Cārvāka View of Consciousness

The first school of thought explored and examined here is Indian Materialism called the Cārvāka. According to the scholar Colebrooke: A collection of all available Cārvāka fragments has been a desideratum since Henry Thomas Colebrooke^[1] first wrote on the materialist tradition in India in 1827. For a pretty long time scholars relied exclusively on Mādhavācārya's explanation of the Cārvāka school in his famous doxographic text called sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. This exposition of the Cārvāka view undoubtedly enjoys the highest popularity among modern scholars. Slow and steady discovery of many a Cārvāka fragment, especially in the Buddhist and Jain works and other compendia of philosophical systems, made it clear that there was more than what meets the eye. Formerly only two legendary names were associated with the materialists system: Bṛhaspati and Cārvāka. Śāntarakṣīta's Tattvasaṅgraha and Kamalāśīla's Pañjikā provide three historical names of Cārvāka authors: Aviddhakarṇa, Kambalāśvatara and Purandara. Cakradhara mentions two more: Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭṭa and Bhāvivikta. Jayarāsi's Tattvopaplavasiṃha belong to 7th century A.D. and is the only extant text on this school. This text is polemic in its content directed against all the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy. The significance of the name 'Cārvāka' is uncertain, but the other common name for the school which is 'Lokāyata' has a meaning which is somewhat clearer. The term Lokāyata indicates that this world (loka) alone exists and there is nothing beyond this material loka.

Mādhavācārya in his text Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha gives an exposition of Cārvāka thus:

The Cārvāka accepts four elements namely earth, water, fire and air as the fundamental elements; from a combination of these the human and other bodies are formed.

Just as the inebriating power is developed from the mixing of certain ingredients^[2] and also destroyed, when that combination ceases, consciousness too, appears and disappears in four elements are mixed in certain proportion.

They quote the śruti for this (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. II.4.12):

“Springing forth from these elements, itself solid knowledge it is destroyed when they are destroyed–after death no intelligence (consciousness) remains^[3].

Therefore, the soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence. Since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, its existence cannot be proved. This school holds that perception is the only source (means) of knowledge and does not accept inference, etc. we cannot infer the existence of the soul or God.

The Cārvākas, identifies the self with consciousness and maintains that it is a product of a combination of the four material elements. Using the production of the intoxicating quality of liquor from certain ingredients that are by nature nonintoxicating, the Cārvākas argue that Consciousness is a quality of the body which can have no existence apart from the living body itself.

The Cārvākas arguments are as follows:^[4]

1. Our observation does not bring forth any instance of a disincarnate consciousness. For the manifestation of life and consciousness, body is an inalienable factor.

2. That body is the substratum of consciousness can be seen in the undoubted fact of the arising of sensation and perception only in so far as they are conditioned by bodily mechanism.

3. The medicinal science by prescribing that certain foods and drinks (such as brāhmī-gḥṛta) have the properties conducive to the development of intellectual powers affords another proof and evidence for the relation of Consciousness with body and the material ingredients (of food).

Arguing thus towards the inalienability of Consciousness from body, some of the Cārvākas called the dhūrta Cārvākas, deny the existence of the soul (self, other than body) altogether, while others the susikṣita Cārvākas, admitted it only so long as the bodily organs last. The latter were divided among themselves in considering consciousness to be a function of the whole body, senses, vital breath, and mind etc. Such a difference gave rise to different schools of Cārvāka philosophy such as dehātmavāda (soul identified with the body), indriyātmavāda (soul identified with the senses), prānātmavāda (soul identified with the vital breath), and mano-ātmavāda [manātmavāda?] (soul identified with the mind). The Cārvākas upholding dehātmavāda were further subdivided into three groups. Some who maintained an identification of the soul with the gross body continued to be known as dehatmavādins while others who identified soul with the subtle body and causal body, came to be known as sūkṣamadehātmavādins and antaḥkaraṇātmavādins respectively.

Sadānanda Yogendra^[5] in his short treatise called the Vedāntasāra mentions four different materialistic schools.

