Consciousness in Gaudapada’s Mandukya-karika

by V. Sujata Raju | 2013 | 126,917 words

This page relates ‘Introduction’ of the study on Consciousness as presented by Gaudapada in his Mandukya-karika. Being a commentary on the Mandukya Upanishad, it investigates the nature of consciousness and the three states of experience (i.e., wakeful, dream and deep sleep) which it pervades. This essay shows how the Gaudapadakarika establishes the nature of Consciousness as the ultimate self-luminous principle.

Introduction

Consciousness is central to human existence because all objective phenomena are believed to exist as manifestations of Consciousness. The very idea of being familiar with Consciousness provides a testimony to its existence. What Augustine said about time is well applicable to Consciousness. According to him when one was not talking about it, one knew what it was, but when asked about it one no longer knows it.[1] One misses out on understanding Consciousness when one tries to hold it, cognize it and objectify it. It appears ethereal and almost deceptive because it is intangible, the more we try to apprehend it the more it slips from the grip.

The Sanskrit term for Consciousness is ‘Cit’. Quite often we find the terms ‘jñāna’ and ‘vijñāna’ being used interchangeably for Consciousness in Upaniṣads. The discussion of ‘Consciousness’ is found in the Upaniṣads while explaining the real nature of the Self/ ātman. The ātman, though usually translated as ‘Self’, does not refer to the empirical self, the ‘I’. In the Upaniṣads, both ātman and Cit refers to pure Consciousness, a kind of trans-empirical Consciousness, which not only is different from the empirical Consciousness, but also is the source/ substratum of the later. In the present study, I have used the terms ‘Self’, ‘ātman’, ‘Brahman’, ‘Consciousness’, ‘pure-Consciousness’, ‘Cit’ as synonyms.

As mentioned above, the study of Consciousness is “evasive”. Nevertheless, it has generated much curiosity and interest in the minds of academicians, neuro scientists, researchers etc. In the contemporary West Consciousness is quite often viewed as an epi-phenomenon of matter and also sometimes equated with the mind. For the most part, Consciousness and mind are treated as synonymous and used interchangeably; and intentionality is regarded as a defining characteristic of Consciousness. Consciousness is always seen ‘of’ or ‘about’ something; and the goal of the pursuit is one of seeking rational understanding of what consciousness/mind is.

In India philosophers have undertaken a complex study of Consciousness but most of the studies have tried to incorporate the views based on the Upaniṣads in general. According to Advaita Vedānta, antaḥkaraṇa or the mind, is like everything, a product of ignorance. The Self alone is Consciousness, and it cannot arise as a contingent factor of subject-object relation. The Advaita agrees with the modern psychologists and says that mind is just a totality of conscious states and process. The Self which is neither mind nor matter is the ground of both mental and physical states of experiences. Consciousness reveals everything and is the substratum of all experience, viz., the wakeful, dream and deep-sleep. It is not a mere knowing but involves transcendence of the objects known and the knowing process. According to Advaita tradition mind is that which has a locus in time and space, whereas Consciousness is that which is not limited either by time or space, but gives a meaning to these. In this tradition mind, like matter, is only an appearance in Consciousness. Just as in dreams, the material substantive experience of waking life also becomes an illusion or a mere appearance.

Indian philosophy in general does not accord any concrete status and an abode to the mind (manas). Manas is a name given to a series of conscious activities such as desires, aversion, pleasure, pain, thought, etc. and also to memory through which it is capable of referring to the past, present and future. That there is a Self for whom these mental modes exist cannot be denied. Apart from the qualities of the mind it is very difficult to know the pure Self at the empirical state, for the former are the only means through which knowledge can arise. Hence, the mind is an instrument, an antaḥkaraṇa whose activity is as an indicator of the existence of the pure Self.

