Anumana in Indian Philosophy

by Sangita Chakravarty | 2016 | 48,195 words

This page relates ‘Definition of Anumana (in Samkhya-Yoga Philosophy)’ of the study on the concept of Anumana (inference) in the Vedic schools of Indian Philosophy. Anumana usually represents the most authentic means of valid knowledge. This paper discusses the traditional philosophical systems such as Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Yoga, Mimamsa and Vedanta.

(A). Definition of Anumāna (in Sāṃkhya-Yoga Philosophy)

Indian logicians have attached much importance to anumāna chiefly because it is accepted as a valid source of knowledge. Every system of Indian philosophy, except Cārvāka has tried to discuss it in the light of its own metaphysical background and secondly because it serves as the most authentic source of knowledge of supra-sensuous objects. The Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge was developed by Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra through their commentaries in the Sāṃkhyakārikā, especially by the latter. In the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system, anumāna is defined after perception and before verbal testimony. In the system of Sāṃkhya-Yoga , the definition of anumāna is influenced by Gautama’s Nyāyasūtra. The Sāṃkhyakārikā, most authentic work on Sāṃkhya logic defines anumāna as the knowledge derived from sign and signate.[1] Vācaspati Miśra explains this definition elaborately. He opines that liṅga means pervaded (vyāpya) and liṅgī means pervasive (vyāpaka).[2] In other words, they are called probans and probandum. Because, as a rule probans should be pervaded by probandum in the process of anumāna. Vācaspati Miśra states that the probans and probandum stand for inferential knowledge. The inferential knowledge arises through the knowledge that probans like smoke is pervaded and probandum like fire is pervasive.[3] Vācaspati Miśra however, realizes that mere knowledge of invariable concomitance cannot lead to the inferential knowledge. Anything like light or burnt up ashes existing on the mountain may not be helpful in inferring fire from smoke. In the same way, the smoke existing at other places cannot lead to inferential knowledge. Therefore, there is additional requirement of an application of probans on subject or the place where probandum is inferred. In the words of Vācaspati Miśra, the word liṅgī in the text of the Sāṃkhyakārikā should be considered as an example of ekaśesa samāsa. While explaining the kārikā, it should be repeated. The first gives an idea of pervasive, i.e., vyāpaka or probandum forming the part of invariable concomitance. The second means that (subject) which is possessed of probans, thus leading to the idea that probans is endowed with the condition of being present in subject (pakṣadharmatā).[4] The definition of anumāna in general can be stated thus: anumāna is the process which involves the cognition of invariable concomitance between the major term and the middle term and the cognition of the presence of the middle term in the minor term.

The Sāṃkhyacandrikā also gives a different interpretation of the above statement of the Sāṃkhyakārikā. It explains liṅga as probans and the liṅgī as probandum. The perception following probans and probandum is deliberation (parāmarśa). It means the pakṣa is possessor of the probans which is pervaded by probandum. This deliberation is called anumāna. It gives rise to the buddhivṛtti that mountain is fiery. It is the internal mediate operation and the inferential knowledge follows it immediately.[5]

Māṭhara[6] and Gauḍapāda also interpret the above statement of the Sāṃkhyakārikā. They also establish the necessity of both probans and probandum for anumāna. But they draw further conclusion that sometimes liṅga leads to the knowledge of liṅgī, and sometimes liṅgī leads to the knowledge of liṅga. For example, in inferring cuckoo from her voice liṅga leads to liṅgī. Again in inferring her voice from the cuckoo, liṅgī leads to the knowledge of liṅga.

