Chapter 2.8 - Pramanas in Jaina Philosophy

Rishabha is considered to be the founder of Jainism. Its teachings were taught by twenty four Tirthankaras who attained liberation. Rishabha was the first Tirthankara and Vardhamana, the last. Vardhamana the last prophet was a contemporary of Buddha. He was born in 599 BC and attained nirvana in 527 BC.^[1]

There are two main sects of Jainism; Shvetambaras and Digambaras. They both agree on all the fundamental tenants of Jainism. The digambaras hold the view that the Tirthankaras live without food; that a monk who owns any property and wears clothes cannot attain liberation; and that no women is eligible for liberation. The digambaras are sky clad or nude. The Shvetambaras are clothed in white.

According to Jaina tradition, valid knowledge is of two kinds; immediate knowledge or perception (pratyaksha) and mediate or indirect knowledge (paroksha).^[2]

Pratyaksha

In Perception—Pratyaksha is the knowledge that is gained directly by the Self without the mediation of mind and senses. It is a distinct (spashta) knowledge. Distinctness consists in the apprehension of an object with its specific qualities without the mediation of any other knowledge. It is independent of other pramanas. It apprehends its specific qualities distinctly-knowledge of ‘thisness’ and particular qualities constitute distinctness of perception. Perception is stronger than indirect knowledge as a kind of valid knowledge. There are two kinds of perception, empirical (vyavaharika) and transcendental (paramarthika). The former is practical. It is uncontradicted perception which prompts successful action in the form of attainment of a desired object or rejection of an undesired object. It depends on the sense organs and other conditions. Ordinary perception is empirical and has two forms, sensuous (stimulated by external objects) and non-sensuous (mental).

Transcendental perception depends upon mere proximity to the Self. It does not depend upon the sense organs and other conditions. It is revelation of knowledge of all objects due to the extirpation of the karma, matter that enters into the soul. It is non-sensuous; it is independent of the sense organs.^[3]

Mediate knowledge (Paroksha)

Paroksha knowledge is that which is acquired by the Self through the mediation of the mind and the sense. It is aspashta (unclear). It is devoid of vividness. It is of five kinds: recollection (smriti), recognition (pratyabhijnana), induction (tarka), deduction (anumana) and verbal testimony (agama).^[4]

Recollection is the knowledge of an object perceived in the past as that due to revival of its disposition (samskara) which is a particular power of Self. It is revived and produces its effect in the form of recollection. It is the effect of the revival of the disposition of the previous perception of an object. It remembers either conscious beings or unconscious things.

Recognition is the composite cognition produced by perception and recollection. Recognition includes the apprehensions of an object in the forms: this is that;this is like that; this is different from that; this is correlated to that and the like. Recognition envelops a perception of an object known in the past as in, this is that devadatta. Here, ‘this’ stands for the perception, ‘that’ for the recollection, ‘knows this’ is that represents recognition.

Induction:

Induction is the knowledge derived from the invariable concomitance of two concurrent objects which have existence in the past, present, and future. It saves the knowledge arrived from the presence or absence of two concurrent things. It is a sort of knowledge sprung from the condition that governs the presence and absence of two objects of equal existence. It is also called uha. Vyapti is of two kinds: anvayavyapti and vyatirekavyapti. Smoke arises only if there is fire, wherever there is smoke, there is fire. This is anvayavyapti. Smoke does not arise, if there is no fire;wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke, this is vyatirekavyapti.^[5]

Anumana (Inference):

Anumana (Inference) is the knowledge of the major term derived from the knowledge of the middle term. Fire is inferred from smoke. Smoke is the middle term and fire is the major term. Inference is based on universal accompaniment of the middle term by the major term in simultaneity or succession. It is based on vyapti derived from induction. The Jainas do not recognize the five marks of the middle term recognized by the Naiyayikas, viz. pakshasattva, sapakshasattva, vipakshasattva, abadhitavishayatva and asatpratipakshtva.^[6]

There are two kinds of Inference: Inference for oneself and Inference for others. In the first, a person perceives the reason (hetu) or middle term (sadhana);remembers the inseparable connection between the reason (hetu) and the inferable object or the major term (sadhya) determined by induction (tarka) and immediately knows the major term.

Inference for others consists in the statement of the middle term, the major term and the minor term. It consists of two propositions; a) the hill is fiery and b) because it is smoky.

Verbal Testimony (Agama)

Verbal testimony is the knowledge of object derived from the words of reliable persons. A reliable person is one who knows object as they really are and express his ideas correctly. He is free from attachment and aversion. His word is in harmony with their objects.^[7] They do not contradict the nature of their objects. Verbal testimony is of two kinds: secular (laukika) and non-secular (lokottara). Verbal testimony of Janaka and such others is secular. Testimony of Tirthamkaras is non secular. Verbal testimony depends upon excellence or perfection of the speaker.

Umasvatmi divides knowledge into five kinds:

1. sense knowledge (mati),
2. verbal testimony (shruti),
3. clairvoyance (avadhi),
4. thoughtreading (manahparyaya) and
5. omniscience (kevalajnana).

Mati and shruti are mediate knowledge (paroksha). Avadhi manahparyaya and kevalajnana are immediate knowledge or perception.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

ibid., p.159

[2]:

Pramana–naya–tattvalokalankara, ii-1

[3]:

Ratnakaravatarika of pramana–naya -tattvalokalankara, ii-4

[4]:

Prof. M. Hirung, Outlines of Indian Philosophy. Pilgrim books (P) Ltd, pp.124-125

[5]:

ibid, iii-7,8 Pareekshamukhasutra, ii, 7-8

[6]:

ibid, iii, 11 -13

[7]:

Pramana -naya–tattvalokalankara, iv -4, 5