According to Nyāya School, manas is not only material but also the internal senseorgan, responsible for the experiences of pleasure, pain and other such internal states. The materiality of manas is clearly emphasized in the Sāṅkhya philosophy because the mind is generated from the primordial matter called the prakṛti. The Advaitins believes that mind along with all other things is but a creation of ignorance. Structurally mind is subtle matter and is limited. The fact that it is material and functions as an instrument of knowledge does not necessarily make it rank as a senseorgan. There is little difference of opinion amongst all the orthodox systems about the proof for the existence of mind. Almost all of them make use of inference to prove that mind exists, and to all of them it is material and unconscious. It is also considered as an invariable accompaniment of the Self at the empirical level of gnosis. Wherever knowledge arises in the Self, it is always either because of the activity of the mind and the sense-organs or at least of the mind alone acting by itself.

All the orthodox (āstika) schools of Indian philosophy, irrespective of the metaphysical theories, conclude that mind cannot be identified with the Self who is the ‘knower’. In Western philosophy the word ‘mind’ is usually taken to mean both the subjects of Consciousness and the psychical states and also the process of Consciousness which manifest the Self. The word ‘mind’ as used in Indian philosophy does not mean this. At best we may say that it is that it refers to the empirical view of mind given by Western philosophers. It is considered positively as a substance and primarily as an instrument of knowledge.

The significant point here is that the individual self (jīva) and the external world (jagat) form a single block like the dreamt subject and dreamt object in the dream state. The dreamer observes the dreamt world through the dream instruments of knowledge (antaḥkaraṇa). In the waking state also the individual jīva and the world experienced form a single block. The individual sees the world through the external sense organs, mind etc. and comprehends it, but it was actually through one’s Consciousness that one experienced the dreamt individual along with the dreamt world and the dreamt instrument. After awaking from the dream and knowing well that it was illusory one does not feel the compulsion to understand the nature of dreamt objects instruments of knowing processes.

It is important for us to understand at the outset that for Advaitins like Gauḍapāda a study of antaḥkaraṇa is not really essential. The antaḥkaraṇa that is used in wakeful state is not different from the instruments utilized for cognizing the dream objects. There is no difference whatsoever between the dream and the wakeful state. It is often noticed in the Māṇḍūkyakārikā that the author uses the term mind as synonymous with Consciousness. He interprets mind to mean the ātman which is neither born nor dies[2] . Mind is sometimes seen by Gauḍapāda as consciousness that is conditioned by ignorance and in this sense it is seen as the ground of the empirical world. Such a conditioned mind is known as jīva. What is pointed out here is significant. As long as the individuality (jīvatva) is superimposed on the eternal Consciousness there is a perception of the world. So long as there are perceptions of the world, it is mandatory to talk about instruments of knowledge. But when one reaches the state of amanibhāva, (a state of no-mind) the error about oneself as being embodied is corrected and the notion of antaḥkaraṇa becomes redundant. What remains as non abandonable presence is Consciousness. This is just like waking up from sleep when one realizes that Consciousness alone assumed an apparent tri-partite division as the cogniser, the object and the instruments of knowledge in dream. Similarly after Selfrealisation one knows that it is the same Consciousness which appeared as the tripartite division of Jagat-jīva-antaḥkaraṇa. The study of antaḥkaraṇa is valid only as long as one is ignorant of the Self. The notion of antaḥkaraṇa itself is a superimposition (adhyāsa) to be corrected with the true knowledge of the Self.

The text Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad is a short treatise with only 12 mantras. This has been commented and elaborated by Gauḍapāda in the form of verses called the kārikās. The text is called Māṇḍūkyakārikā or Gauḍapādakārikā. In his kārikās Gauḍapāda has built a systematic philosophy of Consciousness using scriptures (Śruti) and reasoning (tarka). This is a seminal work of great historical and philosophical significance. The 9th century philosopher and commentator Śaṅkara has offered a further commentary on Māṇḍūkyakārikā giving a clear and lucid exposition of Gauḍapāda’s work. However, there are many controversies regarding the Māṇḍūkyakārikā which I have attempted to unfold in the forthcoming chapters. I have dealt in detail the textual study of both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara in this thesis. The Māṇḍūkyakārikā is also known by the names Māṇḍūkyakārikā or Gauḍapādiyakārikā and Āgamaśāstra. Bhattacharya, (op.cit.,p.Ixi) points out different readings in different manuscripts such as, Āgamagrantha, Upadeśagrantha, Māṇḍūkya-Vārttikā, Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad-Gauḍapāda-Vyākhyāna, Māṇḍūkyasākhā, or simply Gauḍapādīya after its author.

