of all the objects seen in the dream, they all being located within (the body) and on account of their being in a confined space.

This kārikā begins the proof of the unreality of duality by establishing the unreality (vaitathyaṃ [vaitathya]) of all objects (sarvabhāvānām) experienced in dream (svapna). As Śaṅkara explains in his commentary, this includes both the external and the internal objects perceived in dream state. The external dream objects are those such as trees, tables, jars which are outside or different from the dream subject. The internal dream objects are those such as pleasure, pain, fear which are experienced as internal to the dream subject. The wise men give reasons for the knowledge that the dream objects are unreal. The reason is antaḥsthānāt, on account of their being within. ‘Within’ means ‘inside the body,’ for it is inside the body that mountains, elephants and other dream objects are perceived and not outside the body. Therefore, they must be considered unreal.

In dream there is no sensory perception of objects outside the body. When the body is sleeping, the sense-organs are at rest and all dream perceptions are within the body.

Yet, these dream objects are experienced in the dream as though they were external to the perceiver. In the dream the dreamer sees himself as a subject experiencing objects which are external to himself and existing independently of himself. However, when the dreamer wakes up, he realizes that the objects were experienced in dream where the sense-organs do not function and there is no external perception.

In the dream, the experience is as though it were of the waking state. Just as in the waking state, in the dream state also, objects are seen as external and as existing independently of the subject. So, the dream objects are taken to be real. However, when the dreamer wakes up, he/she finds that the seemingly external objects were really only dream objects internally created by the dreamer. It is the contradiction of their appearing to be external and really being internal that makes the dream objects illusory and therefore false. They are illusory because they appear to be other than what they are.

Śaṅkara concludes his commentary on this kārīkā with the following objection and reply: the objection is raised that ‘location within’ is not a valid reason for inferring the unreality of dream phenomena. Objects like jar etc., too are located within a house. But the fact that they are so located cannot prove their unreality. Hence the reason for the inference is not a valid one.

The objection is replied to by saying that dream phenomena are perceived in such enclosed space that they cannot be real—there is no proper (ucita) space for them to really exist. The reply is given by the phrase Saṃvṛtatvena hetunā (by reason of confinement) There is no inconsistency/incongruity in the jar being within the house. So, this is no reason for concluding that the jar is unreal. But there is inconsistency in thinking that mountains, elephants of the dream are within the limited space of the dreamer’s body. The perception of space in the dream state is inconsistent (i.e. diametrically opposed) with the perception of space in the waking state. The large objects and spaces perceived in the dream cannot be contained within the limited space of the sleeping body^[8].

It may be objected that the dream objects cannot be within because the dream experience may occur in a place far away from the place where the dreamer is sleeping. In other words it is not established that objects seen in dream are existing within the limited space (of the body) because a man sleeping in the east is to be seen as though seeing the dream in the north.

The kārikā 2 meets this objection by showing that it is impossible for the dreamer to actually travel to the distant places experienced in the dream. In his commentary on this kārīkā Śaṅkara says that, the dreamer does not go to places outside the body to see dream-phenomena because he seems to reach places hundreds (yojanās) of miles away, which he could not possibly reach in less than a month in his waking state. Yet he seems to reach there the moment he falls asleep and seems to see dream objects/phenomena. But, in fact, he had no sufficient time to go there and come back. Hence, adīrghatvat ca kālasya^[9] , because of the shortness of the time, the dreamer could not possibly go to the place he finds himself in the dream.

Moreover, when awake, no dreamer finds himself where he was during his dream. If he had actually gone to the place he dreamt of, he would have found himself there itself even after his sleep. But that does not happen to be the case. A man sleeping at night sees objects as if they are in the day time. In the dream, there is the experience of meeting with certain people. If this meeting had really occurred, these people would remember having met with the dreamer. But later, in the waking state, these people do not remember the meeting which occurred in the dream. They do not come to tell him, ‘we met you there today’. This gives further evidence that the dreamer was not in the place experienced in the dream. In short, “the dream objects or phenomena” do not conform to the laws of space and time which govern the waking world^[10]. All these reasons show that though the dream appears to have occurred outside the body and even in some cases in places far distant from the place of the sleeping body, when it is examined it is found that the dream occurred within. The purpose of this kārikā is to give further evidence for the conclusions of the first kārikā and to meet possible objections to these conclusions.

