26: Definition of Ākṣepa Alaṃkāra

Ākṣepa is a very well-known arthālaṃkāra. Almost all the rhetoricians have dealt with it. Bhāmaha is the first rhetorician who treats the figure. His definition of the figure is—

pratiṣedha iveṣṭasya yo viśeṣābhidhitsayā/
ākṣepa iti taṃ santaḥ śaṃsanti dvividhaṃ yathā//
  —Kāvyālaṃkāra (of Bhāmaha) 2.68.

—Ākṣepa is an apparent negation of the desired meaning with a view to convey some speciality of it.

Before defining the figure ākṣepa, Bhāmaha has provided the principal divisions of the figure—

vakṣyamānoktaviṣayastatrākṣepo dvidhāmataḥ/
  —Kāvyālaṃkāra (of Bhāmaha) 2.67.

—Ākṣepa is divided into two types—vakṣyamānaviṣaya or when something desired remains to be said and uktaviṣaya or when something desired has been said.

Most of the Kashmirian rhetoricians have followed this concept of ākṣepa.

Udbhaṭa has an almost identic al definition and division of the figure of that of Bhāmaha^[1] . Mammaṭa, too, follows the same idea but he amalgamates the two principal divisions of the figure in the very definition of the figure^[2] .

Ruyyaka though following the same principle of his Kashmirian predecessors, has tried to furnish a much more comprehensive idea of the figure in his definition^[3] and the following vṛtti. He also gives an eight -fold division of the figure. Vidyādhara^[4] , Vidyānātha^[5] and Viśvanātha^[6] have also followed Ruyyaka in their treatment of the figure.

There are, however, divergent views about the nature of the figure ākṣepa. Daṇḍin considers ākṣepa as a statement of denial—

pratiṣedhoktirākṣepaḥ/
  —Kāvyādarśa (of Daṇḍin) 2.120.

This is probably the simplest definition of the figure which can provide multiple applications. He basically divides the figure on account of time (past, present and future) and also states that if the difference (bheda) in the denial, if considered, the figure can have endless varieties—

athāsya punarākṣepyabhedānantyādanantatā/
  —Kāvyādarśa (of Daṇḍin) 2.120.

He gives several examples of a large number of varieties of the figure based on ākṣepyabheda. Bhoja’s definition of the figure is perhaps an elaborated version of that of Daṇḍin^[7] . He regards two primary varieties of the figure śuddha and miśra which can again be sub-divided on the basis of vidhi and niṣedha. He also considers rodha as a sub-variety of the figure ākṣepa. Vāgbhaṭa I has also followed this perception of the figure^[8] .

It can also be observed that the Kashmirian rhetoricians like Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa, Mammaṭa etc. have considered ākṣepa only as an apparent statement of denial for the specific purpose of putting special emphasis on the desired meaning (vidhitsitārtha). On the other hand, rhetoricians like Daṇḍin, Bhoja etc. have considered ākṣepa as real denial.

Vāmana has also regarded ākṣepa as including real rejection but he delimits the scope of the figure by accepting it as the negation of the upamāna alone—

upamānākṣepaścākṣepaḥ/
  —Kāvyālaṃkārasūtravṛtti (of Vāmana) 4.3.27.

In his vṛtti, Vāmana further states that in ākṣepa the upamāna is denied to indicate that the presence of the upameya the upamāna is useless—

upamānasya kṣepaḥ pratiṣedha upamānākṣepaḥ / tulyakāryārthasya nairarthakyavivakṣāyām/
  —Kāvyālaṃkārasūtravṛtti (of Vāmana) 4.3.27. vṛtti.

The Kāmadhenu commentator also gives a lucid explanation of this definition—

tādṛgupameye sati nairarthakyavivakṣāyāṃ pratiṣedha ākṣepa iti vākyārthaḥ/
  —Kāmadhenu, Kāvyālaṃkārasūtravṛtti (of Vāmana) 4.3.27.

Vāmana illustrates the figure ākṣepa as—

tasyāścenmukhamasti saumyasubhagaṃ kiṃ pārvaṇendunā
saundaryasya padaṃ dṛśau ca yadi cet kiṃ nāma nīlotpalaiḥ/
kiṃ vākomalakāntibhiḥ kisalayaiḥ satyeva tatrādhare
hādhātuḥ punaruktavastu racanārambheṣvapūrvo grahaḥ//
  —Kāvyālaṃkārasūtravṛtti (of Vāmana) 4.3.27. vṛtti.

—When her face is there what the use of a full-moon is? When her charming eyes are there what is the use of blue lotuses? When her lips are there what too is the use of fresh leaves? Oh! How wonderful is the creator’s desire in creating useless things over and over again.

Here the upamānas full-moon, blue lotuses and fresh leaves are rejected or their excellence is questioned. This is done with the specific purpose to clearly indicate that these upamānas are useless in the presence of the upameyas face, eyes and lips respectively. Hemacandra has also considered this same example as an instance of upamānākṣepa. This is the third variety of ākṣepa admitted by him^[9] . Mammaṭa has considered this type of the figure as pratīpa^[10] . Appayya Dīkṣīta has also recognised this type as the fifth kind of pratīpa^[11] .