There are English translations of the Māṇḍūkyakārikā and its commentary. There are two accepted scholarly publications of the Manuscripts of the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad and Gauḍapādakārikā along with the commentaries. They are as follows: (1) The Memorial Edition, vol.5 of The Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad with Gauḍapāda’s kārikāand Śaṅkara Bhāṣya and (2) the standard Ānadasrama Sanskrit series, No.10 which includes Ānandagiri’s Tīkā as well. It should be noted that there are other interpretations accorded to Māṇḍūkyakārikā by Kuranarayana, Madhva and Purusottama for the Visistadvaita, Dvaita and Suddhadvaita traditions respectively.

There are several translations of the text available. The first English translation was done in 1894 by Manilal N. Dvivedi entitled The Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad with Gauḍapāda’s Kārikās and the Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara (The Bombay Theosophical Publication Fund). This was soon followed by a German translation by Paul Deussen in 1897 (Sechzig Upaniṣad’s des Veda, Leipzig). Dr. M. Srinivasa Rao’s translation of The Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad with Gauḍapādakārikāand Śaṅkara’s commentary appeared in the Vedānta Kesari, vols, xviii-xxi, of Sri Ramkrishna Math, Madras, 1931-5. In 1936 Swami Nikhilananda’s translation with annotation of the same was published by Sri Ramkrishna Ashrama, Mysore. The great scholar Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya has meticulously edited with exhaustive notes the text Māṇḍūkyakārikā entitled The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda which he also translated into English in the year 1943. This was published by the University of Calcutta Press. In response to Bhattacharya, R. D. Karmarkar, brought out a new edition of the Gauḍapādakārikā with an English translation and notes in 1953 (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute). In the same year Swami Chinmayananda published his Discourses on the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad with Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā, Madras: Cinmayananda publication Trust. In 1957 another translation of the Upaniṣad and Kārikā with Śaṅkara’s commentary was included in Swami Gambhirananda’s Eight Upaniṣads, Vol.II, Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1957, PP 173-404. An English introduction of Swami Satchidanandendrasaraswati’s Māṇḍūkya Rahasya Vivṛiti (A commentary on Sri Gauḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkya Kārikās with Śaṅkarabhāṣya): published by Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya, Holenarasipur, Karnataka, 2011, firmly established that Gauḍapāda was truly a follower of Upaniṣadic sampradaya and not Buddhist tradition as claimed by Bhattacharya. A major Hindi translation of Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad, Gauḍapādakarika with Śaṅkara’s commentary, published by Gita Press, Gorakhpur, Samvat 2062, is a crucial and renowned work which becomes indispensible for proper understanding of the text Gauḍapādakārikā.

Of the above mentioned primary texts, I have profusely used the translation of Swami Nikhilananda, “The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad with Gauḍapāda’s Kārikāand Śaṅkara’s commentary”. Swami Nikhilananda’s extensive notes on the kārikās are beneficial in understanding the central philosophy of Gauḍapāda. He seems to convincingly argue for a more radical position than the commentator Śaṅkara himself.

Many secondary scholarly works has been published on the text Gauḍapādakārikā. T.M.P.Mahadevan’s book titled Gauḍapāda: A Study in Early Advaita, University of Madras, 1975, is one such study which has an in depth understanding of the text. His book contains an elaborate response to the arguments put forward by Bhattacharya claiming Buddhist influence on the Gauḍapādakārikā. Many western Indologists have also made a fair study of Māṇḍūkyakārikā. Some significant publications need special mention which are as follows:

Michael Comans, The Method of Early Advaita Vedanta: A Study of Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara Surveśvara and Padmapāda. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000. The teaching of Gauḍapāda is discussed in this work uniquely within the tradition of Advaita.