Gauḍapāda in kārikā 3 cites yet another reason for the unreality of objects seen in dream. This kārikā thus explains: Following reason, (as indicated above) śruti declares the non-existence of the chariots etc. (perceived in dream). Therefore it is said (by the wise) that śruti itself declares the illusoriness (of the dream-experiences), established (by reason).

This kārīkā is referring to the third section of the fourth chapter of Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. “In dream there are no chariots, no animals to be yoked to them, no roads to tread....” (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.3.10)^[11]. This Upaniṣad says that although chariots and other objects may be seen in dream, these objects are not really present. It says that all the dream objects are only the creation of the one who sees the dream. Thus speaks śruti about the non existence of dream objects. The objects (or phenomena) experienced in dream are not real for the reason that they are not seen on waking. It is true that they appear to be real so long as the dream experience lasts. Gauḍapāda refers to Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad because the chariots and horses, the roads and bridges which one perceives in a dream are accepted as real by the person concerned during dream experience; and when the person wakes up he declares them to be illusory because they have disappeared. The fact is that all dream objects are projections of the mind. That is why, Gauḍapāda says, śruti speaks about the absence of chariots, roads, and so on in dream, even though one perceives them at that time. The dream-lion is as illusory as a snake mistakenly seen in the rope in waking experience. In the words of T.M.P Mahadevan^[12] :

The dream-objects are on a par with the contents of erroneous experience in waking life. One might mistake a rope for a snake so long as the error lasts, one imagines that the snake is real. But when right knowledge supervenes, the illusoriness of the snake that appeared is realized. Similar is the case with the world of dreams. As long as one is in it, one does not doubt its reality. But when comes out of the charmed circle, its non-reality is easily recognized.

Śaṅkara in his commentary on this kārikā says that the illusoriness of dream objects has been established in the first two preceding kārikās. The knowers of Brahman say: this śruti text is primarily intended to establish that ātman is self-luminous. The śruti also establishes the unreality of dream objects by envisaging the reasoning adopted in the earlier two kārikās, viz., ‘the dream objects are confined in a limited space within the body’.

The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad shows how the self luminosity of the ātman gets revealed in dreams. The primary purpose of that Śruti was to prove the self-luminous nature of the Self. In the waking state, the various luminous deities as the sun, the fire, etc may be said to be illumining the objects. But who illumines objects experienced in dream? The reply is-the self-luminous ātman. Even dream reveals the reality of the Self, Śaṅkara says. And the Śruti speaks about the unreality of dream phenomena only when it reveals the self-luminosity of the Self.

So, Gauḍapāda demonstrates the unreality of dream in the first three kārikās by referring to three means of knowledge: inference (anumāna), perception (pratyakṣa) and verbal testimony, in this case the Śruti.

In kārīkā 4 Gauḍapāda proves the unreality of the waking world. He begins by saying: Like the dream-objects, the objects of the waking experience, are illusory for the same reason that they are perceived. The only difference between dream and waking state is that in dream the objects are within on account of being enclosed in the body. In other words the objects of dream are within and confined to a limited space. But the wakeful objects are not thus confined. According to Gauḍapāda different objects cognized in dream (are illusory) on account of their being perceived to exist. For the same reason, the objects seen in the waking state are illusory. The nature of objects is the same in the waking state and dream. The only difference is the limitation of space (associated with dream objects).

Śaṅkara in his commentary on this kārikā helps us to understand Gauḍapāda’s argument by formulating it in the form of an inference viz., five membered syllogistic arguments^[13] :

(1) Objects perceived in the waking state are unreal. This is the proposition (pratijñā), the hypothesis to be proved.

(2) Being perceived is the reason (hetu).

(3) The perception of objects in dream is the example (dṛṣṭānta/udāharaṇa). Whatever is perceived is illusory, e.g., a dream-lion.

(4) Just as in dream the objects that are perceived are unreal / illusory, it is thus also in the waking state. “Being perceived” is common to both the states. This is hetupanaya, application of reason.

(5) Therefore, things perceived (dṛśyatvāt) in the waking state too are said to be unreal. This is the conclusion (nigamana).

The reason (hetu) by which objects of the waking state are proved to be illusory is that they are perceived (dṛśyatvāt).In order to understand the argument that is given here, the role of perception in experience must be understood. All experience is perceived. Waking objects and dream objects are both objects of perception. The only way that we can know or experience any object is in the perception of it. Hence, ‘being perceived’ is common to both the states.