Vāmana has also furnished an alternative explanation on the nature of the figure ākṣepa.

According to him, ākṣepa can also be formed when the upamāna is incomprehensive and is only hinted at—

upamānasyākṣepataḥ pratipattirityapi sūtrārthaḥ/
  —Kāvyālaṃkārasūtravṛtti (of Vāmana) 4.3.27. vṛtti.

He illustrates this type of ākṣepa with the following verse—

aindraṃ dhanuḥ pāṇḍupayodhareṇa śaraddadhānārdranakhakṣatābham/
prasādayantīsakalaṅkaminduṃ tāpaṃ raverabhyadhikaṃ cakāra//
  —Kāvyālaṃkārasūtravṛtti (of Vāmana) 4.3.27. vṛtti.

—The Autumn with her breast-like white clouds and bearing the nail-mark like rainbow gives pleasure to the moon with dark-marks but causes great heat or pain to the sun.

Here the autumn is compared to a prostitute, the moon with her lover and the sun with her rival lover. The upamānas are thus only hinted and not comprehensively expressed.

So Vāmana says in his vṛtti—

atra śaradveśyeva induṃ nāyakamiva raveḥ pratināyakasyevetyupamānāni
gamyanta iti/
  —Kāvyālaṃkārasūtravṛtti (of Vāmana) 4.3.27. vṛtti.

It is clear from the above discussion that there are different views about the nature of the figure ākṣepa and the definitions of the figure widely differ from rhetorician to rhetorician. Jagannātha has elaborately discussed these divergent views about the figure which have emerged in Sanskrit Poetics from time to time^[12] . The basic area of difference seems to be the nature of negation involved in the figure. Some consider it to be real while some others regard it as apparent. Vāmana considers this negation or denial to be real but he only recognises the denial of upamāna as the scope of the figure. This is quite unique and it only gets its support from Hemacandra who considers upamānākṣepa as a variety of the figure. The second type of ākṣepa admitted by Vāmana is of a peculiar nature and is also unique in Sanskrit Poetics.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

pratiṣedha iveṣṭasya yo viśeṣābhidhitsayā/
ākṣepa iti taṃ santaḥ śaṃsanti kavayah sada//
vakṣyamāṇoktaviṣayaḥ sa ca dvividha iṣyate/
  —Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha (of Udbhaṭā) 2.2-3.

[2]:

niṣedho vaktumiṣṭasya yo vaśeṣābhidhitsayā/
vakṣyamāṇoktaviṣayaḥ sa ākṣepo dvidhāmataḥ//
  —Kāvya-prakāśa (of Mammaṭa) 10.161.

[3]:

uktavakṣyamāṇayoḥ prākaraṇikayorviśeṣapratītyarthaṃ niṣedhābhāsa ākṣepaḥ/
  —Alaṃkārasarvasva (of Ruyyaka) p-114.

[4]:

kamapi viśeṣaṃ vaktuṃ prakṛtasyoktasya vakṣyamāṇasya/
yaḥ pratiṣedhābhāsaḥ kathitaḥ so'yaṃ dvidhākṣepaḥ/
  —Ekāvalī (of Vidyādhara) 8.31.

[5]:

viśeṣavodhāyoktasya vakṣyamāṇasya vābhavet/
niṣedhābhāsakathanamākṣepaḥ sa udāhṛtaḥ//
  —Pratāparudrayaśobhūṣaṇa (of Vidyānātha) Chapter-VIII, p-440.

[6]:

vastuno vaktumiṣ ṭ asya viśeṣapratipattaye/
niṣedhābhāsa ākṣepo vakṣyamāṇoktayo dvidhā//
  —Sāhitya-darpaṇa (of Viśvanātha) 10.64.

[7]:

vidhinātha niṣedhena pratiṣedhoktiratra yā/
śuddhāmiśrāca sākṣepo rodho nākṣepataḥ pṛthak//
  —Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa (of Bhoja) 4.64.

[8]:

uktiryatra pratītirva pratiṣedhasya jāyate/
ācakṣate tamākṣepālaṅkāraṃ vibudhāyathā//
  —Vāgbhaṭālaṃkāra (of Vāgbhaṭa I) 4.75.

[9]:

vivakṣitasya niṣedha ivopamānasyākṣepaścākṣepaḥ/
  —Kāvyānuśāsana (of Hemacandra) 6.11.

[10]:

ākṣepa upamānasya pratīpamupameyatā/
tasyaiva yadi vākalpyātiraskāranibandhanam//
  —Kāvya-prakāśa (of Mammaṭa) 10.201.

[11]:

pratīpamupamānasya kaimarthyamapi manyate/
  —Kuvalayānanda (of Appayyadīkṣīta) 16.

[12]:

Rasa-gaṅgādhara (of Jagannātha) Chapter-II, pp-421-426.