The validity of Anumana (inference) in Nyaya system

by Babu C. D | 2018 | 44,340 words

This thesis is called: The validity of Anumana (inference) in Nyaya system. It tries to establish the validity of Anumana through citing its application either consciously or unconsciously in every sphere of human life. Anumana in Nyaya system is the knowledge of any object not by direct observation but by means of the knowledge of a liṅga or sign ...

Chapter 1 - Nyaya system (Introduction)

Epistemology is one of the much discussed and debated fields of study in various schools of Indian thought and philosophy. The term ‘epistemology’ comes from the Greek words ‘Episteme’ (knowledge or science) ‘Logos’ (knowledge or information). One of the core issues in epistemology is about the study of the nature of knowledge. Philosophers and thinkers differ widely in their perception regarding the nature of knowledge and how it is acquired. There have been good number of texts belonging to various schools of philosophy on the Theory of knowledge or ‘pramana shastra’ and it has become a rich field in Sanskrit literature.

From ancient time onwards, the concept of knowledge has been the attraction for thinkers all over the world. Some philosophers define it as an act, some others regard it as relation and according to some it is selfsubsistent and for some others it is quality. In Indian tradition truth and falsity are attributed to cognition and awareness–which is called jnana that has a number of synonyms such as vijnana, buddhi, dhi etc. The term jnana is derived from the root ‘jna’ which is etymologically related to the English word ‘know’. However, translating or representing jnana as knowledge is evaded because jnana can be true or false which are contradictory. Further, jnana is a particular and momentary event; whereas knowledge often refers to a general and lasting acquaintance with facts. Jnana is always individual and belongs to a single person.

In India the word ‘jnana’ chiefly refers to spiritual awareness and may be used in a variety of meanings. It is a theory of knowledge and encompasses one or more reliable and valid means by which human beings gain accurate, true knowledge. In general, knowledge as referring to an organized body of knowledge or even a science is usually called Veda or Vidya.

As per the views of the rationalists, knowledge is possible only if it is based on self-evident and absolutely on certain principles which are implicit in the very notion of reasoning itself. For them, knowledge is what can be deduced from principles that are undoubtable. They affirm the above with the example -a thing cannot ‘be’ and ‘not be’ at the same time. In the same way, ‘a whole is always greater than any of its parts.’[1]

The Bauddha and the Mimamsaka systems agree in describing knowledge as an activity, a transitive process or function (kriya) rather than a mode or a substance. The Nyaya School refutes the above and suggests that knowledge occurs as a result of a relation between soul and body and that they themselves cannot be identified with knowledge. Nyaya system upholds that knowledge is an attribute of the Self. It is not a substance, since it cannot be a permanent substratum for certain recognized and variant properties. On the contrary, Sankhya and the Yoga systems consider cognition as a substantive mode or modification (vriitti) of the buddhi or consciousness of the Self. Naiyayikas repudiating the above view remark that it is not reasonable to think self’s consciousness which is immaterial and intangible will be reflected on any material substratum. Knowledge should be viewed as consciousness belonging to buddhi antecedent itself rather assuming it as a reflection. The Nyaya brings together all cognitive facts such as-sensation, perception, inference, memory, doubt, dream, illusion and the like under knowledge. Buddhi therefore corresponds to cognition.

The Orthodox system (astika) consists six schools viz., Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Sankhya, Yoga, Mimamsa and Vedanta. Among these, the Nyaya School is devoted mostly to logic, epistemology and methodology. Reflection on logical subjects first began in this school though other schools also soon developed their own views as a result of an exchange of ideas between the different schools. But, in course of time the principal logical view (the style and terminology) of the Nyaya School won a supremacy over the rest and became the stock in trade of all Indian schools of Philosophy. This is evident when most of the theories nourished by different systems are deciphered.

