by Nandalal Sinha | 1923 | 149,770 words | ISBN-13: 9789332869165
The Vaisheshika-sutra 10.1.3, English translation, including commentaries such as the Upaskara of Shankara Mishra, the Vivriti of Jayanarayana-Tarkapanchanana and the Bhashya of Chandrakanta. The Vaisheshika Sutras teaches the science freedom (moksha-shastra) and the various aspects of the soul (eg., it's nature, suffering and rebirth under the law of karma). This is sutra 3 (‘pleasure and pain are not form cognition—continued’) contained in Chapter 1—Of the Attributes of the Soul—of Book X (of the differences of the attributes of the soul and of the threefold causes).
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 10.1.3:
तयोर्निष्पत्तिः प्रत्यक्षलैङ्गिकाभ्याम् ॥ १०.१.३ ॥
tayorniṣpattiḥ pratyakṣalaiṅgikābhyām || 10.1.3 ||
tayoḥ—their, of doubt and certainty; niṣpattiḥ—production; pratyakṣa-laiṅgikābhyām—by means of perception and inference.
3. The production thereof (i.e., of Doubt and Certainty) is by means of perception and inference.
Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:
He lays down another principle of differentiation.
[Read sūtra 10.1.3 above]
‘Tayoḥ,’ of doubt and certainty, ‘niṣpattiḥ,’ production, (is) from perception and from inferential marks. Neither pleasure nor pain is produced by the perceptive apparatus or by inferential marks. For, pleasure is four-fold, being objective, subjective, imaginative or sympathetic, or habitual. Of these, the last three by no means possess the characteristic of taking their origin from the contact of the (outer) senses (with their objects). Should it be contended that the first is cognition, inasmuch as it is generated by contact of the senses and their objects, we reply that it is not so, for a part only of the whole cause, (being the same), cannot entail homogeneity in the effect; else all and sundry effects would come to be homogeneous as they must have space and time as their common antecedents. Moreover, (if pleasure were cognition), the pleasure which is not produced through contact of the senses and their objects, would be either non-discriminative or indefinite, or discriminative or definite. But it cannnot be the first, for then it would be supersensible; nor can it be the second, inasmuch as it does not consist of a judgment respecting two objects in the relation of subject and predicate. Again, pleasure and pain are necessarily accompanied with sensibility; (were they forms of cognition), there would be involved in the (consequent) notion of a sensibility of cognition a regression to infinity. ‘Laiṅgika’ [laiṅgikaṃ] (the adjective) means merely ‘liṅga’ [liṅgaṃ] (the noun), mark, as the word, objective, (means an object).
The author of the Vṛtti, on the other hand, explains the aphorism thus, that the origin thereof, i.e., of cognition and pleasure, is explained, ‘pratykṣa-laiṅgikāṃ,’ i.e., by the explanations of perceptual and inferential cognitions, that is to say, that whereas perceptual cognition is produced by the senses, and inferential by marks of illation, it is not so with pleasure, etc.—3.
Commentary: The Vivṛti of Jayanārāyaṇa:
(English extracts of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana’s Vivṛti or ‘gloss’ called the Kaṇādasūtravivṛti from the 17th century)
It may be urged that as non-discriminative cognition is neither doubt nor certitude, so too may be pleasure and pain. Accordingly he says:
The proof of pleasure and pain is furnished by perception and inference. In one’s own soul, pleasure and pain are proved by perception; in other souls, pleasure is inferred by brightness of the eyes, etc., and pain by paleness of the face, etc. So that, had they the form of non-discriminative cognition, there could be no perception, nor could it be possible for them to be the subject of inference by such marks as brightness or paleness of the face, and the like. Hence, the import is, they are not included in cognition.