The validity of Anumana (inference) in Nyaya system

by Babu C. D | 2018 | 44,340 words

This thesis is called: The validity of Anumana (inference) in Nyaya system. It tries to establish the validity of Anumana through citing its application either consciously or unconsciously in every sphere of human life. Anumana in Nyaya system is the knowledge of any object not by direct observation but by means of the knowledge of a liṅga or sign ...

Chapter 5.10 - Anumana in Weather Forecasting

Weather forecasting also adhere to the process of inference. In this, the application of science and technology makes things easy to study the state of the atmosphere for a given location and time. It is done by collecting as much of data as possible regarding the temperature, humidity, winds etc. It helps to determine how the atmosphere would evolve in the future.[1] In weather forecasts like ‘it is very likely to get widespread rain across the state’ or ‘there is likely to have storm in the sea and therefore fishermen are advised not to go for fishing, etc,’ either inductive or deductive method of inference is seen exercised. The result of the forecast depends on the accuracy of the inference.

Inference always gives the knowledge of an object which is not at all perceived. For example the perceptual knowledge of smoke gives rise to nonperceptual knowledge of fire. In the five syllogistic procedure of inference, the existence of the effect relies on its causes. This cause is inferred from the effect. This causal relation (tadutpatti) perceived in the effect in the form of probans is the base of invariable concomitance.[235]

Inference also eliminates the chances of the burden or nuisance of contrary character related to probandum as the nature of probandum is definitely known. For instance, ghatatva (the state of being pot) cannot be imposed on an object if there is the observation of the specific features like head, hand, etc. If a person mistakes an object for another either he will be ignorant or will have no proper knowledge of its distinguishing features.

Philosophers of all schools of Indian thought except Carvaka accepts inference as a valid source of knowledge. However, the denial of inference as a valid source by Carvakas is refused by both groups of Nyaya i.e., ancient and modern along with other systems. They refute it by saying that Carvakas are self-contradictory in their arguments and their conclusions are as one’s saying ‘my mother is a sterile women’. If there is motherhood, there cannot be barrenness. Even the mode of knowing the contradictory judgement of others’ is also a form of inference.[2] So in order to know the difference between valid and invalid cognitions’ to detect one’s mind to know the absence of an object etc., the methods of inference are unavoidable. Moreover, for the denial of an invisible or heavenly object the contributions of this second valid source knowledge are uncountable.

Refuting the view of Carvaka, Udayana remarks, if there is doubt or fear, it can be cleared by inference only. He continues, ‘if there is any doubt of deviation between two objects existing at different time and place, it can be cleared through inference.[3]

Validity of perception can be established on the strength of its unfailing correspondence to the fact. In the same way validity of inference can be proved on the strength of its unfailing correspondence to the fact. Validity of presentative cognition cannot be proved by itself. It deems collection of causes for the same which is the locus of the validity. This perceptual cognition is established by inference and therefore the validity of inference cannot be denied.

Validity of inference can also be inferred from the probans in the form of the state or condition being the locus of the limiting property of being the instrument of the valid cognition (Anumanam pramanam pramitikaranatavacchedakadharmavattvat caksurvat)[4]

However, it is also observed that inference is not devoid of fallacies or wrong notions or information. Fallacies occur due to various reasons. If the usage of premises or syllogism statements is not true, the conclusions of the inference can lead to faulty inference. The five types of Hetvabhasas (fallacies) are Savybhicara (Discrepant) if the same hetu exists in more than one place. It is categorized into sadharana, asadharana and anupasamhari; viruddha (contradictory) which proves negation and not existence, Satpratipaksha (Opposable) if another reason is available to prove the nonexistence of sadhya, Asiddha (Futile) if the Paksha is not reachable for hetu. It is of three types: Ashrya asiddha, Svarupasiddha, vyapyatavsiddha; and Badhita (false) if the sadhyabhava (non-existence of sadhya) is established by another pramana.[5]

The illustrations and discussions seen above highlight the inevitable presence and existence of the use of inference in day to day life for gaining valid knowledge. It is impossible to convince a person of knowledge without having recourse to the pararthanumana propounded by the Nyaya School. The logical and sequential arguments put forward by the Nyaya school through the five member syllogism to arrive at a new knowledge from the existing one is convincing for other schools too and it is because of this that most of the schools accept this tenet of Nyaya school. Reviewing all the examples cited, one can easily find the all pervasive significance of anumana especially of pararthanumana in drawing conclusions which are convincing and utilizable for the public.

There is a general conception that inference is a complicated process and only intelligent people can use it effectively. But the fact is that people from all walks of life irrespective of their educational, social, economical and professional background use the inferential knowledge to find out a remedy for their problems in their day to day life. It is obvious that most of the dealings of human beings are managed sociologically by the application of anumana (inference) only.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

BBC. Weather–A History of TV weather forecasts. BBC weather

Nyayamanjari, 2nd Chapter, p.112, Gangadhar Sastri, Edition.

[2]:

S.J. Chakravorty Edi. Bouddhadarshana of Sarvadarshanasamgraha, p.5

[3]:

-Haridasi on 3.7.

[4]:

Justification of Inference, p.141.

[5]:

Dr. K.V.L. Narasimhacharyulu. Padartha Vijnana. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Krishnadas Academy. 2009.

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