In India formal logic officially commences with the appearance of Nyayasutra[2] of Gautama at about 200 A.D. It is in the Nyayashastra that the subject of inference including the five membered syllogisms is for the first time discussed. True of the sixteen substances (padartha)[3] that the Nyayashastra deals with, only two directly bear up inference and the rest are all dialectical in character. Even those two substances are disposed off summarily compared to the rest. Not only in terms of space but also in terms of quality, the discussion of inference leaves much to be desired. There is for instance no mention of pervasion (vyapti) as a component in a syllogism and the syllogism remains really an argument from comparison. Nevertheless, a beginning is made in thinking about arguments abstractly, a beginning which eventually expands to greater dimension. Though Nyayashastra is primarily a text for the Nyaya schools, it had profound influence on other schools. It provided the starting point for subsequent logical thought in other schools as well. It is therefore rightly regarded as the organon of Indian logic.[4]

In spite of its great importance, the Nyayashastra is not an original work totally. A mass of doctrines recognizable as continuously embodied in it were already in existence prior to it. Gautama only sharpened and redacted it. It is not sure when this mass doctrine took shape. The period during which the methodology of discussion evolved and flourished is a pre-logical period and works like Milina panha and Kathavathu (both ca 100 B.C) which belong to this period exhibit little trace of formal logic.[5]

The second phase spans across a long period of about a millennium from the second century AD to the twelfth. It is marked by a great interaction between the Naiyayikas and the Buddhists, though the Jains also made their own contributions. The first two eminent Naiyayikas of this period are Vatsyayana (400 AD) whose Nyayabhasya is the earliest commentary on the Nyayashastras and Uddyotakara (600 AD) whose Nyayavarittika is regarded as one of the most celebrated treatises on logic.[6] Vatsyayana sets for the traditional interpretations of the aphorisms of Gautama. He makes no further advancement beyond Gautama’s speculation. Inference for him is still an argument from comparison. He does not fully appreciate the importance of pervasion too. It should be observed that whatever interaction took place between the logical ideas of Naiyayikas and the Buddhists prior to Vatsyayana is relatively of a rudimentary kind and had no much influence in shaping the subsequent development of logic.

Between Vatsyayana and Uddyotakara, the Nyaya field remained a barren land. During this period -between 500-700 AD-the Buddhist logic showed a rapid growth in the leadership of the logicians Vasubandu, Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. Their logical battle activity was mainly against the unmatured Buddhist’s findings of Gautama as interpreted by Vatsyayana. It may be because of the long gap that fell between the ever worshipped Gautama and the only known commentator Vatsyayana that the ride of the Buddhists was unopposed which finally resulted in the eschewing of the values of Gotama’s aphorisms. Dinnaga through his works Alambana pariksa, Trikalapariksha, Hetucakrasamarthana, Nyayamukha and pramana samuccaya has become a competitor against the logic propounded by Naiyayaikas and there was none equal to him.

Naiyayikas were groping for a long period not less than a century and half when Uddyotakara came out with sufficient reminiscence by which the news upheld by the opponents were refuted and a revival of the ancient Nyaya system was made possible. But it remains a matter of displeasure that though he succeeded in his mission, he could not like his ancestors sow the seed for a new growth as old testimonies, sometimes because of the emergence of new ways of thinking that overshadowed all fields of science and philosophy. After Dharmakirti, the Buddhist logic virtually came to an end in India. The third and the final phase of Indian logic formally was with Tattva-Cintamani of Gangesha.

Theory of knowledge has been the very base of Nyaya system. Nyaya philosophy primarily deals with the conditions of valid thought and the means of acquiring it. Nyaya may be described as the science of the methods and conditions of valid thought and true knowledge of objects. In narrow sense it means the syllogistic type of inference consisting of five propositions. Etymologically, the word Nyaya comes from the root ‘Ni’ meaning ‘to lead’ or ‘take away’. It is thus a study that leads us to right knowledge. According to Sinha and Vidyabhusan, it is etymologically identical with Nigamana the conclusion of a syllogism. [7] It is also called Hetu Vidya or Hetu shastra, the science of causes or anvikshiki-the science of inquiry. Puligandla [8] in his book ‘Foundations of Indian philosophy’ states that Nyaya is chiefly concerned with the cannons of correct thinking and valid reasoning as methodological tools for acquiring knowledge of reality. Hence, it is called tarkashastra-the science of reasoning. The Nyaya theory of knowledge is the cumulative body of the logical studies. Nyaya is also used as a synonym of syllogism and therefore refers to the science of inference.

