I, 3, 33

33. Bādarāyaṇa, on the other hand, (maintains) the existence (of qualification for Brahma-vidyā on the part of the gods); for there are (passages indicatory of that).

The expression 'on the other hand' is meant to rebut the pūrvapakṣa. The teacher, Bādarāyaṇa, maintains the existence of the qualification on the part of the gods, &c. For, although the qualification of the gods cannot be admitted with reference to the madhu-vidyā, and similar topics of knowledge, in which the gods themselves are implicated, still they may be qualified for the pure knowledge of Brahman, qualification in general depending on the presence of desire, capability, &c.^[1] Nor does the impossibility of qualification in certain cases interfere with the presence of qualification in those other cases where it is not impossible. To the case of the gods the same reasoning applies as to the case of men; for among men also, all are not qualified for everything, Brāhmaṇas, for instance, not for the rājasūya-sacrifice^[2].

And, with reference to the knowledge of Brahman, Scripture, moreover, contains express hints notifying that the devas are qualified; compare, for instance, Bṛ. Up. 1, 4, 10, 'Whatever Deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed became that; and the same with ṛṣis;' Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 2, 'They said: Well, let us search for that Self by which, if one has searched it out, all worlds and all desires are obtained. Thus saying, Indra went forth from the Devas, Virocana from the Asuras.' Similar statements are met with in Smṛti, so, for instance, in the colloquy of the Gandharva and Yājñavalkya^[3].--Against the objection raised in the preceding Sūtra (32) we argue as follows. Words like āditya, and so on, which denote devas, although having reference to light and the like, yet convey the idea of certain divine Selfs (persons) endowed with intelligence and pre-eminent power; for they are used in that sense in mantras and arthavāda passages. For the devas possess, in consequence of their pre-eminent power, the capability of residing within the light, and so on, and to assume any form they like. Thus we read in Scripture, in the arthavāda passage explaining the words 'ram of Medhātithi,' which form part of the Subrahmaṇya-formula, that 'Indra, having assumed the shape of a ram, carried off Medhātithi, the descendant of Kaṇva' (Ṣaḍv. Br. I, 1). And thus Smṛti says that 'Āditya, having assumed the shape of a man, came to Kuntī.' Moreover, even in such substances as earth, intelligent ruling beings must be admitted to reside, for that appears from such scriptural passages as 'the earth spoke,' 'the waters spoke,' &c. The non-intelligence of light and the like, in so far as they are mere material elements, is admitted in the case of the sun (āditya), &c. also; but--as already remarked--from the use of the words in mantras and arthavādas it appears that there are intelligent beings of divine nature (which animate those material elements).

We now turn to the objection (raised above by the pūrvapakṣin) that mantras and arthavādas, as merely subserving other purposes, have no power of setting forth the personality of the devas, and remark that not the circumstance of subordination or non-subordination to some other purpose, but rather the presence or absence of a certain idea furnishes a reason for (our assuming) the existence of something. This is exemplified by the case of a person who, having set out for some other purpose, (nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves, grass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road.--But, the pūrvapakṣin may here object, the instance quoted by you is not strictly analogous. In the case of the wanderer, perception, whose objects the grass and leaves are, is active, and through it he forms the conception of their existence. In the case of an arthavāda, on the other hand, which, as forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory passage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the latter), it is impossible to determine any energy having a special object of its own. For in general any minor syntactical unity, which is included in a more comprehensive syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its own. Thus, for instance, we derive, from the combination of the three words constituting the negative sentence, '(Do) not drink wine,' one meaning only, i.e. a prohibition of drinking wine, and do not derive an additional meaning, viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of the last two words, 'drink wine.'--To this objection we reply, that the instance last quoted is not analogous (to the matter under discussion). The words of the sentence prohibiting the drinking of wine form only one whole, and on that account the separate sense which any minor syntactical unity included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be accepted. In the case of injunction and arthavāda, on the other hand, the words constituting the arthavāda form a separate group of their own which refers to some accomplished thing^[4], and only subsequently to that, when it comes to be considered what purpose they subserve, they enter on the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine, as an illustrative example, the injunctive passage, 'He who is desirous of prosperity is to offer to Vāyu a white animal.' All the words contained in this passage are directly connected with the injunction. This is, however, not the case with the words constituting the corresponding arthavāda passage, 'For Vāyu is the swiftest deity; Vāyu he approaches with his own share; he leads him to prosperity.' The single words of this arthavāda are not grammatically connected with the single words of the injunction, but form a subordinate unity of their own, which contains the praise of Vāyu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far as they give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected with a distinguished divinity. If the matter conveyed by the subordinate (arthavāda) passage can be known by some other means of knowledge, the arthavāda acts as a mere anuvāda, i.e. a statement referring to something (already known)^[5]. When its contents are contradicted by other means of knowledge it acts as a so-called guṇavāda, i.e. a statement of a quality^[6]. Where, again, neither of the two mentioned conditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the arthavāda is to be taken as a guṇavāda on account of the absence of other means of knowledge, or as an arthavāda referring to something known (i.e. an anuvāda) on account of the absence of contradiction by other means of proof. The latter alternative is, however, to be embraced by reflecting people.--The same reasoning applies to mantras also.

There is a further reason for assuming the personality of the gods. The Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to Indra and the other gods, presuppose certain characteristic shapes of the individual divinities, because without such the sacrificer could not represent Indra and the other gods to his mind. And if the divinity were not represented to the mind it would not be possible to make an offering to it. So Scripture also says, 'Of that divinity for which the offering is taken he is to think when about to say vauṣaṭ' (Ai. Br. III, 8, 1). Nor is it possible to consider the essential form (or character) of a thing to consist in the word only^[7]; for word (denoting) and thing (denoted) are different. He therefore who admits the authoritativeness of the scriptural word has no right to deny that the shape of Indra, and the other gods, is such as we understand it to be from the mantras and arthavādas.--Moreover, itihāsas and purāṇas also--because based on mantra and arthavāda which possess authoritative power in the manner described--are capable of setting forth the personality, &c. of the devas. Itihāsa and purāṇa can, besides, be considered as based on perception also. For what is not accessible to our perception may have been within the sphere of perception of people in ancient times. Smṛti also declares that Vyāsa and others conversed with the gods face to face. A person maintaining that the people of ancient times were no more able to converse with the gods than people are at present, would thereby deny the (incontestable) variety of the world. He might as well maintain that because there is at present no prince ruling over the whole earth, there were no such princes in former times; a position by which the scriptural injunction of the rājasūya-sacrifice^[8]would be stultified. Or he might maintain that in former times the spheres of duty of the different castes and āśramas were as generally unsettled as they are now, and, on that account, declare those parts of Scripture which define those different duties to be purposeless. It is therefore altogether unobjectionable to assume that the men of ancient times, in consequence of their eminent religious merit, conversed with the gods face to face. Smṛti also declares that 'from the reading of the Veda there results intercourse with the favourite divinity' (Yoga Sūtra II, 44). And that Yoga does, as Smṛti declares, lead to the acquirement of extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and so on, is a fact which cannot be set aside by a mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also proclaims the greatness of Yoga, 'When, as earth, water, light, heat, and ether arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is no longer illness, old age, or pain for him who has obtained a body produced by the fire of Yoga' (Śvet. Up. II, 12). Nor have we the right to measure by our capabilities the capability of the ṛṣis who see the mantras and brāhmaṇa passages (i.e. the Veda).--From all this it appears that the itihāsas and purāṇas have an adequate basis.--And the conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to be unfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.

The general result is that we have the right to conceive the gods as possessing personal existence, on the ground of mantras, arthavādas, itihāsas, purāṇas, and ordinarily prevailing ideas. And as the gods may thus be in the condition of having desires and so on, they must be considered as qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, the declarations which Scripture makes concerning gradual emancipation^[9]agree with this latter supposition only.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

See above, p. 197.

[2]:

Which can be offered by kṣattriyas only.

[3]:

Śrautaliṅgenānumānabādhaṃ darśayitvā smārtenāpi tadbādhaṃ darśayati smārtam iti. Kiṃ atra brahma amṛtam kiṃ svid vedyam anuttamam, cintayet tatra vai gatvā gandharvo mām aprikkhata, Viśvāvasus tato rājan vedāntajñānakovida iti mokṣadharme janakayājñavalkyasaṃvādāt prahlādājagarasaṃvādāc coktānumānāsiddhir ity arthaḥ.

[4]:

As opposed to an action to be accomplished.

[5]:

Of this nature is, for instance, the arthavāda, 'Fire is a remedy for cold.'

[6]:

Of this nature is, for instance, the passage 'the sacrificial post is the sun' (i.e. possesses the qualities of the sun, luminousness, &c.; a statement contradicted by perception).

[7]:

And therefore to suppose that a divinity is nothing but a certain word forming part of a mantra.

[8]:

The rājasūya-sacrifice is to be offered by a prince who wishes to become the ruler of the whole earth.

[9]:

In one of whose stages the being desirous of final emancipation becomes a deva.