Brahma Sutras (Shankaracharya)

by George Thibaut | 1890 | 203,611 words

English translation of the Brahma sutras (aka. Vedanta Sutras) with commentary by Shankaracharya (Shankara Bhashya): One of the three canonical texts of the Vedanta school of Hindu philosophy. The Brahma sutra is the exposition of the philosophy of the Upanishads. It is an attempt to systematise the various strands of the Upanishads which form the ...

6. Even if we admit (the Sāṅkhya position refuted in what precedes, it is invalidated by other objections) on account of the absence of a purpose (on the part of the pradhāna).

Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the Sāṅkhya's) belief, should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sūtra, viz. that the pradhāna is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open to an objection 'on account of the absence of a purpose.' For if the spontaneous activity of the pradhāna has, as you say, no reference to anything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and consequently your doctrine that the pradhāna is active in order to effect the purpose of man will become untenable. If you reply that the pradhāna does not indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark that in that case we must distinguish between the different possible purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoyment, we ask, can belong to the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or pain)[1]? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for release[2].--If release, then the activity of the pradhāna would be purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the state of release; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of sounds, &c.[3]--If both, then, on account of the infinite number of the objects of pradhāna to be enjoyed (by the soul)[4], there would be no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be considered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhāna; for neither the non-intelligent pradhāna nor the essentially pure soul can feel any desire.--If, finally, you should assume the pradhāna to be active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to the pradhāna) would be purposeless; it would follow that, as the creative power of the pradhāna does not cease at any time any more than the soul's power of sight docs, the apparent world would never come to an end, so that no final release of the soul could take place[5].--It is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhāna enters on its activity for the purposes of the soul.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Anādheyātiśayasya sukhadukhaprāptiparihārarūpātiśayaśūnyasyety arthaḥ. Ān. Gi.

[2]:

For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhāna aims--ex hypothesi--only at the soul's undergoing varied experience.

[3]:

I.e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience.

[4]:

Tṛtīye'pi katipayaśabdādyupalabdhir vā samastatadupalabdhir vā bhoga iti vikalpyādye sarveṣām ekadaiva muktiḥ syād iti manvāno dvitīyaṃ pratyāha ubhayārthateti. Ān. Gi.

[5]:

The MSS. of Ānanda Giri omit saṃsārānucchedāt; the Bhāmatī's reading is: Sargaśaktyanucchedavad dṛkśaktyanucchedāt.

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