Sometimes liṅga like tridaṇḍa leads to the knowledge of mendicant and sometimes liṅgī like mendicant leads to the knowledge of liṅga like tridaṇḍa. [7] According to the Sāṃkhyasūtra, anumāna is the knowledge of the invariably associated (vyāpaka) after observing through the knowledge of invariable association[8] . Anumāna is the knowledge of pervade (vyāpaka, the major term), following the knowledge of the pervaded (vyāpya, the middle term), on the part of one who sees the relation of avinābhāva or of one not being without the other. The word pratibandha means pervasion (vyāpti) or invariable accompaniment of one thing, e.g., fire, by another thing, e.g., smoke. The knowledge of the pervade (vyāpaka) or what is so accompanied, which results from seeing the pervasion, is the proof called inference (anumāna).This is the meaning. While anumiti or the result of inference, i.e.,the knowledge produced by inference, is the knowledge belonging to Puruṣa. The Sāṃkhyasūtra defines it in terms of inferential knowledge of which invariable association serves as the cause. Vindhyavāsin also interprets this same definition of anumāna. Aniruddha, however, offers a different interpretation. He interprets prtibandhadṛśaḥ as a case of man who has known the invariable association. According to him, anumāna is the knowledge of pervasive after knowing the pervaded in case of one who has observed the invariable concomitance between the two.[9] Vijñānabhikṣu in his bhāṣya interprets the sūtra thus, ‘anumāna is the knowledge of the pervasive through observing the invariable concomitance.’[10] He holds that it refers to buddhivṛtti as a means of knowledge.

In the system of Yoga, we find the definition of anumāna in the Yogabhāṣya of Vyāsa. According to Vyāsa, anumāna is the modification of citta brought about by the relation which exists in objects of homogenous nature and does not exist in the objects of heterogenous nature and ascertains chiefly the generic nature of an object.[11] The modification of buddhi in the form of an object is the common factor to all the pramāṇas. The distinguishing factor of anumāna is that such a modification is caused by the knowledge of relation. According to Vyāsa, pramāṇa is defined as modification of citta in the form of object cognized, viz., moon and stars are moving object, and pramā as its false identification with Puruṣa. The knowledge of sambandha and pratibandha is the commonly used expression in the definitions of anumāna by Vārsagaṇya, Vyāsa and the Sāṃkhyasūtra of Kapila. Here, sambandha means relation or invariable concomitance. We can say that the definition of anumāna in Sāṃkhya-Yoga means the modification of citta brought about by invariable concomitance.

The above definitions of anumāna require some explanation of the concept of vyāpti for their comprehension. Vyāpti is regarded as the logical ground of anumāna. In anumāna, the knowledge of the sādhya or major term as related to the pakṣa or minor term depends on the knowledge of vyāpti between the middle and the major terms. In the Sāṃkhya system, Vācaspati Miśra’s discussion of ‘pervasive’ and ‘pervaded’ gives an idea of vyāpti. He accepts vyāpya as that which is invariably and naturally associated with the nature of an object without involving some condition suspected or ascertained.[12] The vyāpaka is that with the nature of which the former is related.[13] The relation stands here for invariable association which is denoted by the term vyāpti. The relation of invariable association involves three things—the two correlatives and a particular association in them. In the present case, the association should be natural and invariable. It should not be conditional. The case of relation involving condition can be explained thus—when one infers smoke from fire, then fire would be pervaded (liṅga) and smoke would be pervasive (liṅgī) . But it is generally observed that fire is not naturally related to smoke. If fire would have been invariably associated with smoke, then it would always be accompanied with smoke and would never have been found without smoke. But in some cases like iron-ball fire exists without smoke. That is why the association of fire with smoke involves condition. The fire requires wet fuel in addition to itself to give rise to smoke. Thus, fire does not accompany the smoke naturally. On the contrary, it involves further condition of wet fuel.

In the Sāṃkhyasūtra, it is stated that constant co-existence of both, i.e., the sādhya and the sādhana or of one is called vyāpti. [14] The word dharmasāhityam means association or concomitance in being properties, in other words, going together or being in co-existence. Ubhoyoḥ, the word has been stated in respect of the case of equal pervasion (i.e., sādhya and sādhana). And regularity (niyata) is cognizable by means of favourable arguments. Hence, there is no impossibility of the apprehension of vyāpti. The strength and validity of anumāna depends not only on the inclusion of all possible similar instances, but and much more on the exclusion of all possible contrary instances, which go to establish the general proposition underlying it. Vyāpti cannot be a separate principle, because of the necessity for the supposition of an entity. The first part of this definition, viz.,‘in case of two’ refers to the case of equal pervasion which is called samavyāpti. The latter half, viz., ‘in case of one’ of them refers to the case of unequal pervasion, which is called viṣamavyāpti. The former is found in the case when both the vyāpya and vyāpaka are always found together without exception as that in createdness and non eternity.[15] The second is found in cases where the pervasion is not equal or the pervasives is more than pervaded in pervasion just as that found in case of fire and smoke.[16]