They are as follows:

1. A school when identifies the soul with the gross body (Sthūlaśarīra);
2. A school when identified with the sense (indriya).
3. A school identifies with vital breaths (prāṇa) and
4. The last school which identifies with the mental organ (manas).

As mentioned earlier all the above four seem to agree with the view that consciousness is a mere product of matter. Consciousness is the result of an emergent and dialectical evolution. It is an epi-phenomenon, a by-product of matter.

The Buddhist philosopher Sāntarakṣīta in his Tattavasṃgraha says that the materialist Kambalāshvatāra maintains the view that consciousness arises out of the material body associated with vital breaths.

What is significant in all the above views of Cārvākas is that consciousness or the principle of awareness found in the psychophysical complex called the body is that it is created or brought into existence. The process of consciousness coming into existence can be differently stated but the central idea is that consciousness is not eternal. This is in stark opposition to the Śāṅkhya and Vedānta views of Consciousness/Self. This will become amply clear in the subsequent and relevant chapters of this thesis. I further delineate the different views of consciousness as propounded by the Cārvākas philosophy in the following pages.

The Cārvākas, who see the soul as something created and present in the material body, argue that there is nothing called soul apart from the body. According to them, consciousness, though not observed in the material elements like earth etc. either in their separateness or in their mere togetherness, but does emerges when transformed into the complex, called the body, and hence consciousness originates as a result of such a material combination. Man is nothing but body qualified by consciousness. Thus, according to them, no soul separate from the body capable of going to heaven or of attaining liberation, because of the presence of which in the body is supposed to acquire consciousness. On the contrary, the body itself is conscious; and the entire complex might be called the soul.

The Lokāyata position is based on the Anvaya and Vyatireka Nyāya which is as follows: Anvaya means, the cause being present, the effect is present; wherever there is the cause there is also the effect. Vyatireka means, when the cause is absent the effect also is necessarily absent. Wherever there is body, there is also consciousness (anvaya), and wherever there is the absence of body, there is also the absence of consciousness (vyatireka).

Thus the Lokāyata use the logic of anvaya and vyatireka to disprove the existence of disembodied consciousness. This again is significantly different from the Saṅkhya and Vedānta perspectives according to whom consciousness is in fact disembodied by nature (even while present in the body).

However, even admitting that the evidence of anvaya substantiated by vyatireka leads one to admit that the body is the cause of consciousness, or that consciousness is only an attribute of the body, the whole thing can appear as highly impossible. The Lokāyatikas claim that the body is purely material i.e. made of nothing but the four material elements namely earth, water, fire and air. The origin of consciousness from material elements, each of which is by itself unconscious, appears impossible because of the assumption. It is the assumption that an altogether new quality can never emerge from some peculiar combination and transformation of certain things that are by themselves distinctly without this quality. Evidently, the Lokāyata do not know the full implication of such a fact, though, the way in which they want to understand has a unique interest in the history of science.

A succinct presentation of Cārvāka view is found in the text called Nyāyamañjarī authored by the foremost classical Naiyāyika Jayanta Bhatta.^[6] The view is thus explained:

The mixture of the forms of matter that gives rise to consciousness is not an arbitrary one; it is a specific form of mixture leading to a specific kind of transformation (pariṇāma viṣaya). When the forms of matter constitute the body, the transformation takes place and consciousness appears in the body. But in things like the jar and others, the transformation does not take place; hence, consciousness does not appear in them.

It is not true that the quality in the effect necessarily comes from the quality in the cause. The various ingredients of a spirituous drink do not possess individually any intoxicating power; but when they are mixed in a particular proportion and undergo transformation, they become characterized by such power. The case of the body being conscious, in spite of its origination out of unconscious material elements, may be similarly explained. So long as one lives, transformation is there and the long as one lives, transformation is there and the body remains conscious. When death comes, the transformation is not there, and the body becomes unconscious.

There being no pramāṇa to establish the existence of a distinct self, the body itself is to be admitted as the seat of consciousness, as the substratum for the qualities of knowledge (jñāna), desire (icchā) and others.