In both states, the objects are illusory because they appear to be other than what they are. When we are in each of these states, we think that the objects exist independently and that we then perceive them. But when we examine the nature of perception, we see that there is no perception of external objects. Objects are created in the perception of them. The error is in thinking that objects exist independently of perception.

But the waking state and the dream state are experienced as being two different states. There must be some difference between them if the one is to be distinguished from the other. This kārīkā continues by explaining how the two states are different. It is said, the only difference between them is because the objects of dream are within and confined to a limited space. Śaṅkara says that ‘because of being within and being in an enclosed space the objects seen in dream are different from those seen in waking state. The being perceived and being unreal are common to the objects of both states’.

In dream the body is at rest and there is no external perception. But in the waking state, the body is active and perception is through the senses so that the objects are seen as though they are external to the body. It is this difference in the way the objects are seen that accounts for the difference between the two states. Dream objects are thought to be internal to the perceiver. Waking objects are seen as though they are external to the perceiver.

However, it must be noted that this distinction cannot be seen while one is in the dream state itself. One must leave the dream state in order to see that the objects seen there are/were internal. The distinction between wakeful and dream is really seen from the point of view of the wakeful state. It is only from the wakeful state that it can be thought the dream objects are within the enclosed space of the dreamer’s body. From the point of view of the dream state, the dream objects have no relationship to the sleeping body because the sleeping body does not exist in dream. The distinction between the two states is based entirely upon the illusory notion that in the wakeful state there is the perception of external objects.

Gauḍapāda continues in kārīkā 5 by showing that since the objects of the two states have been shown to be equally illusory, the distinction between the two states cannot be maintained. As Śaṅkara explains:

The identity of the dream and waking states has been declared by the wise because it has been shown that the relationship of the perceiver and the perceived is the same for the different objects of the two states. This is the result of the previously established proof.

The objects of the two states are the same because in both the states they are objects of perception. The two factors, like the subject-object, the seer and the seen, are equally present in both the dream and the waking states. The insight that is at the centre of this proof is the recognition that any object must be an object of perception. There is no knowledge of any object that is not perceived by a perceiver. To be an object is to be perceived. This relationship between the perceiver and the perceived holds for both the waking and the dream states. Hence, the two states are fundamentally the same.

The fact that the object can be remembered show that the actual perception of the object must be within. In memory, there is no perception of an external object through the senses. Yet, there is perception of the object. This shows that the perception of the object must always be within, even at the time that it appears to be an external perception. The object can only be known as it is within the perception of the perceiver. The object that we see can never be external and can never exist independently of the perception. It is on the basis of this insight that this kārikā concludes that the dream and waking states are fundamentally the same. They are both brought into existence by perception. So, the objects of both the states are of the same nature and are equally unreal.

The kārīkā 6 gives yet another reason for concluding that the objects in waking state are unreal. Gauḍapāda states the reason in this way: That which is non-existent at the beginning and in the end, is necessarily so (non-existent) in the middle. The objects are like the illusions we see, still they are regarded as if real.

Śaṅkara offers the following explanation in his commentary. According to him, the objects perceived in waking state are unreal, for they do not exist in the beginning, i.e. prior to their creation or at the end, i.e. after destruction. That object which does not exist at the beginning or at the end, like a mirage, does not exist in the middle also. This is an accepted truth in the world. A mirage is a good illustration of this truth. Mirage water actually is a distorted perception of the sand. It has neither prior existence nor does it have existence after its disappearance. However, it is seen to exist and this existence is only an appearance. Thus different objects seen in the waking state are unreal. They are unreal like a mirage and other illusory appearances. The ignorant not knowing the reality behind all appearances would regard the later to be real. This is because they failed to see the Self or the ātman.

When we recognize that all objects are objects of perception, we can see that the perceived object does not exist either before or after the perception. Śaṅkara gives the example of the mirage. The example as well as our common experience tells us that when we know that an object does not exist either before or after the perception of it, we know that it does not exist even when it is perceived. At the time of perception, there is simply the perception. This holds true whether the perception is of a mirage or of any other waking state object. It is not even possible for there to be an object which is then perceived. All objects are like the mirage, they exist only in the perception of them and it is illusory to think that they exist independently of the perception.

