II, 1, 3

3. Thereby the Yoga (Smṛti) is refuted.

This Sūtra extends the application of the preceding argumentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the Sāṅkhya-smṛti the Yoga-smṛti also is to be considered as refuted; for the latter also assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhāna as the independent cause of the world, and the 'great principle,' &c. as its effects, although neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views.--But, if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already disposed of by the previous arguments; of what use then is it formally to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sūtra does.)--We reply that here an additional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge; so, for instance, Bṛ. Up. II, 4, 5, '(The Self) is to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated upon^[1].' In the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, moreover, we find various injunctions of Yoga-practice connected with the assumption of different positions of the body; &c.; so, for instance, 'Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II, 8).

Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without expressly enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11, 'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga;' 'Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 18); and so on. And in the Yoga-śāstra itself the passage, 'Now then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth,' &c. defines the Yoga as a means of reaching perfect knowledge. As thus one topic of the śāstra at least (viz. the practice of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the entire Yoga-smṛti will have to be accepted as unobjectionable, just as the Smṛti referring to the aṣṭakās^[2].--To this we reply that the formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments primarily directed against the Sāṅkhya) has the purpose of removing the additional doubt stated in the above lines; for in spite of a part of the Yoga-smṛti being authoritative, the disagreement (between Smṛti and Śruti) on other topics remains as shown above.--Although^[3] there are many Smṛtis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the Sāṅkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sāṅkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (Śve. Up. VI, 13). (The claims which on the ground of this last passage might be set up for the Sāṅkhya and Yoga-smṛtis in their entirety) we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude (the highest aim of man) is not to be attained by the knowledge of the Sāṅkhya-smṛti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice. For Scripture itself declares that there is no other means of obtaining the highest beatitude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is conveyed by the Veda, 'Over death passes only the man who knows him; there is no other path to go' (Śve. Up. Ill, 8). And the Sāṅkhya and Yoga-systems maintain duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In the passage quoted ('That cause which is to be apprehended by Sāṅkhya and Yoga') the terms 'Sāṅkhya' and 'Yoga' denote Vedic knowledge and meditation, as we infer from proximity^[4]. We willingly allow room for those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. In their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all qualities the Sāṅkhyas are in harmony with the Veda which teaches that the person (puruṣa) is essentially pure; cp. Bṛ. Up. IV, 3, 16. 'For that person is not attached to anything.' The Yoga again in giving rules for the condition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that state of retirement from the concerns of life which is known from scriptural passages such as the following one, 'Then the parivrājaka with discoloured (yellow) dress, shaven, without any possessions,' &c. (Jābāla Upan. IV).

The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all argumentative Smṛtis. If it be said that those Smṛtis also assist, by argumentation and proof, the cognition of truth, we do not object to so much, but we maintain all the same that the truth can be known from the Vedānta-texts only; as is stated by scriptural passages such as 'None who does not know the Veda perceives that great one' (Taitt. Br. III, 12, 9, 7); 'I now ask thee that person taught in the Upaniṣads' (Bṛ. Up, III, 9, 26); and others.