The Jain logician Haribhadra, in his compendium of Indian philosophy called Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya, describes the position of the Lokāyatas as follows:

The Lokāyatas say that,

“There is nothing called soul, liberation, virtue and vice resulting from pious and impious actions... that which is past can never return. The body is just a combination of the four material elements, which are earth, water, fire and air. These are the basis of consciousness, i.e. that from which consciousness originates..."

Guṇaratna^[7], a late commentator of Haribhadra, gives the most elaborate account of the Lokāyata denial of the soul for the purpose of completely refuting it. Guṇaratna, being highly skilled in logic wants to show in this account how he can himself argue for the defense of the Lokāyata view rather than how the Lokāyatas themselves argue. He says that the world (loka) consist only of as much as is within the scope of the sense (indriya-gocara). The implication of the expression indriya-gocara is as follows: The senses are five-tactual, gustatory, olfactory visual and auditory; that which is within their scope (gocara), i.e., can be known by them (is Indriya gocara). Only such things exist in reality as can be known by the five senses, and nothing else.

Consciousness originates from the material elements in the same way in which originates the intoxicating power. Living beings are like water-bubbles. The human body is nothing but the body endowed with consciousness.

As Bṛhaspati says,

“Earth, water, air and fire, these alone are real. The products of their combination are known as body, objects and senses consciousness is produced from them (i.e. the forms of matter).

The Buddhist philosophers, Śāntarakṣita and his commentator Kamalaśila give an elaborate and highly scholastic account of the Lokāyata view as their purvapakṣa. According to them, the defense of the Lokāyata view, rest ultimately on one point. It is the instance of mada-sakti or intoxicating (as in alcohol) power.

As Śāntarakṣita puts it,

“Therefore, from certain specific material elements originates consciousness (knowledge), and it resides in these just like fermented acid (sukta) and alcohol (sura)”.

Vacaspati Misra, the most versatile exponent of what is often called the 'Orthodox systems', explains the Lokāyata position:

“Although consciousness is not observed in earth, water, fire and air, either taken collectively (samasta) or separately (vyasta), it may still be present in them when they are transformed into the shape of a body. It is not that kiṇva, etc. Since they are not found to be intoxicating taken either collectively or separately would not produce intoxication when they are transformed into a spirituous drink.

Summing up the central position of Cārvāka which is clearly distinct from the Sāṅkhya and Advaita Vedānta views is that consciousness is a sensation which activates the body, senses, mind, breath and the intellect. It has an origin and an end. Consciousness is an epiphenomenon meaning, it is a product that arises out of certain combination and processes which are discussed in the above chapter. The Saṅkhya and Vedānta differing in their own ideas, do not see consciousness as a product which is arising due to a constituted parts of inert matter. They view consciousness as eternal, without a beginning or an end. Being subtle of subtlest it cannot originate from matter which is inert. Inert matter which is the cause cannot generate consciousness which is non-material.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, “Cārvāka Fragments: A New Collection”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 30, (2002): 597.

[2]:

Kiṇva is explained as 'drug or seed used to produce fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, etc. 'Colebrooke quotes from Śaṅkara: 'The faculty of thought results from a modification of the aggregate elements, in like manner as sugar with a ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and a betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu chewed together have an exhilarating property not found in these substances severally'. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (ed.), Cārvāka/Lokāyata: An Anthology of Source Materials and some Recent Studies, (New Delhi: ICPR, 1990), 255 fn.

[3]:

Of course Śan ƒkara, in his commentary, gives a very different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual existence once the knowledge of the Supreme is attained. Cf. Śaabara’s Comm, Jaimini S ūt., i.i.5. Ibid.

[4]:

K.K. Mittal, Role of Materialism in Indian Thought, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1974), 45.

[5]:

Sadānanda Yogendra The Vedāntasāra, (Calcutta:G.A. Jacob, Susil Gupta (India) Ltd., 1957).

[6]:

Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (ed.), Cārvākas/Lokāyata: An Anthology of Source Materials and Some Recent Studies, (New Delhi: ICPR, 1990), 113.

[7]:

Guṇaratna on ṣaḍ-darśana-Samuccaya (SDS), 80-86 (verses).