According to Nyaya, knowledge is awareness or apprehension of objects. Objects are revealed when they become objects of knowledge. Thus knowledge is the property of illumination or manifestation that belongs to the self. Without this luminous light of knowledge we lose the ground of all rational practice and intelligent activity. Knowledge (buddhi) thus is regarded as the ground of what may be called the behavior or conduct of a living being. No knowledge can exist independently by itself without implying a knower and a thing known. Knowledge is a self-transcending property of the self and is the basis of all practical activities. (Ways of knowing)

Describing it further, cognition and the other properties are only accidental to the self which it acquires during its worldly existence and when it comes to be joined to manas and sense organs. Cognition thus is a quality of the psycho-physical organism. For them self is essentially a pure substance and cognition is one of its qualities which come and go without affecting its essential nature.

They uphold realism, the view that the existence and characteristics of external objects are independent of the experiencing subject; that the correspondence between knowledge and the object of knowledge is in no way dependent upon the knower. Knowledge is produced in the soul when it comes into contact with the non-soul. They perceive two types of knowledge anubhava or presentation and smriti or memory.[9] In the former it is original in character and not the reproduction of a previous knowledge of objects. The latter is not the presentation of objects but a reproduction of previous experience. It is again divided into valid (yathartha) and invalid (ayathartha)

They call valid knowledge as prama -true presentational knowledge (yatharthanubhava).[10] It is definite and an assured cognition of an object which is also true and presentational in character.

Validity of knowledge is based on two theories viz., self-validity (svatah pramanya) of knowledge and extraneous means of knowledge (parartah–pramanya). In the former, it is self-assured; whereas in the latter it has to ascertain through appropriate test. Nyaya upholds the latter i.e., of practical verification. (samvadi pravriti) Validity of perception of water is determined by its capacity of quenching thirst. It stresses on cognitive function of pramana. Three essential factors are involved in prama-the knower, the object and the method of knowledge (pramata, prameya and pramana)[11]

Pramana is the instrument of valid knowledge i.e., means or source of knowledge. It is impossible to have any right understanding of things except through means of pramana. It is the cause of valid cognition of objects in as much as it gives us knowledge of objects as they really are and exist in themselves. It is a means of cognizing things. Knowledge, in order to be valid has to correspond to reality. The essence of the theory of knowledge is how correct knowledge can be acquired and how one knows and how one doesn’t.[12] There should be some means and methods by which knowledge can and should be acquired. A pioneer in systematic treatment of the means of knowledge in India is Gautama, the author of Nyaya sutras wherein he also deals with the objects of knowledge. The main enquiry hidden in the science is ‘Is it possible to perceive the means of knowledge apart from knowledge as well as from the objects of knowledge.’ The six accepted schools of orthodox Indian thought assent to at least two or at the most all eight sources of knowledge viz., direct knowledge (pratyaksha) inference (anumana) knowledge by similarity (upamana) verbal testimony (shabda) presumption (arthapathi) implication (sambhava) non-existence (abhava) and tradition (aithihya)[13] Vaisheshika accepts the first two, Sankhya Yoga the first three, Nyaya the first four, Mimamsa the first five and Advaita the first six.

The value and accuracy of a means of knowledge are to be known from the validity of the knowledge derived from it. It follows from this, that if the validity of knowledge is unknowable then that of its method is far more unknowable. According to Nyaya, there are four distinct and independent methods of knowledge i.e., perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.[14] Among all the six schools, Nyaya is unique in advocating logical realism. The ultimate concern of Nyaya philosophy like that of other systems is liberation, which is the summum bonum.[15] It can be attained by true knowledge.

As a system of realism, the Nyaya deserves special study to show that Idealism was not the only philosophical creed of ancient India; but as a system which contains a thorough refutation of the other schools. Therefore it should be studied prior to accepting the validity of other views in order to ascertain how far those views can satisfy the acid test of the Nyaya criticism and deserve to be accepted. The importance of Nyaya is therefore significant for the correct understanding of ancient Indian philosophy as for the evaluation of modern western philosophy.

