II, 1, 29

29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his (the opponent's) view likewise.

Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the pradhāna implicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid of sound and other qualities--viz. the pradhāna--is the cause of an effect--viz. the world--which is made up of parts, is limited and is characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that doctrine also either that the pradhāna as not consisting of parts has to undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not consisting of parts has to be abandoned.--But--it might be pleaded in favour of the Sāṅkhyas--they do not maintain their pradhāna to be without parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the three guṇas, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that the pradhāna forms a whole containing the three guṇas as its parts.--We reply that such a partiteness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in hand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in itself without parts^[1]. And each guṇa by itself assisted merely by the two other guṇas constitutes the material cause of that part of the world which resembles it in its nature^[2].--So that the objection lies against the Sāṅkhya view likewise.--Well, then, as the reasoning (on which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhāna rests) is not absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhāna consists of parts.--If you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhāna cannot be eternal, and so on.--Let it then be said that the various powers of the pradhāna to which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts.--Well, we reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of the world in Brahman.

The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do not get beyond the first atom^[3] If, on the other hand, you maintain that the atom enters into the combination with a part only, you offend against the assumption of the atoms having no parts.

As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objections raised, the latter cannot be urged against any one view in particular, and the advocate of Brahman has consequently cleared his doctrine.