Colin A. Cole, Asparśa Yoga: A Study of Gauḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkya Kārikā. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982. This work has tried to investigate the nature of the soteriology the quest for liberation, of Advaita Vedānta from religious point of view.

Caterina Conio, The Philosophy of the Māṇḍūkya Kārikā. Varanasi: Bhartiya Vidya Prakashan, 1971. A critical evaluation of the significance of Māṇḍūkya-kārikā to contemporary Philosophy both in and out of India has been done in this work.

Thomas E. Wood, The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the Āgama Śāstra. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982. This work challenges many of the interpretations of Māṇḍūkyakārikā which have been favored by the Śaṅkara School and by most modern scholarships.

The present research work entitled: “A Study of Consciousness in Gauḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkyakārikā”, aims to look at the nature and function of Consciousness from the classical Indian philosophy in general and Advaita tradition in particular. The methodology that I have adopted is a textual one. A detailed study of the primary text of Gauḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkyakārikā and Śaṅkara’s commentary on it has been done with the aim of expounding the text for a comprehensive analysis of the nature of consciousness.

Being soteriological in its approach, Advaita Vedānta proposes liberation/freedom as the ultimate goal and believes that it is attained only by being aware of the true nature of Consciousness. According to Advaita, understanding Consciousness is crucial to eradicate the misery of bondage. Bondage is effected by (1) non understanding of the given i.e. Consciousness (tattvāagrahaṇam) and (2) instead misapprehending or distorting the reality, i.e. (anyathāgrahaṇam). This bondage, based on ignorance, can be removed only by knowledge of the “tattva” i.e. Consciousness. Hence the study of Consciousness is central to Advaita Philosophy. In the contemporary world, torn apart by caste, creed, gender and religious differences, an understanding of the nature of Consciousness stands as a statement of hope, as an injunction to live a just and virtuous life, to pursue higher knowledge and to transcend the delusion of both the “other” and suffering.

This research is an indepth study of Consciousness based on the models and mechanisms undertaken by Gauḍapāda in his seminal text Māṇḍūkyakārikā which brings out the nature of Consciousness through a comprehensive and rigorous investigation of the three states, namely, wakeful, dream and deep sleep demonstrating that Consciousness is non-dual, continuous and pervasive in and through the three states of experience. It stands as an irrefutable principle. One can speak of one’s experience only if one is conscious of it; and to be conscious means to be Consciousness itself. One does not possess Consciousness as an adjective but one is that principle itself.

Attempt has been made in this textual study to resolve crucial issues around which the study of the nature of Consciousness revolves. They are as follows: What is Consciousness? How is it different from the internal organs namely the mind, intellect, ego and memory? How does Consciousness manifest itself? In ‘disputational terms’, is it self-illumined (svaprakāśa) or has a dependent illumination (paraprakāśa)? Does Consciousness possess intentionality or not? In other words: is it saviṣayaka or nirviṣayaka? Questions regarding the form, structure and content of Consciousness raised by scholars in India are as follows: Is Consciousness with form (sākāra) or without form (nirākāra)? Does Consciousness have a locus, (āśraya) or being all pervasive it is free from space and time cognates (nirāśraya)? Taking into consideration the above mentioned issues, I strongly feel that no other system of philosophy has thought so deeply on the nature of Consciousness as Gauḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkyakārikā.

According to Advaita Vedānta, Consciousness is not a characteristic of mind but selfmanifesting, non-intentional principle of awareness. They hold that self-luminosity is the defining principle of Consciousness; i.e. Consciousness is immediately experienced, even though it is not an object of knowledge. It is called the subject, not in the sense of ‘knower’ or ‘cognizer’ (Jñātā or pramātā), but in the sense that it is the ultimate revealing principle, the transcendental a-priori, which itself is not revealed by anything else. It is often described in the Advaita literature as prakāsa eka raśa, meaning that which has only one rasa or essence that is manifestation. Therefore, Consciousness is described as the ‘light of lights’ (Jyotisām jyotiḥ) as the ultimate presupposition of all knowledge.

