Brahma Sutras (Shankaracharya)
by George Thibaut | 1890 | 203,611 words
English translation of the Brahma sutras (aka. Vedanta Sutras) with commentary by Shankaracharya (Shankara Bhashya): One of the three canonical texts of the Vedanta school of Hindu philosophy. The Brahma sutra is the exposition of the philosophy of the Upanishads. It is an attempt to systematise the various strands of the Upanishads which form the ...
II, 2, 18
18. (If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates with its two causes, (there takes place) non-establishment of those (two aggregates).
The reasons on account of which the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas cannot be accepted have been stated above. That doctrine may be called semi-destructive (or semi-nihilistic[1]). That the more thorough doctrine which teaches universal non-permanency is even less worthy of being taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.
That doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due either to the difference of the views (maintained by Buddha at different times), or else to the difference of capacity on the part of the disciples (of Buddha). Three principal opinions may, however, be distinguished; the opinion of those who maintain the reality of everything (Realists, sarvāstitvavādin); the opinion of those who maintain that thought only is real (Idealists, vijñānavādin); and the opinion of those who maintain that everything is void (unreal; Nihilists, śūnyavādin[2]).--We first controvert those who maintain that everything, external as well as internal, is real. What is external is either element (bhūta) or elementary (bhautika); what is internal is either mind (citta) or mental (caitta). The elements are earth, water, and so on; elemental are colour, &c. on the one hand, and the eye and the other sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of atoms; the atoms of earth being hard, those of water viscid, those of fire hot, those of air mobile.--The inward world consists of the five so-called 'groups' (skandha), the group of sensation (rūpaskandha), the group of knowledge (vijñānaskandha), the group of feeling (vedanāskandha), the group of verbal knowledge (samjñāskandha), and the group of impressions (saṃskāraskandha)[3]; which taken together constitute the basis of all personal existence[4].
With reference to this doctrine we make the following remarks.--Those two aggregates, constituting two different classes, and having two different causes which the Bauddhas assume, viz. the aggregate of the elements and elementary things whose cause the atoms are, and the aggregate of the five skandhas whose cause the skandhas are, cannot, on Bauddha principles, be established, i.e. it cannot be explained how the aggregates are brought about. For the parts constituting the (material) aggregates are devoid of intelligence, and the kindling (abhijvalana) of intelligence depends on an aggregate of atoms having been brought about previously[5]. And the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelligent being, such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord, which could effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can the atoms and skandhas be assumed to enter on activity on their own account; for that would imply their never ceasing to be active[6]. Nor can the cause of aggregation be looked for in the so-called abode (i.e. the ālayavijñāna-pravāha, the train of self-cognitions); for the latter must be described either as different from the single cognitions or as not different from them. (In the former case it is either permanent, and then it is nothing else but the permanent soul of the Vedāntins; or non-permanent;) then being admitted to be momentary merely, it cannot exercise any influence and cannot therefore be the cause of the motion of the atoms[7].
(And in the latter case we are not further advanced than before.)--For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for. But without aggregates there would be an end of the stream of mundane existence which presupposes those aggregates.
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
Because according to their opinion difference of size constitutes difference of substance, so that the continuous change of size in animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of old and the continual origination of new substances.
