by Nandalal Sinha | 1923 | 149,770 words | ISBN-13: 9789332869165
The Vaisheshika-sutra 10.1.7, English translation, including commentaries such as the Upaskara of Shankara Mishra, the Vivriti of Jayanarayana-Tarkapanchanana and the Bhashya of Chandrakanta. The Vaisheshika Sutras teaches the science freedom (moksha-shastra) and the various aspects of the soul (eg., it's nature, suffering and rebirth under the law of karma). This is sutra 7 (‘an objection answered’) contained in Chapter 1—Of the Attributes of the Soul—of Book X (of the differences of the attributes of the soul and of the threefold causes).
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 10.1.7:
एकदेशे इत्येकस्मिन् शिरः पृष्ठमुदरं मर्माणि तद्विशेषस्तद्विशेषेभ्यः ॥ १०.१.७ ॥
ekadeśe ityekasmin śiraḥ pṛṣṭhamudaraṃ marmāṇi tadviśeṣastadviśeṣebhyaḥ || 10.1.7 ||
eka-deśe—in the part; iti—such; This. ekasmin—in one (body); śiraḥ—the head; pṛṣṭhaṃ—the back; udaraṃ—the stomach; marmāṇi—the vitals; tat-viśeṣaḥ—their distinction; tat-viśeṣebhyaḥ—from the distinctions or their causes.
7. The head, the back, the stomach, the vitals are in the parts of one and same (body); this their difference (results) from the differences thereof (i.e., of their causes).
Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:
It may be objected; If the difference of pleasure and pain from cognition depend on the difference of their causes, and if the difference of pleasure and pain from each other be just like the mutual difference between a pillar and a water-pot, etc., then there can be no mutual difference between the body and its parts such as the head, the feet, the back, the stomach, etc., there being, in regard to these, no difference in their causes, whether they bo the ultimate atoms, binary atomic aggregates, etc., or blood and semen.
To meet this objection, he says:
[Read sūtra 10.1.7 above]
‘Eka-deśa iti’ means, in the part. ‘Ekasmin’ means, in the body; ‘Śiraḥ”—this is one part; ‘udara’ [udaraṃ]; ‘priṣṭha’ [priṣṭhaṃ]; and ‘marmāṇi,’ i.e., the sinews, etc.; their ‘viśeṣaḥ,’ difference in kind, (results). ‘tat-viśeṣebhyaḥ,’ from the difference in kind of their causes. There, again, (i.e., in the case of the heterogeneity of the causes), heterogeneity results only from the heterogeneity of the causes (of those causes); for, the combinative causes of the stomach, the back etc., also are not just of the same kind as that of the head; just as the heterogeneity of a a piece of cloth, a water-pot, etc., results from the heterogeneity of threads, postherds, and other material causes; heterogeneity being possible, in them also, the heterogeneity of threads, postherds, etc., also, results from the heterogeneity of fibres, dust, etc. Heterogeneity is, in like manner, to be sought in the successive material causes; for, while the ultimate atoms may be common, the heterogeneity of the respective material causes universally gives rise to heterogeneity (in their respective effects); whereas homogeneity of the material causes, constituted by their substanceness, does not cause such heterogeneity. This is the point.—7.
Commentary: The Bhāṣya of Candrakānta:
Candrakānta read Ekadeśe iti of X.i.7 with X.i.6, and explains it as giving an additional reason why pleasure and pain cannot be forms of cognition, the meaning being that pleasure and pain are localised in the body, whereas cognition is not so localised.
Here ends the first chapter of the tenth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.