(E). Liṅga—its varieties

It has been already stated that every anumāna must involve at least three steps. The first is the knowledge of the middle term (hetu) related to the minor term (pakṣa). Secondly, there is the knowledge of a universal relation between major term (sādhya) and the middle term (hetu). Thirdly, there is the conclusion, in which the hetu is predicted of the minor term (pakṣa). In the discussion of yathārtha anumāna, it may be noted that while vyāpti is regarded as the special cause of anumāna, in the same way liṅgaparāmarśa is treated as the immediate cause of anumāna. It serves to make an anumāna most cogent and convincing. The Naiyāyikas hold that without liṅgaparāmarśa, as a synthetic correlation of the minor, middle and major terms, we cannot explain the transition from the premises to the conclusion. It is the operative cause of anumāna. The cause of an anumāna whether for one’s own self or for another is simply the consideration of a sign, therefore the anumāna is just this consideration of sign.^[1]

On this analysis anumāna involves the following five steps.

1. the knowledge of vyāpti between the middle and the major terms.
2. the perception of the minor term as related to the middle term.
3. a recollection of the vyāpti between the middle and major terms.
4. a contemplation of the middle as correlating the major and minor terms.
5. the conclusion relating the minor term with the major term.^[2]

Though the ancient Naiyāyikas regard liṅga as the instrumental cause of anumāna, yet some Navya Naiyāyikas criticize this view. According to them, the middle term (hetu) may be a thing of the present or the past or future. The middle term (hetu) cannot lead to the conclusion except through the knowledge of vyāpti between it and the major term. Hence, the knowledge of vyāpti or the universal relation between the middle and the major terms should be taken as the special cause (kāraṇa) of anumāna. But the knowledge of vyāpti does not immediately lead to the conclusion. It has for its function (vyāpāra) a synthetic view of the middle term as related to the major term, on the one hand, and the minor on the other (liṅgaparāmarśa)^[3] . This is called tritīyaliṅgaparāmarśa, i.e., a consideration of the middle term for the third time. For example, ‘smoke’ (middle term) is known first when we acquire the knowledge of its invariable relation with ‘fire’ (major term) in the kitchen. It is known for the second time in relation to the minor term, e.g., ‘the hill’. It is considered for the third time when we know it as that character of the minor term which is universally related to the major term, as when we say, “the hill is possessed of such smoke as is always related to fire”. It is through such liṅgaparāmarśa. Liṅga is said to be of three kinds.

Annambhaṭṭa enumerates these three types of sign, viz.,

1. (i) anvayavyatireki,
2. (ii) kevalānvayi and
3. (iii) kevalavyatireki. ^[4]

(i) Anvayavyatireki is that sign which is possessed of pervading inherence both in respect of its association and its absence.^[5] For example, when it is said, “where there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen”, we have a case of concomitant presence. When it is said, “where there is no fire, there is no smoke also, as in a great deep lake”, we have a case of concomitant absence.

According to Annambhaṭṭa, an anvayavyatireki probans are involved in a vyāpti through anvaya as well as vyatireki. In Tarkasaṃgrahadipīkā he gives the required explanation. In his view, the rule of concomitance obtained between a probans and a probandum is anvaya vyāpti. ^[6] In the Tarkabhāṣā also it is stated that the reason is of the affirmative-negative kind, in as much as it has invariable concomitance both in the affirmative-negative manner.^[7] Again, the rule of concomitance obtained between the absence of the probans and the probandum is the vyatireka vyāpti. ^[8]

(ii) Secondly, kevalānvayi is that sign which has no negative instance. A thing is said to be kevalānvayi when it is proved to be something that is not absent anywhere.^[9] For example–‘the jar is nameable because it is cognizable, as cloth is’, there is no instance of nameableness or of cognizable being present where the other is absent, because everything is both cognizable and nameable.^[10] Keśavamiśra in his Tarkabhāṣā, also have mentioned that some other reasons are such as have only affirmative concomitance.^[11]

(iii) Thirdly, kevalavyatireki is that sign, which is involved in a rule of concomitance through knowledge only of agreement in absence.^[12] For example, ‘earth differs from the other elements, because it has odour.’ Or, what is not different from the other elements has no odour; earth has odour; therefore, earth is different from the other elements. Here, the reason ‘odour’ is the uncommon attribute of the inferential subject ‘earth’. It is co-extensive with the subject. There is no similar instance in which it may exist. According to the Tarkabhāṣā, some reasons are such as have only negative concomitance, e.g., the reason ‘presence of breath etc.’when put forward to prove the probandum ‘presence of soul’.^[13]

There are some differences between the ancient Naiyāyika and Navya-Naiyāyika regarding the knowledge of liṅgaparāmarśa in anumāna. However, we may conclude that liṅgaparāmarśa is not an essential condition of all anumāna, although it serves to make an anumāna most powerful.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

svārthānumitau parārthānumitau liṅgaparāmarśa eva karaṇam tasmālliṅgaparāmarśo’ numānam. Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 30

[2]:

yena puruṣena mahānasādau dhūme vahnivyāptigṛhitā paścāt sa eva. Bhāṣāpariccheda, p. 314

[3]:

vyāpārastu parāmarśaḥ karaṇam vyāptidhirbhavet. Bhāṣāpariccheda and Siddhāntamuktāvalī, kārikā 66

[4]:

liṅgam trividham, anvayavyatireki kevalānvayi kevalavyatireki ceti. Tarkasaṃgraha, 44

[5]:

anvayena vyatirekena ca vyāptimad anvayavyatireki. Ibid.

[6]:

hetusādhyayoḥ vyāptiḥ anvayavyāptiḥ. Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā on Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 31

[7]:

sa cānvayavyatireki, anvayena vyatirekena ca vyāptimatvāt. Tarkabhāṣā, 42

[8]:

tadabhāvayoḥ vyāptiḥ vyatirekavyāptiḥ. Ibid.

[9]:

kevalānvayisādhyakam kevalānvayi. Ibid.

[10]:

anvayamātravyāptikam kevalānvayi, yathā…vyatireka vyāptirnāsti. Tarkasaṃgraha, pp. 30-31

[11]:

kaścidanyo hetuḥ kevalānvayī,yathā viśeṣo’bhidheyaḥ, prameyatvāt… tasmāttathā iti. Tarkabhāṣā,47

[12]:

vyatirekamātravyāptikam kevalavyatireki. Ibid.

[13]:

kaścid hetuḥ kevalavyatirekī, tad yathā sātmakatve sādhye prāṇādimatvaṃ hetuḥ. Ibid., 45