The Jayamaṅgalā mentions seven kinds of relation between sign and signate, viz.,

  1. master and servant,
  2. original and its modification,
  3. cause and effect, as between cow and calf,
  4. pot and its possessor,
  5. association,
  6. opposition, as between cold and hot and
  7. the object and the being for which it is meant as between an object of enjoyment and its enjoyer.[17]

According to the Sāṃkhyasūtra, vyāpti is not a different category from the co-existence of properties, otherwise it would lead to the cumbrousness of postulations as it would compel to consider vyāpti as an independent category.[18] Aniruddha states that if vyāpti is considered to be an independent category, then the invariable association would require separate mention. That is why it is said that invariable concomitance itself is vyāpti. [19] According to Vijñānabhikṣu, if vyāpti is an additional entity to those admitted by Sāṃkhya, then it would lead to the acceptance of the substratum of vyāpti as another additional entity and it would be difficult.[20] Again some Acārya opines that vyāpti is the result of the power of objects and as such as an additional entity.[21] Aniruddha opines that vyāpti is the power in pervasive, e.g., fire and pervaded, e.g., ‘smoke’ and is observed through observing the two. Pañcaśikha opines that vyāpti means the relation connected with power of being maintained or sustained.[22] The three technical terms of Hindu logic, viz., vyāpya, vyāpaka and vyāpti practically summarise the whole theory of inference. The word vyāpya means that which is pervaded and the word vyāpaka means that which pervades and vyāpti means the pervasion. Thus from the denotative view-point, in the example of fire and smoke, the denotation of fire is perceived as wholly contained within the denotation of fire. Hence, smoke is the thing pervaded; fire is the thing pervading; and the denotation of smoke under the denotation of fire is the pervasion of smoke by fire. It is the vyāpti which forms the basis or principles of all inferences. It is different in different cases and the number of vyāpti is manifold, according to the various combinations of objects. According to the Sāṃkhya system, every effect must be contained in its cause before its manifestation and after unmanifestation. Therefore, the cause possesses a power of sustaining the effect while the effect has got a power of being an object located (ādhāra). Vyāpti or invariable concomitance is the power of being associated in the pervaded. So, Vijñānabhikṣu states that causes like Prakṛti are said to be pervaded and in this way, vyāpti comes to be in possession of the power of being pervaded. According to Aniruddha, the word ādheyaśakti means that it should be the power of being related as pervaded and not the object itself.

In the systems of Indian philosophy, anumāna depends on vyāpti (universal relation). Now, the question naturally arises as to how such an invariable association between two objects can be ascertained. The Sāṃkhyas ascertain vyāpti through perception. But Vijñānabhikṣu, the commentator on Sāṃkhyasūtra refers to anukulatarka as a means of ascertaining vyāpti. He holds vyāpti as an invariable concomitance of reason with the consequent and refers to anukulatarka sahakṛta darśana as the method of arriving at such a concomitance.[23] According to Vijñānabhikṣu, if one has to know the relation of smoke with fire, one perceives smoke associated with fire and starts thinking that smoke is invariably associated with the fire. Again, if smoke would not have been invariably accompanied by fire, it would have been perceived without fire, but such a case is not observed. There is no possibility of smoke without fire. That is why the invariableness is ascertained through such confutation.

