Chapter 3.3 - Grounds of Inference (Anumana)

Vyapti (invariable concomitance) and pakshadharmata are considered to be two major grounds of inference by the Indian philosophers. Vyapti forms the base of inference in a logical process as our knowledge of the sadhya or major term as related to the paksha or minor term relies on the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the middle and major terms. Knowledge about inferred object (vyaptibalena arthagamagam lingam) is gained through understanding the relation of invariable concomitances or vyapti to the middle term.

Invariable concomitance or Vyapti means the state of pervasion or permeations inferring an association between vyapya (the pervaded) and vyapaka (the pervador).^[1] It is of cause-effect relationship. Pervasion occurs only if it is followed by another. In most of such cases, the pervador can be inferred from the pervaded. It means that the vyapaka or the pervaded is present in all the places in which the vyapaka or the pervaded is present. For example, smoke is pervaded by fire as all the smoky objects are fiery; nevertheless while all the smoky objects are fiery, all fiery objects are not smoky. E.g., the red hot iron ball.

Vyapti may be classified into two as visamavyapti (non-equipollent) and samavyapti (equipollent) concomitances.^[2] The former occurs when there is unequal extension of terms in invariable concomitance such as smoke and fire, men and morals. Here the relation is of non-equipollent concomitance between two terms wherein one is inferred from the other but not vice versa. It is as inferring fire from smoke, but not smoke from fire. Samavyapti or equipollent concomitances occurs when vyapti between two terms are of equal extension. Here in this, both the terms are co existent and one can be inferred of them from the other. Thus the pervador from the pervaded, cause from the effect or substance from the attribute and vice versa, will be inferred.

Both differ in their nature of universal proposition. While only subject is distributed in visamavyapti, both subject and predicate are distributed in samavyapti. The latter corresponds to the universal negative and universal affirmative proposition in the Western logic. Men are rational animals and whatever is produced is non-eternal are examples to cite in this regard.

Irrespective of the sama (equipollent) or visama (non-equipollant) status of vyapti, all inferences should have the basic condition of some kind of vyapti between the middle and major terms. It underlines the fundamental law of syllogism that one of the premises should be universal. The relation between the middle and major terms in vyapti indicates a co-existence (sahacarya). For instance, where there is fire there is smoke indicating a coexistence. However, there may be instances where fire exists without smoke wherein there is an absence of vyapti or universal relation. In these cases the co-existence depends on upadhi (condition) other than the terms. The above concludes that invariable concomitance is relation of co-existence between middle and major terms independent of all upadhis.^[3] This relationship between the two terms is characterized as nitya anaupadhika sambandha between middle and major terms indicating that there is no exemption or exclusion in the relation of concomitance between the two.

An upadhi or condition is a term which is coexistent with the major but not with the middle term of an inference. Therefore, when one infers the existence of smoke from fire, there lies a conditional relation between fire and smoke, because fire is attended with smoke on condition that it is fire from ‘wet fuel.’ The condition of wet fuel is always related to the major term smoke, yet not related to the middle term ‘fire’ as there is a case of fire without wet fuel. It tells that all conditions must be excluded to ensure the universal concomitance between two things.

Invariable concomitance (vyapti) may be defined as positive or negative depending on the logical condition of Anumana. In the former sense, it is the uniform existence of the middle term in the same locus with the major term.^[4] Negatively, it is the nonexistence of middle term in all the places where major term does not exist.^[5] These definitions give two dimensional view of the whole proposition. E.g., All cases of smoke are cases of fire and no case of smoke is case of fire. The afore mentioned definition tells us about two kinds of vyapti i.e., anvaya (positive) and vyatireka (negative). While the former can be known through the example ‘whatever is Smokey is fiery’, the latter (vyatireka vyapti) is understood by ‘whatever is not fiery is not smokey.’

The relation of invariable concomitance (vyapti) is affirmed through excluding all conditions or doubts through repeated observations (bhuyodarshana) of the agreement of middle and major terms either in their presence or absence under differing conditions and situations. If the doubt continues even after the continuous observation, tarka can be used to remove the doubt about the relation between the terms. The universal proposition ‘all cases of smoke are cases of fire’ may thus be established directly by invalidating or negating the opposite and affirm that ‘some cases of smoke are not case of fire’ is correct meaning that there may be smoke without fire. However, the premise of smoke without fire questions the relation of causality that is there can be effect without cause. This is an absurd assumption because if the above is accepted why fire is sought for to produce smoke? Therefore, if someone reiterates effect without cause it can be disproved by quoting the practical contradictions involved in it. ^[6]

Naiyayikas use simple enumeration assisted by tarka to establish vyapti or invariable concomitance. Through simple enumeration the relation between two things through deducting from general to particular is predicted. However, simple enumeration solely cannot prove universal proposition as it breaks the general law of inference that one must go beyond the evidence. Referring to samanyalakshana they tell that the universal perception ‘all smokes are with fire’ cannot be deducted from specific occurrences of smokes as related to fire because these specific occurrences cannot be generalized. On the other hand, in order to generalize one should understand the universalness of ‘smokeness’ to ‘fireness.’ Accordingly when an instance of smoke is known, the inclusiveness of universal smokeness in them also can be understood.^[7]