[2]:
The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken exclusively from the commentaries on the Śaṅkarabhāṣya, and no attempt has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha books. Cp. on the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the Bauddha chapter of the Sarvadarśaṇasaṃgraha.--The Nihilists are the Mādhyamikas; the Idealists are the Yogācāras; the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas together constitute the class of the Realists.--I subjoin the account given of those sects in the Brahmavidyābharaṇa.--Buddhasya hi mādhyamika-yogācāra-sautrāntika-vaibhāṣikasamjñakāś catvāraḥ śiṣyāḥ. Tatra buddhena prathamaṃ yān prati sarvaṃ śūnyam ity upadiṣṭaṃ te mādhyamikās te hi guruṇā yathoktaṃ tathaiva śraddhayā gṛhītavanta iti kṛtvā nāpakṛṣṭāḥ punaś ca taduktasyārthasya buddhyanusāreṇākṣepasyākṛtatvān notkṛṣṭabuddhaya iti mādhyamikāḥ. Anyais tu śiṣyair guruṇā sarvaśūnyatva upadiṣṭe jñānātiriktasya sarvasya śūnyatvam astu nāmeti gurūktir yoga iti bauddaiḥ paribhāṣitopetāḥ tad upari ca jñānasya tu śūnyatvaṃ na saṃbhavati tathātve jagadāndhyaprasaṅgāt śūnyasiddher apy asaṃbhavāc ceti buddhamate ācāratvena paribhāṣita ākṣepo'pi kṛta iti yogācārāḥ vijñānamātrāstitvavādinaḥ. Tadanataram anyaiḥ śiṣyaiḥ p. 402 pratītisiddhasya kathaṃ śūnyatvaṃ vaktuṃ śakyam ato jñānavad vāhyārtho'pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva so'stu, paraṃ tu so 'numeyo na tu pratyakṣa ity ukte tathāṅgīkṛtyaivaṃ śiṣyamatim anusṛtya kiyatparyantaṃ sūtraṃ bhaviṣyatīti taiḥ pṛṣṭam atas te sautrāntikāḥ. Anye punar yady ayaṃ ghaṭa iti pratītibalād vāhyo'rtha upeyate tarhi tasyā eva pratīter aparokṣatvāt sa kathaṃ parokṣo'to vāhyo'rtho na pratyakṣa iti bhāṣā viruddhety ākṣipann atas te vaibhāṣikāḥ.
[3]:
The rūpaskandha comprises the senses and their objects, colour, &c.; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they here re-appear as caittika on account of their connexion with thought. Their objects likewise are classed as caittika in so far as they are perceived by the senses.--The vijñānaskandha comprises the series of self-cognitions (ahamaham ity ālayavjñānapravāhaḥ), according to all commentators; and in addition, according to the Brahmavidyābharaṇa, the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate, of external things (savikalpakaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ ca pravṛttivijñānasamjñitam).--The vedanāskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c.--The samjñāskandha comprises the cognition of things by their names (gaur aśva ityādiśabdasamjalpitapratyayaḥ, Ān. Gi.; gaur aśva ityevaṃ nāmaviśiṣṭasavikalpakaḥ pratyayaḥ, Go. Ān.; samgñā yajñadattādipadatadullekhī savikalpapratyayo vā, dvitīyapakṣe vijñānapadena savikalpapratyayo na grāhyaḥ, Brahmavidyābh.). The saṃskāraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c., dharma and adharma.--Compare also the Bhāmatī.--The vijñānaskandha is citta, the other skandhas caitta.
[4]:
It has to be kept in view that the sarvāstitvavādins as well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (kṣaṇikatva), the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.
[5]:
Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence of an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.
[6]:
In consequence of which no release could take place.
[7]:
The Brahmavidyābharaṇa explains the last clause--from kṣaṇikatvāc ca--somewhat differently: Api ca paramāṇūnām api kṣaṇikatvābhyupagamān melanaṃ na sambhavati, paramāṇūnāṃ melanaṃ paramāṇukriyādhīnam, tathā ca svakriyāṃ prati paramāṇūnāṃ kāraṇatvāt kriyāpūrakṣaṇe paramāṇubhir bhāvyam kriyā p. 404 śrayatayā kriyākṣaṇe'pi teṣām avasthānam apekṣitam evaṃ melanakṣane'pi, nahi melanāśrayasyābhāve melanarūpā pravṛttir upapadyate, tathā ca sthiraparamāṇusādhyā melanarūpā pravṛttiḥ kathaṃ teṣām kṣaṇikatve bhavet.--Ānanda Giri also divides and translates differently from the translation in the text.