Chapter 4.3.3 - Navya Nyaya (c): Three kinds of inference (Anumana)

According to Gamgesha, there are three kinds of inference; Kevalanvyayi anumanam (exclusively affirmative inference), kevalavyatirekya anumanam (exclusively negative inference) and anvayavyatirekya anumanam (affirmative negative inference)

Kevalanvyayi anumanam is the inference in which the major term is not the counter part of that absolute non-existence, which has an abode or as an inference in which there is no non-presence of the major term. E.g. this is namable because it is knowable

Kevalavyatireka anumanam is the inference in which the major term does not abide in anything else but in the minor term e.g. the earth is different from other things because it possesses smell.

Anvaya-vyatirekya anumanam is that in which the major term has both affirmative and negative examples.

E.g.

The hill is full of fire
Because it is full of smoke
As a kitchen and not as a lake

Presumption is not regarded as a separate means of knowledge by Gamgesha but includes in the negative inference which establishes the absence of the middle term through the absence of the major term.

He mentions about two types of anumana viz., svarthanumana (inference for oneself) and pararthanumana (inference for others). In svarthanumana a person having repeatedly experienced himself the vyapti of smoke with fire, when sees smoke on a hill recollects that wherever there is smoke there is fire and concludes that the hill has smoke which is in invariable concomitance with fire.’ The knowledge derived thus is termed as linga paramarsha (consideration of the sign) or paramarsha (consideration). The conclusion arrived thus that the hill has fire is the inferential knowledge through svarthanumana.

In pararthanumana the inferring of fire from smoke is demonstrated through a syllogism of five members. The demonstration produces consideration of the sign in other people in order to make them understand that the hill has fire.

The elements of inference for others are sentences expressing cognition. They are stated in isolation of person thinking them and there is nothing psychological about them. The set of premises therefore cannot be said literally to cause the conclusion. Moreover, cognitions are eternal entities and they are not subject to causation. The conclusion is already an element in inference for others and the relation between the two is that of a set and its member. If a set of premises is taken to cause the conclusion, it would mean that the same set of premises produces the same conclusion always as, according to the doctrine of causality the same cause is supposed to produce the same effect always. The usual practice among the modern interpreters of Nyaya is to take it in the psychological sense of a thought process.

An inference form is simply the scheme of any concrete inference and is a device for attaining generality. Syllogism consists of five sentences; each one of which provides knowledge. These sentences are known as ‘avayavas.’ According to Gangesha, avayava or a member of the syllogism is a verbal cognition or a sentence that produces knowledge leading to the production of an entire knowledge that generates consideration. Each of the five members provides individual cognition. And five members together give an integrated cognition which produces consideration based on the five members. “anumitikaranalingaparamarshaprayojaka shabdajnanajanaka shabdajnanajanaka vakyatvam avayavatam.” The five parts of the syllogism are dealt below: