The grounds of Anumāna: Vyāpti and Pakṣadharmatā

It has been already stated above that Kumārila follows Śabara and he explains the relation as invariable concomitance of a sign or reason with a predicate, the former being pervaded by the latter and being the indicator of the latter, which is indicated. The sign is called vyāpya, because it is co-extensive with or narrower than the predicate in time and place. The predicate is called vyāpaka because it is co-extensive with or wider than the sign in time and place. The unperceived predicate is inferred from the sign perceived in the subject on the ground of the uniform relation between them known already in similar instances. Smoke was perceived to be accompanied by fire in a kitchen and other similar instances at certain times and in certain places. Smoke is subsequently perceived in a hill exactly in the same form. So, the existence of a fire in the same form in a hill is inferred from it. The sign or reason (hetu) proves the existence of the predicate.^[1] The predicate alone is not the object of anumāna, because it is already known. The subject, e.g., a hill as qualified by the predicate, e.g., a fire is the object of anumāna. The subject which is alone unrelated to the predicate can not be the object of anumāna.

Vyāpti and pakṣadharmatā are known as the grounds for the operation of anumāna. Smoke is perceived on the hill and fire is inferred. An anumāna takes place only when the universal relation between smoke and fire is already known. This is called vyāpti. ^[2] According to Kumārila, the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) is known by repeated observation of concomitance of the two general properties of the reason and the predicate and some times of two particular objects denoted by them strengthened by the non-observation of contrary instances of their non-concomitance.^[3] The observation of concomitance of the reason and the predicate in numerous instances and the non-observation of non-concomitance between them are the means of knowing invariable concomitance.^[4] Kumārila says that vyāpti is not a simple assertoric judgement but it is a necessary judgement. For example, “smoke is accompanied by fire” is an assertoric judgement while “smoke must be accompanied by fire” is a necessary judgement.

Vyāpti is a necessary relation having the form ‘this happening that must happen.’^[5] The conclusion that is drawn cannot be certain unless the relation between the middle and major terms is necessary.^[6]

Pārthasārathi Miśra also holds the same view as was accepted by Kumārila. The observation of the concomitance of all smokes with fire and the absence of smoke in all non-fiery objects is not necessary for the knowledge of the invariable concomitance. The observation of the concomitance of smoke with fire in numerous instances and the non-observation of the contrary instances are enough for the knowledge of the invariable concomitance.^[7] The knowledge of invariable concomitance is inferential since the concomitance of smoke with fire in the past, the present, the future, the remote places can never be perceived.

The perceptual character of it is contradicted by consciousness since it is not direct and immediate.^[8] Hence, invariable concomitance is known through induction by simple enumeration.

According to Prabhākara Miśra, the knowledge of invariable concomitance is attained by a single act of sense perception. The invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between smoke and fire is apprehended in the very first observation of the two together and what subsequent observations serve is merely to remove extraneous conditions (upādhi). According to Prabhākara, anumāna is the apprehension of the apprehended,^[9] though it is not of the nature of memory. The uniform relation may express inherence, co-inherence in the same substance, causality and the like. The causal relation between smoke and fire is invariable. The relation between taste and colour, which inheres in the same substance is invariable. But the relation between colour and taste is not invariable. Whenever there is taste, there is colour,e.g., ‘in water.’ But wherever there is colour, there is no taste, e.g.,‘in light.’ An invariable relation is the ground of inference (anumāna).^[10]

Kumārila regards novelty or flair for innovativeness as an essential characteristic of valid knowledge. It consists in not being apprehended already (agṛhitāgrāhitva). It is objected that inference (anumāna) contains the recollection of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) which apprehends what has already been apprehended and thus invalidates anumāna. Kumārila argues that though the concomitance of smoke and fire in a kitchen and the like is certainly known in a general way, yet the relation between the present subject, i.e., ‘a hill’ and the predicate, i.e., ‘a fire’ is not already known. The hill was not already known far less its fieriness. What is the novel factor, which was not already apprehended in the anumāna? The fieriness of smoky objects is already known in a general way. The generic character of fire is already known. The hill is perceived. But the hill as qualified by a fire was not already known by any means of valid knowledge.^[11]

It has been reiterated that anumāna is the apprehension of the apprehended. The vyāpti of smoke with fire which means a relation of the two free from all spatio-temporal limitations (deśakālānavacchinna) is cognized through perception. It is always said by us that ‘smoke and fire are conjoined’ but is never said that ‘this is the conjunction of smoke and fire’. Thus, the experience itself reveals that spatio-temporal limitations are imposed on substances alone, while conjunction is free from these. Now, if the conjunction of smoke with fire, which is revealed by the first perception, can acquire the status of vyāpti, then why should the conjunction of fire with smoke, which too is similarly revealed, not acquire the same status? Prabhākara replies that the conjunction of fire with smoke, though revealed by the first perception, is known through subsequent perceptions as depending on an extraneous condition, viz., wet fuel, and on this ground dhūmavatta of fire is determined not to be natural to fire, while the property of being conjoined with fire of smoke is determined to be natural to smoke, for no extraneous condition is observed in the latter case.^[12]

Kumārila and his followers maintain that vyāpti is a necessary relation. But Pārthasārathi Miśra says that vyāpti cannot be a necessary relation. In his view, the vyāpti, between smoke and fire amounts to the statement that all the observed cases of smoke are cases of fire. It expresses a regular sequence between observed smokes and observed fires. But how can this be a necessary relation so long as it restricts the relation to only such places and times as have been actually observed in the past? A necessary relation is not subject to spatio-temporal limitations. If we witnessed many instances in which smoke and fire were found together, we cannot say that smoke must be accompanied by fire merely on this ground. The necessity of the smoke-fire relation is explained in terms of neural connections in the brain. By the repeated experience of smoke and fire a bond of association is created in the mind and a corresponding bond is created in the nervous system, so that whenever in future smoke is perceived, the idea of fire is revived. In this way, anumāna is merely a conditioned response. But if this is the whole account of anumāna, we have no logical justification for inferring fire from smoke and also for imposing our own conclusion on others. Hence, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) is the instrumental cause of anumāna and it is the ground for the operations of anumāna.

How is the vyāpti known? In this regard it can be said that vyāpti is not known by sensuous perception, which cognizes objects here and now acting upon the sense organs. Nor is it known by mental perception since the manas can not perceive external objects independently of the external sense organs. Nor is it cognized by perception aided by the impressions of repeated perceptions since they are the causes of recollections only. Nor is it known by anumāna since it is the ground of anumāna. If vyāpti were known by anumāna and anumāna were based on it, then it would lead to infinite regress. Nor is vyāpti known by Vedic testimony since it gives the knowledge of duty (kārya) only. Nor is it known by comparison since it cognizes similarity only. Nor is it known by presumption since it also depends upon a constant relation like anumāna and so will lead to infinite regress. Therefore, vyāpti is known by mental perception.^[13]

In the process of observation eyes and other sense organs as well as manas are involved. Eyes come in contact with an external object on the one hand and with manas on the other. But the contact of eyes with vyāpti is not possible. Because vyāpti is not a thing found in one particular time and place. Repeated observation reveals only that smoke is connected with fire, but this is not vyāpti. It is a universal connection and vyāpti implies a knowledge not only of the present time and place, but also of past and future times and places. If it be accepted that mental observation can give the knowledge of vyāpti, it can not be said that manas is the source of such knowledge simply on the ground that it is involved in it. When manas functions with the help of external sense organs, the pramāṇa is called perception. When it functions with the help of liṅgajñāna, the pramāṇa is called inference (anumāna). When it functions exclusively by itself as in the case of pleasure etc. the pramāṇa is called mental perception. In the case of vyāptijñāna, manas cannot function with the help of external senses, nor with the help of liṅgajñāna, nor exclusively by itself. Therefore, the pramāṇa of vyāpti is neither perception, nor inference, nor mental perception, but different from them.

According to Prabhākara, smoke and fire are perceived as conjoined since conjunction as a quality depends upon the substances which are conjoined. Time and place also are perceived as qualifications of substances. The conjunction of smoke and fire unbounded by time and place is perceived in a kitchen and the like. Hence their conjunction is natural, which depends upon the existence of smoke only. If the existence of smoke is known by perception, then its relation to fire can at once be inferred.^[14] Prabhākara recognizes the importance of repeated observation for the elimination of suspected conditions.^[15] He also regards induction by simple enumeration as the ground of invariable concomitance (vyāpti). He considers anumāna to be valid since the knowledge of the predicate existing in the subject is in the nature of apprehension, though it is produced by the perception of the sign and the recollection of the invariable concomitance (vyāpti).^[16]

The Bhāṭṭas hold that neither causality nor identity could serve as a method of arriving at vyāpti. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the invariable concomitance of two general objects is recognized through a repeated cognizance and through the removal of all doubt as to their difference (non-concomitance).^[17] There is an invariable concomitance of particular object also. For example, the perception of the appearance of the constellation of Kṛttikā gives rise to the notion of the proximity of (its neighbour) Rohiṇī. ^[18]

Sucaritamiśra, the commentator on Ślokavārttika, says that the knowledge of vyāpti arises after several observations of two things together. According to him, we know the invariable relation of smoke and fire in one perception, but not in the first perception as Prabhākara maintains. Before the knowledge of vyāpti arises in the mind there must have been a series of experiences of smoke together with fire. On the final experience helped by the revival of the memory-impressions of previous experiences a person comes to know that smoke possesses the nature of being invariably accompanied by fire.^[19] In Sucaritamiśra’s view, in the first stage, a vyāpti is merely suggested by a uniform positive experience. On the other hand, in the second stage, the vyāpti is confirmed by a uniform negative experience. It is not only perceived that smoke is accompanied by fire but also that there is no smoke when there is no fire. Again, in the third stage, there is a process of reasoning. When a person has uniformly observed smoke with fire and has not observed smoke without fire, he thinks that there must be an invariable relation of smoke with fire since the fact that smoke follows fire without any regard to the difference of places, times and other conditions and that it is totally absent in the absence of fire, which cannot be explained otherwise than on the basis of an essential or natural relation between smoke and fire. According to him, vyāpti is known through perception and is confirmed by the non-perception of any exception.

Pārthasārathi Miśra criticizes this view and he says that vyāpti cannot be an object of perception because it implies a knowledge of remote times and places, which cannot come in contact with the senses. Though the Mīmāṃsakas are not unanimous regarding the function of vyāpti, yet they admit the importance of vyāpti in anumāna.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Ślokavārttika, Anumāna, 5,6,10,11

[2]:

yatra yatra dhūmastatra tatrāgniriti sāhacaryaniyamo vyāptiḥ. Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 49

[3]:

bhūyodarśanāgamyā ca vyāptiḥ sāmānyadharmayo /
jñāyate bhedahānena kvacicchāpi viśeṣayoḥ // Ślokavārttika, Anumāna, 12

[4]:

sāhitye mitadeśatvāt prasiddhe vahnidhūmayoḥ /
vyatirekasya cādṛṣṭer gamakatvam prakalpyate // Śāstradīpikā, p. 113

[5]:

asmin satyamunā bhavyamiti śaktyā nirūpyate. Ślokavārttika, Anumāna,14

[6]:

tairdṛṣṭerapi naivestā vyāpakāṇsāvadhāraṇā, Ibid.,15

[7]:

anumitsatā na sarveṣām dhūmavatām agnimattāvagantavyā, nāpi sarvatrānagnau dhūmasyābhāvaḥ. bhūyognisāhityam vyabhicāradarśanam, ityetāvadevānumānārthibhiravyarthanīyam. Śāstradīpikā, p. 113, Nyāyaratnamālā, p. 336

[8]:

yatra yatra dhūmastatratatrāgniriti yovagamaḥ sopyanumānika eva parokṣarūpatvāt, tasya tu pratyakṣatvam samvidviruddham aparokṣyābhāvāt. Ślokavārttika, Anumana,12

[9]:

tasmādagṛhītagrāhyamevānumānam. Śāstradīpikā, p. 117

[10]:

Vide Sinha, J.N., Indian Philosophy, vol-1,p. 807

[11]:

sāmānyena hi dhūmavatāmagnimattāvagatā, parvatādeś tu deśaviśeṣasya svarūpamapi prāganavagatam no tāramagnimattvam. Śāstradīpikā, p. 114

[12]:

Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 222

[13]:

Vide Sinha, J.N., Indian Philosophy, vol-1., p. 808

[14]:

prathamam mahānasādavagner dhūmena saha saṃyogo deśakālānavacchinna eva pratīyate. sa tasmāt svābhāvikaḥ. Tantrarahasya, p. 11

[15]:

prāthamika pratyakṣam eva dhūmāgnyoḥ sambandha niyame pramāṇam, bhūyodarśanena paścāt tasya nirupādhikatvāniścayaḥ. Ibid., pp. 11,12

[16]:

Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 71

[17]:

Ślokavārttika, Anumāna, 12

[18]:

kṛttikodayamālakṣya rohiṇyāsattiklṛptivat vyāpteśca dṛśyamānāyāḥ kvaścid dharmaḥ prayojakaḥ. Ibid.,13

[19]:

prācīnānekadarśanajanitasaṃskārasahāye carame darśane cetasi cakāsti dhūmasya vahniniyatasvabhāvatvam. Kāśikā on Ślokavārttika, Anumāna,12