Yoga-sutras (with Bhoja’s Rajamartanda)

by Rajendralala Mitra | 1883 | 103,575 words

The Yoga-Sutra 2.19, English translation with Commentaries. The Yogasutra of Patanjali represents a collection of aphorisms dealing with spiritual topics such as meditation, absorption, Siddhis (yogic powers) and final liberation (Moksha). The Raja-Martanda is officialy classified as a Vritti (gloss) which means its explanatory in nature, as opposed to being a discursive commentary.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 2.19:

विशेषाविशेषलिङ्गमात्रालिङ्गानि गुणपर्वाणि ॥ २.१९ ॥

viśeṣāviśeṣaliṅgamātrāliṅgāni guṇaparvāṇi || 2.19 ||

19. The specific, the unspecific, the solely mergent, and the immergent are the divisions of the qualities.

The Rajamartanda commentary by King Bhoja:

[English translation of the 11th century commentary by Bhoja called the Rājamārtaṇḍa]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

“The divisions of the qualities,” i.e., their specific conditions, should be known to be four—this is enjoined. Thereof the “specific” (viśeṣa) are the gross elements and the organs. The “unspecific” (aviśeṣa) are the subtile elements and the internal organ. The “solely mergent” (liṅgamātra) is intellect. The “immergent” (aliṅga) is the unmanifest or undiscrete, i.e., Prakṛti. This is what is said. Since the relation everywhere of this undiscrete of the form of the three qualities is necessary to be known at the time of commencing knowledge, the four divisions are defined.

Notes and Extracts

[Notes and comparative extracts from other commentaries on the Yogasūtra]

[The object of this aphorism is to explain that the spectacle assumes different forms under different circumstances. It is " specific” or well-defined when it refers to the elements and the organs. It is “unspecific” or undefined when related to the subtile elements and the internal organ or the mind. It is “solely mergent” or mere thought when it refers to the intellect or the thinking principle. And it is “immergent” or unmanifest or undiscrete when referring to Prakṛti. Here Prakṛti is included as one of the forms or phases of the spectacle, though in the commentary on the seventeenth aphorism the spectacle has been defined to be the intellect or the principle of understanding (buddhitattva). This inconsistency is explained away by saying that the intellect is but a modification of Prakṛti, and, inasmuch as its primary form is Prakṛti, the spectacle must include Prakṛti. The words used in explaining the term ātmā in the commentary on the last aphorism—“a modification not different from its primary form,” (svarāpābhinnaḥ pariṇāmaḥ)—supports this inference. This is, apparently, different from the doctrine of Kapila who assigns 23 out of the 25 categories to the spectacle, leaving out the soul and Prakṛti; but in reality there is no difference, except in the phraseology, as will be shown in the twenty-first aphorism.

The four terms have been differently rendered by different translators. The terms used above have been taken from Cole-brooke and Wilson’s ‘Sāṅkhya Kārikā.’ Mr. Davies, in his ‘Hindu Philosophy,’ adopts the first two, but for “mergent” uses “attributive,” and for “immergent” its negative. Dr. Ballantyne uses “diverse,” “non-diverse,” “merely resolvable” and “irresolvable.” In translating aphorism 45 of Book I, I have rendered these words collectively with the subject, liṅga, into “defined character,” “undefined character,” “mere character” and “devoid of character.”]

Since the detestableness of spectacle must be first known, and it having been described along with its conditions, to show what should be accepted, the spectator, the author now says:

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: