II, 1, 2

2. And on account of the non-perception of the others (i.e. the effects of the pradhāna, according to the Sāṅkhya system).

The principles different from the pradhāna, but to be viewed as its modifications which the (Sāṅkhya) Smṛti assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in Smṛti; but with regard to things which, like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience--no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense--Smṛti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1. But if that part of Smṛti which is concerned with the effects (i.e. the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which refers to the cause (the pradhāna) will be so likewise. This is what the Sūtra means to say.--We have thus established a second reason, proving that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Smṛtis does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.--The weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sāṅkhya doctrine) will be shown later on under II, 1, 4 ff.