Chapter 3.4 - Jaina views on Inference

In Indian thoughts, Arhata or Jaina and Nyaya philosophies occupy a significant place due to their logical thought and philosophical accuracy. It seems to be idealistic in outlook and realistic in approach. As per Jaina logicians, definiteness is the indispensable mark of valid knowledge. Vedasuri defines valid means of knowledge as a definite knowledge which reveals itself and the other object. Siddhasena considers non-contradictness in place of definiteness as a mark of prama. Manikyanandi described pramana as valid knowledge of itself and of things not proved before. It means that pramana being identical with Jnana (knowledge) is self-illuminator among other things. In general, pramana accepted by Jainas is two-fold: immediate presentational knowledge (pratyaksha) and mediate knowledge (paroksha).

Valid knowledge as for Jainas is derived in two ways; one is agamic tradition and the other is logical tradition. According to agamic tradition, determinate knowledge has been divided into five types; mati, shruti, avadhi, manahhparyaya and kevala.^[1] As per logical tradition, it has been classified into two: pratyaksha or direct and paroksha or indirect. Avasyaka nirukti of bhartrbahu follows agamic tradition. However, Siddhasena Divakara in his Nyayavatara follows logical tradition. Tattvarthadhigamasutra of Umasvati followed both the traditions.^[2]

Jaina logician defines perception as clear knowledge. According to Vidhyanandi, pratyaksha is the knowledge which is clear. Manikyananadi vadideva and Hemacandra also define perception as clear knowledge.^[3] Direct determinate knowledge like pratyaksha or perception discussed after the real science of the logic, talk with others on a certain subject of the indirect organ of knowledge. There are five types of valid knowledge, viz., recollection (smriti), recognition (pratyabhijna), reasoning of concomitance (tarka), inference (Anumana) and verbal testimony (agama).^[4] Among the afore-mentioned, recollection is the first activity useful for the validity of perceptual knowledge. Recollection means a sort of revival of knowledge already acquired regarding something.”^[5]

Memory or recollection is a valid knowledge though its validity is questioned by several other philosophers for many reasons. However, the validity is accepted by Jaina logicians. They explain that the nature itself comes out in the form of Jnana which is self-illuminating. Based on this, the Jaina logicians find no difficulty in admitting the validity of recollection.^[6]

Mimamsakas define recognition as ‘the synthetic judgement born out of observation and recollection as typified by such forms as that is necessary (judgment of identity). It is like that (judgement of similarity), that is dissimilar to that (judgment of dissimilarity), this is different from that (judgement of difference), and the like.^[7] .” In the view of a Jaina logician the means of knowledge Upamana and recognitions are a superfluous set up of a third new organ of knowledge. In the name of Upamana, otherwise for the completion of reasoning course of action other new organs of knowledge decided by the dissimilarity and difference will have to be accepted.^[8] .

Satish Chandra Vidhyabhushan, in his renowned book, ‘A History of Indian logic’ defines ‘recognition’ as knowledge which arises from perception through recollection in the forms, “that is that”, “this is like that”, “this is different from that”, “this is the counter part of that”, etc. He gives further examples like, ‘this is that devadatta,’ ‘the buffalo is different from the cow’, ‘this is a tree’, etc.^[9]

According to Manikyanandi, ‘argumentation is knowledge of the connection between the middle term and the major term based on the presence or absence of the latter in the form, “if this is so, that is so, and if this is not so, that is not so.” Therefore smoke will arise only if there is fire and will not arise if there is no fire.^[10]

Manikyanandi states that Verbal testimony or agama is knowledge of an object derived from the words of reliable persons or scriptures in virtue of their natural fitness or suggestiveness. The North Pole does exist is given as an example.^[11]

He defines Inference as the knowledge of the major term arising through the middle term as; there is fire here, because there is smoke. Major term is called sadhya or that which is to be proved. Middle term is called sadhana or that by which something is to be proved. The minor term is called paksha. The major term is also called dharma or predicate and the middle term linga is the mark or sign used.^[12]

According to Devasuris Pramana-Naya-tattvalokalanakara inference is of two kinds: (1) ‘svartha’-for one’s own sake and (2) ‘parartha’ for the sake of others.

Avayava or parts of an inference are the following:

1. Paksha prayoga: it is the use of minor term otherwise called proposition as the hill is fiery.
2. Hetu prayoga (use of the middle term): because it is smoky.
3. Dristanta (example): whatever is fiery, is smoky, as kitchen.
4. Upanaya (application): this hill is fiery.
5. Nigamana (conclusion): therefore this hill is fiery.

Upanaya (application) and nigamana (conclusion) as the parts of the syllogism are noted useless. Devasuri in his Pramana-Naya tattvalokalankara expressed the following fallacies:

i) Naigamabhasa (the fallacies of naigama) — as in estimating soul a distinction between its “existence’ and its consciousness is solicited.

ii) Samgrahabhasa (the fallacy of the collective) — It occurs when a thing is called real due to its possessing the generic property alone altogether losing from sight the specific properties if any as in the case of a bamboo, it is real so far as it is a tree, but having no specific properties.

iii) Vyavaharabhasa (the fallacy of the practical) — dealing as the Carvaka philosophy which makes a wrong distinction of substance, quality, etc.

iv) Rijusutrabhasa (the fallacy of the straight or immediate) — As the tathagata philosophy which altogether denies the reality of things.

v) Shabdabhasa (the verbal fallacies) — It occurs when realizing the distinction in the meaning of a word in the past, present and future; one goes on using the same word in the same meaning in all the three cases. Using the word “krata” (sacrifices) in the sense of strength which it signified a thousand years ago is an example.

vi) Sambhirudhabhasa (the fallacies of subtle) — occurs when one interprets the synonyms of a word such as Indra, Sakra, Purandara, etc., to signify altogether different things.

vii) Evambhutabhasa (the fallacies of such like) — occurs when a thing is discarded simply because it does not at the moment possess any property mentioned by the name. For instance, Rama is not a man (a thinking animal) because he is not at present thinking.^[13]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

- Tattvarthadhigama sutra, 1-9

[2]:

Samkhya yoga Epistemology, p.111

[3]:

- Pramana Naya Tattvalokalankara, (PNT)

[4]:

Tattvarthadhigama sutra, 1-13

[5]:

Pramana nyaya tattvavalokalankara, 3-3 and Pramana mimamsa, 2-3

[6]:

Jaina and hindhu logic, p.159

[7]:

Pramana mimamsa 2-9, Translated By Mugargy and Talia

[8]:

Premeya ratnamala 3-11

[9]:

History of Indian logic, p.189

[10]:

ibid,

[11]:

ibid,192

[12]:

ibid, 190

[13]:

ibid, pp.203-204