Anumana propounded by Naiyayikas is purely logical and is founded on five member syllogism. It is based on pararthanumana[16] which means proved or validated through extraneous means. Almost all the Indian philosophies have been greatly influenced by the logical and dialectical technicalities of Nyaya philosophy. Anumana in Nyaya system is the knowledge of any object not by direct observation but by means of the knowledge of a linga or sign and that of its universal relation with the inferred object. Anumana differs from Pratyaksha because the latter is independent of any previous knowledge whereas inference relies on the previous knowledge. It means that inference (anumana) precedes perception (pratyksha) or that inference derives from certain previous knowledge. While perception is of only one type, anumana is of different types depending upon the Vyapti or universal relation. Naiyayikas propound pararthanumana as against svarthanumana. However, the former is based on the latter because one cannot convince another if the same person is not convinced of himself or herself. In svarthanumana, the premises are understood by ones’ own experience while in pararthanumana the premises are discovered by one and imparted to another through the medium of knowledge. Nyaya system makes use of the five membered syllogism of a thing to impart the knowledge to others who are ignorant or doubtful or having wrong notion of a thing. Being truth oriented, the logical arguments gained world wide popularity since none could succeed in the game, unless shuffling cards is done with Naiyayika to choose a correct one.

The present thesis is an attempt to understand mainly the Anumana of Naiyayikas. In the past a number of philosophers, thinkers and researchers belonging to several disciplines set out to find out the means of knowledge or to arrive at a common theory of knowledge. At last, a detailed and comprehensive review on Anumana, the second major means of knowledge particularly that of Naiyayikas’ has been accepted largely by all philosophers due to its realistic and logistic nature. Understanding the validity and relevance of anumana is pertinent as for any knowledge emerging from any means as anumana will be the finger post. On denying the validity of anumana, all the dealings of human being would be in trouble. Even scientific researches show a progress in dependence on this powerful means of knowledge. Bridging the gap of an in-depth critical review and understanding on Anumana propounded by Naiyayikas’, this thesis has made a serious effort to analyse and understand the validity and relevance of anumana especially pararthanumana of Nyaya school.

Purpose of a research of this nature can be gained through different ways. It can be obtained through giving a historical account of the subject either by taking Nyaya and examining its views on inference or by taking each topic in the Nyaya theory of inference and examining the view on it by different thinkers; or by concentrating on certain specific texts and trying to make sense of the account of inference given there in terms of contemporary idiom. This work has chosen the latter course.

In this context, the thesis commences by presenting a historical and metaphysical perspective to Nyaya theory of inference in the first chapter. In chapter two after considering the basic concept of theory of knowledge, the thesis turns to a consideration of the various means of knowledge by various Indian Schools, which according to the Nyaya-Vaisheshikas is the vehicle of cognition. In the subsequent third and fourth chapters, a direct treatment of inference has been undertaken. Chapter three deals with inference in Nyaya shastra and chapter four examines the nature and different elements of inference according to Nyaya Vaisheshika. Chapter five tries to validate and highlight the relevance of Anumana by relating it to events and life situations in the contemporary world. The last chapter summarises the thesis and gives a conclusion wherein the hypothesis is substantiated.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Dr. Arbind, K, Jha. Nyaya Philosophy-Epistemology and Education, New Delhi: Standard Publishers, 2005, pp. 38-39

[2]:

The Nyayasutra (Nyayasutra) is so called because of its aphoristic form. ‘Sutra’ means an aphorism.

[3]:

The word ‘padartha’ in this context does not refer to a category as it does in later Nyaya-Vaisheshika literature though it is sometimes translated as such

[4]:

Bochenski. I, M. A History of Formal Logic, Edited and translated by Ivo Thomas, Nortre Dame, Indiana: University of Nortre Dame press, 1961, p. 417, 425

[5]:

Ibid, pp.422-423

[6]:

Randle, H,N. Indian logic in early schools, Bombay, Oxford university press, 1930, p.35

[7]:

N.L. Sinha and S.C. Vidyabhushana, The Nyaya Sutra of Gautama, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, p.1 of Intro.

[8]:

Puligandla, Foundations of Indian philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1965.

[10]:

-Sapthapadarthi, 140.

[11]:

Sarvadarishanasamgraha, Chapter on Nyaya philosophy.

[12]:

Dr. Arbind, K, Jha, Nyaya Philosophy-Epistemology and Education, New Delhi, Standard Publishers, 2005, pp. 71-72

[13]:

J, Prasad, History of Indian Epistemology, 1956, p.9

[14]:

S.C. Chatterjee, Nyaya theory of Knowledge. Delhi, Bharatiya kala prakashan, 2008. p.21.

[15]:

Dr. Arbind, K, Jha. Nyaya Philosophy-Epistemology and Education, New Delhi, Standard publishers, 2005, p. 73

[16]:

Tarkabhasya (Tarkabhasha), p.9

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