This brings out the significance of understanding class-essences for generalizing from particular. Nyaya method is built on these class essences. It underlines that by mere observance of certain number of occurrences of relation between two things, it is difficult to understand anything for certain. But knowing the essential nature which is also referred as the base of the relation helps to understand it for sure. Thus, the experiences of particular instances are used to generalize when considered their essential or common nature. Here the observance of particular or individual instances becomes important because it is from these that one able to identify the essential nature for understanding the universals that forms the classes of things. It can also be inferred from the above that if anything is connected to the essential nature or the essence of class, it is related to all members of that class. This evidences that induction essentially requires identifying underlying class essences seen in specific things. Though the western logic has agreed to this concept of Nyaya they do not agree to the non-sensuous intuition concept based on the perception of vyapti. The initial step of induction therefore is the direct perception of the vyapti in the specific object. Generally, from this initial step of direct perception itself certain generalization are made and in the consecutive stages they are tested and affirmed. It therefore concludes that knowledge is evolved through direct perception of vyapti in specific objects.

3.3.1 The psychological ground of Inference (Pakshata)

Paksha or the subject (minor term) is indispensable for inference. Similarly, vyapti is essential for its validity which occurs when there is relation between the middle and major terms.^[8] Here while the former is considered as the psychological ground or condition, the latter is the logical ground for inference.

Paksha exists in the doubt of the sadhya or the major term (sadhyasandeha). The essentiality of the minor terms assumes that Paksha embodies two clear conditions i.e., absence of surety (siddhyabhava) and will to infer (sishadhayisa). Naiyayikas of ancient accepts both the conditions.^[9] However, it should be observed here that doubt arises not only when there is absence of certainty about something but also when there is a thirst or an aspiration for new knowledge.

Contradicting the above view of pakshata, the modern Naiyayikas remark that inference can occur even when there is no doubt of something or when there is no will to infer. Inferring the existence of elephant from its trumpeting voice and clouds from the roar of thunders can be shown as examples. From this, it can be concluded that inference may occur in any conditions irrespective of the presence or absence of certainty and if the presence of minor to infer. But on analysis, one cannot skip the fact that inference does not occur at a time when there is presence of certainty and absence of will to infer.^[10]

While the Indian thinkers have elaborately dealt with psychological conditions, some of the logicians from the west do not recognize its significance. Nevertheless, certain others like Dr. Stebbing and Johnson acknowledge its importance and suggest two conditions for inference viz., propositions and the relation between them. The explanations provided by the Indian and Western logicians thus converge onto two essential conditions for inference, viz., that there must be a true proposition and that it must imply another proposition. Yet, they differ in their views regarding how these conditions ‘condition’ inference.

3.3.2 Paramarsha as the Immediate Cause of Inference

Every inference has at least three steps; the knowledge of the middle term related to the minor term; the knowledge of vyapti between the middle and the major terms and the conclusion, in which the major term is predicated of the minor term. The conclusion is the result deduced by reasoning. But here, it is essential to know, what is hetu-cause -so as to reach the right conclusion or the knowledge of the linga (mark) or the middle term or the knowledge of vyapti or invariable concomitance between the middle and major term.

The Baudha-Jaina logicians inclusive of the philosophers of Nyaya are of the opinion that, inference is the knowledge of linga or the middle term that leads to the conclusion. Therefore the middle term is to be taken or understood as the karana or operative cause of the deduced by reasoning. Mimamsakas and Vedantists, consider the vyapti or invariable concomitance between the middle and major term as the special cause of inference. By understanding the linga or the relation of middle term to the paksha or minor term, the knowledge of vyapti is recovered leading one to arrive at a logical conclusion.

There are four steps in the process of making inference;

1. The knowledge of vyapti or the universal relation between the middle and major term. Example, all cases of smoke are cases of fire.
2. The perception of the minor term is qualified by the middle term. Example: the hill is a case of smoke.
3. A revival of the impression of vyapti previously acquired, without any necessary recollection of it: and
4. The conclusion that the minor term is related to the major term. Example: the hill is a case of fire.

Contradicting the above view, the modern Naiyayikas say that the linga or the middle term cannot be the operative cause of inference. The linga may be represented by any object of the present or the past or the future. It cannot guide one to a conclusion except through the knowledge of vyapti or invariable concomitance between it and the major term. Therefore the knowledge of invariable concomitance or the vyapti between the middle and the major terms should be taken as the particular cause of the deduced by reasoning. But the knowledge of invariable concomitance does not naturally lead to a logical end. It has for its function a synthetic view of the middle term as related to the major on the one hand and the minor on the other.^[11]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

ibid. p.240

[2]:

ibid

[3]:

Vide Tarkabhasha, pp 7-8

[4]:

Bhashaparicheda (Bhashaparicheda), p. 69.

[5]:

Bhashaparicheda, 68.

[6]:

S. C. Chatterjee, Nyaya theory of knowledge, Bharatiya Kala Prakashan: New Delhi, p. 249

[7]:

SM., 65.

[8]:

uäù -Tarkabhasha, p 11.

[9]:

-Nyayasutra1.1.1, -Tarkabhasha, p.11

[10]:

SM, pp. 309-10

[11]:

S.C. Chatterjee, Nyaya theory of knowledge, Bharatiya Kala Prakashan: New Delhi, p. 262.