Advaita Vedānta maintains that Consciousness is one and is ‘unnegatable’, ‘non abandonable’ and ‘non sublatable’ principle. Between the seer, the Consciousness and the seen, the world, the former stands as an immutable witness that has no annihilation. The negation of objects can well be construed but the negation of the thinker is not possible, for the one who negates has to be present in every act of negation. The negation of the Consciousness cannot be even hypothetically posited, because every act of negation presupposes Consciousness. It is important to note that Consciousness cannot be made available through any known epistemic mechanisms such as perception, inference etc. Since Consciousness is necessary pre-condition for pramāṇas to function; no known epistemic mechanisms such as perception, inference etc. can be made available to grasp it. However, the system ingeniously conceives a model which is universally available using which the immutable Consciousness can be known. This model gets clearly established by Gauḍapāda through his avasthātrayaparikṣā, the study of three states. In order to prove the undisrupted continuity of Consciousness, the followers of Advaita Vedānta, like Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara undertake an intensive analysis of Consciousness from the perspective of three states, namely, wakeful, dream and deep sleep. While the objects of waking and dream may get sublated by the successive state, the witnessing Consciousness remains the same forever.

The main feature of the wakeful state of Consciousness, as stated by the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, is the commonness of experience about the world around us. All human perception, ideation, reasoning, knowledge about the external world are considered to be the output of wakeful state. It is referred to as Viśva. The mind and the senses which functions in this state aided by physical light are the instruments through which Consciousness experiences every kind of external object. The Upaniṣad describes Viśva as bahiṣprajñaḥ meaning that Viśva is the knowledge of the external objects.

The state of dream is a condition wherein the external sense organs cease to function. There is no cognition of “I” or “mine” with reference to the gross physical body. Based upon the impressions from the experience of objects of the waking state, the mind projects dream objects. This state is called Taijasa, since it experiences internal objects through internal light. It is also referred to as antaḥprajñaḥ.

In the waking state when the sense organs are active, one can review the dream experiences and understand the dream as mere external projection of the mind. From the standpoint of dream, dream objects are as gross and external as those experienced in the waking states. However, one who has awakened knows that the dream objects were subtle, internal and composed of mere impressions gathered from the waking states.

In the deep sleep state, senses and the entire antaḥkaraṇa comprising of intellect, mind, ego and memory remains non-operative. This state is shorn of all desires, dreams and erroneous cognition. The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad refers to this state as prajñānaghanaḥ, a mass of undivided, uniform Consciousness. This state is free from both knowledge as well as ignorance owing to the absence of above antaḥkaraṇaḥ. Consciousness therefore remains blissful and peaceful (ānandamaya). However, the continuity of Consciousness is established when one wakes from deep sleep. It is only then, we are able to explain recollection of the experience as “I slept happily and I did not know anything”. This experience is felt when one emerges from deep sleep to the wakeful state. The recollection is possible because of the presence of Consciousness in that state.

The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad refers to the fourth or Turīya which represents the nature of Consciousness. Turīya is described as essentially a non-dualistic state. It can only be expressed through negation. It is a state free from sense perception, the world of thought and ideas cognized through the instruments of mind and intellect, and other limited forms of understanding. The text indicates that Turīya is not an object, nor an entity, nor an idea of concept, nor even a state but rather the ever present “substratum” which allows for “sentience”, “intelligence”, “vitality”, and “experience”. Turīya ever remains unaffected and unattached by the three states. I have discussed more of Turīya in the following chapters.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Whitney J. Oaks (ed.), ‘The confession’, chapter xiv. Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, (New York: Random House, 1948), 191.

[2]:

Māṇḍūkyakārikā III, 46, 54, 61-62, etc.

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