As regards the forms of vyāpti, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system has not discussed the problem clearly. In the Yoga system, the Yogabhāṣya implies the division of vyāpti into positive invariableness which is called anvaya vyāpti and negative invariableness which is called vyatireka vyāpti. Anumāna is said to be caused by the relation which is found present in the similar cases and absent in the dissimilar cases.[24] In the case of anvaya vyāpti, the probans and the probandum are present in the same place. On the otherhand, in the case of vyatireka vyāpti, the probandum is absent and the probans should also be absent. Vācaspati Miśra refers vyatireka vyāpti as the basis of avīta anumāna. [25] In the system of Sāṃkhya, Vijñānabhikṣu[26] and Aniruddha[27] admit two other kinds of vyāpti, viz., samavyāpti and viṣamavyāpti. When the probans and probandum are co-extensive or equal in pervasion then it is a case of samavyāpti. Both of them are never found separate, just as createdness and non-eternity. On the other hand, in anumāna, the probans as a rule should be pervaded by the probandum. The pervasive is one which is found at more places than the pervaded. For example, when fire is inferred through smoke, then fire is pervasive. The fire exists in more places than the smoke. This is a case of viṣamavyāpti.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam trividhamanumānamākhyātam / talliṅga liṅgīpūrvakam āptaśrutirāpta vacanantu // Sāṃkhyakārikā, k. 5

[2]:

liṅgam vyāpyam liṅgī vyāpakam. Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhyakārikā, k. 5

[3]:

dhūmādirvyāpya vahnyādirvyāpaka. Ibid.

[4]:

Vide Kumar, Shiv., Sāṃkhya Yoga Epistemology, p. 112

[5]:

Sāṃkhyacandrikā, 5

[6]:

talliṅgaliṅgīpūrvakamiti liṅgena tridaṇḍādi darśanenadṛṣṭo api liṅgī sādhyate nunamasau parivrāḍasti yasyedam tridaṇḍamiti. Māṭharavṛtti on Sāṃkhyakārikā, k. 5

[7]:

liṅgena liṅgī anumīyate yathā daṇḍena yatiḥ……liṅgīnā liṅgamanumīyate yathā dṛṣṭvā yatimasyedam tridaṇḍamiti. Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya on Sāṃkhyakārikā, k. 5

[8]:

pratibandhadṛśaḥ pratibaddhajñānamanumānam. Sāṃkhyasūtra, 1. 100

[9]:

avinābhāvadarśino vyāpyajñānādanuvyāpakajñānamanumānam. Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti, 1. 100

[10]:

vyāptidarśanād vyāpakajñānamanumānam. Sāṃkhya Pravacanabhāṣya, 1. 100

[11]:

anumeyasya tulyajātīyesu anuvṛttau bhinnajātīyebhya vyāvṛttaḥ sambandho yastadviṣayā sāmānyāvadhāraṇa pradhāna vṛttiranumānam. Yoga Bhāṣya, 1. 7

[12]:

śaṃkitasamāropitopādhinirākaraṇena vastusvabhāva pratibaddham vyāpyam. Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī, 5

[13]:

yena pratibaddham tad vyāpakam. Ibid.

[14]:

niyatadharmasāhityamubhayorekatarasya vā vyāptiḥ. Sāṃkhyasūtra, 5. 29

[15]:

Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti, 5. 29

[16]:

Ibid.

[17]:

kadācilliṅga pūrvakam kadācilliṅgīpūrvakam dṛśyate…gamyagamakatvam satisambandhe. Jayamaṅgalā on Sāṃkhyakārikā

[18]:

na tattvāntaram vastukalpanāprasakteḥ. Sāṃkhyasūtra, 5. 30

[19]:

tattvāntarasvīkāre apyavyabhicāro vaktavyaḥ. Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti, 5. 30

[20]:

niyatadharmasāhityātirikta vyāptirna bhavati vyāptitvāśrayasya vastuno’pi kalpanāprasaṅgāt. Sāṃkhya Pravacanabhāṣya, 5. 30

[21]:

nijaśaktyudbhavamityācāryāḥ. Sāṃkhyasūtra, 5. 31

[22]:

ādheyaśaktiyoga iti pañcaśikhaḥ. Ibid., 5. 32

[23]:

niyamaścānukulatarkena grāhya iti na vyāptigrahāsambhava iti bhāvaḥ. Sāṃkhya Pravacanabhāṣya, 5. 29

[24]:

Yoga Bhāṣya, 1. 7

[25]:

Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī, 5

[26]:

ubhoyoriti samavyāptipakṣe proktam. Sāṃkhya Pravacanabhāṣya, 5. 29

[27]:

ubhoyoriti samavyāptikayoḥ …viṣamavyāptikasya. Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti, 5. 29

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