What is conditioned by time is evanescent, impermanent. For example, a pot which we see now and think that it exists was not there prior to its origination; and it will be no more when it is destroyed. So having a beginning and an end, it is limited by time and what is conditioned by time is impermanent. We see the pot and claim that it exists in the present, even though it was non-existent in the past and will be nonexistent in the future. We see a lion in a dream and claim that it exists and is real at that time; we see a mirage in our waking life and claim that it exists and is real. The truth is that both the dream lion and the mirage are illusory because they have a beginning and an end. In the same way, the objects of our waking experience, which we see, are illusory because they have a beginning and an end, because they are experienced only in the waking state. The entire waking objects are not perceived in other states and hence they are not there at all times. Still, we consider them as real because of ignorance.

When we are in the waking states, we feel that the utility of the objects that we encounter approves to their reality. Food, vehicles and machinery tools can be used to fulfill a purpose. Dream objects cannot fulfill any purpose and we take this to be an indication that they are illusory. One might argue that on the basis of their utility, we are able to know that waking objects are real and dream objects are unreal.

In response to this, Gauḍapāda in the kārikā 7 says: The serving a purpose (as means to an end), of them (the objects of waking experience) is contradicted (opposed) in dream. Therefore they are undoubtedly admitted to be illusory on account of their (both waking and dream) being with a beginning and an end.

The only reason due to which we think that waking objects are useful and dream objects are not is that we make this judgment while we are in the waking state. When we are in the dream state, the situation is just reverse. In dream, dream objects are used and waking objects have no utility. In the commentary on this kārikā, Śaṅkara uses the example of food. In the waking state, we may feel hungry, eat a meal and be satisfied. We may then go to sleep, enter the dream state, and feel hungry again. The food that we ate in the waking state had no effect/utility upon the hunger of the dream state. The dream state hunger can be appeased only by eating the the dream food. Of course, it is also true that food eaten in the dream state will have no effect/utility (Saprayojanatā)^[14] in appeasing hunger that is felt upon awakening. Waking experience is thus sublated in dreams in the same way as dream experience is sublated in the waking state. If sublation/contradiction of dream experience by waking experience speaks of the unreality of dream experience, the sublation of waking experience by dream experience should also be taken to establish the unreality of waking experience.

The utility of both (states) begins and ends with their appearance in the state in which they are seen. Consequently, the utility of waking objects does not prove that they are real; it only proves that they are useful for the waking state. When we consider both states, we can see that waking objects come and go just as easily as dream objects. There is no reason to say that waking objects are any more real than dream objects. Again waking state is as much marked by beginning and end as dream state. For this reason, they are both rightly held to be unreal.

The next objection calls into question the illustration of dream. The objection is that the illustration is not proved (dṛṣṭāntāsiddhi). The objector says: ‘since dream and waking states are of the same nature, therefore, one could infer from the unreality of dream the unreality of the waking state’ is not a right contention. You cannot possibly give an instance whereby you could prove the similarity between the two states. For what you see in the waking state you simply do not see in the dream state. In the dream state you see things for which there is absolutely no parallel in the waking state, things are extraordinarily unusual and strange. One may, for example, find oneself in that state an eight armed being riding a four tusked elephant. Such and other kinds of strange sights frequently occur in dreams. These dream objects are not like other illusory objects. They have to be taken as real. The analogy between the dream state and the waking state cannot thus be sustained. Hence, the statement that the waking experiences are illusory (unreal) like those of dream is not correct. Śaṅkara in his reply to this above mentioned objection says: The objects perceived in dream are reflective of the state of being of the dreamer or perceiver. These objects one chooses to consider as real are unique to dreams are not realities in and by themselves.

Gauḍapāda in kārīkā 8 says that these unusual or strange (apūrva) dream object are like those perceived by a dweller in heaven (svarganivāsin). He says that unusualness is not a criterion for reality. The idea is that the unusualness belongs to the person who is in that state (sthāni), it does not belong to the state itself. In other words, the strangeness is purely subjective, and so it cannot be used to prove that something is real. Gauḍapāda gives the example of a scholar (suśikṣitaḥ). When an educated person travelled to a different country to pursue further studies, he might find the customs of that place to be strange, but the strangeness is the experience of the traveler, for the inhabitants of the place do not find their custom strange. Similarly if one went to dwell in heaven one might find everything unusual there (in heaven) the feeling of strangeness of dream is only from the standpoint of the person who dreams and later on reflects upon the experience when awake. Since the unusualness is subjective it cannot be used as an argument to prove that dream is real. Śaṅkara in his commentary on this kārīkā explains:

Indra and other gods that dwell in heaven are said to have a nature unlike that of human beings. They are said to have a thousand eyes and possess is other attributes which are superhuman. Similar is the case with a dreamer. But these strange things have no being of their own. These unusual objects the dreamer sees in his dream are the thoughts of his mind and have no independent reality other than the perceiver. They reflect the state of being of the one placed in the dream as much rope–snake and mirage reflect the state of being of their perceiver. They are unreal appearances.

So, the view that objects in a dream are marked by strange characteristics that do not obtain in the waking state and for this reason cannot be cited as illustrations to establish the equation between the dream state and the waking state has been refuted by Śaṅkara.

Gauḍapāda in kārīkās (9-10) elaborates on the similarity of objects perceived in wakeful and dream states. Just as the dream objects imagined as well as perceived are negated totally by the waker, so too the internal and external cognition of the wakeful state. He says that:

In dream, also, what is imagined within by the mind is illusory and what is cognized outside (by the mind) appears to be real. But (in truth) both these are known to be unreal. Similarly, in the waking state, also, what is imagined within by the mind is illusory; and what is experienced outside (by the mind) appears to be real. But in fact, both should be rationally held to be unreal.

Śaṅkara in his commentary on these two kārīkās (9-10) explains that, even in the dream state we make a distinction between real and unreal objects according to whether the objects are seen as external or internal. In dream, objects seen as being merely a product of one’s own mind or imagination are seen as unreal. Whereas, objects seen as being external and as seen through the senses like eyes etc., are seen/appear as real. This distinction is seen while one is still in the dream state. But when one wakes up from the dream state, one can see that all the dream objects were merely internal imaginations. We take the distinction between the unreal internal objects and the supposedly real external objects more seriously in the waking state only because we still in the perspective of this state.

These two (9-10) kārīkās are stated in such a way that the wording in each of them is exactly the same except for the use of the words dṛṣṭam and yuktam. This shows that the misperception of objects in each of these states is exactly the same. The difference between the states that is mentioned here is in the means by which it is known that the objects are misperceived. In the case of the dream state, we are able to look at dream experience from the waking state) and see (dṛṣṭam [dṛṣṭa]) that both the internal and the external objects are really perceived internally and are therefore unreal. In the case of the waking state, we are able to apply reason and examine the waking experience and prove (yuktam [yukta]) that the objects of the waking state are unreal for precisely the same reasons that objects of the dream state are unreal.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Raghunath Damodar Karmarkar, Gauḍapāda Kārikā, Edited With a Complete Translation in English, Notes, Introduction, and Appendices, (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1973), 71.

[2]:

Karl H. Potter, “Was Gauḍapāda An Idealist”? in Sanskrit and Indian Studies, M.Nagatomi, B.K.Matilal, J.M.Masson and E. Dimock (eds.), 183-199, (Dordrecht: D.Reidel 1979), 185.

[3]:

R.Balasubramanian, T.M.P.Mahadevan, The Builders of Indian Philosophy Series, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1998), 58.

[4]:

Michael Comans, The Method of Early Advaita Vedānta: A Study of Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Sureśvara and Padmapāda, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000), 26.

[5]:

Richard King, Early Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism The Mahayana Context of the Gauḍapādiya-Kārikā, (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications A Division of: Indian Books Centre, 1997), 168.

[6]:

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad: Gauḍapādakārikā, Śaṅkarabh āśya, (with Hindi Translation), (Gorakhpur: Gita Press, Samvat 2062), 24.

[7]:

Ibid., 82.

[8]:

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad Gauḍapādakārikā, 83.

[9]:

Ibid., 84.

[10]:

T. M. P. Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda A Study in Early Advaita, (Madras: University Of Madras, 1960), 121.

[11]:

Som Raj Gupta, The Word Speaks to the Faustian Man, Volume Two, (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995), 257.

[12]:

T. M. P. Mahadevan, Gauḍapada A Study in Early Advaita, 121-2.

[13]:

Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad Gauḍapādakārikā, Śaṅkarabhāsya (with Hindi trans.), 86.

[14]:

Saprayojanatā in this kārikā (2:7) is explained by Ānandagiri as phalaparyantatva capacity to yield concrete fruit or result. Prof. Bhattacharya reads (svapne api pratipadyate) “that the things have some purpose also in dream is known;” but this reading does not bring out the sense intended by the kārikā. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, Edited, Translated And Annotated, The Āgama śāstra of Gauḍapāda (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1943), 20 .