by Nandalal Sinha | 1923 | 149,770 words | ISBN-13: 9789332869165
The Vaisheshika-sutra 10.1.2, English translation, including commentaries such as the Upaskara of Shankara Mishra, the Vivriti of Jayanarayana-Tarkapanchanana and the Bhashya of Chandrakanta. The Vaisheshika Sutras teaches the science freedom (moksha-shastra) and the various aspects of the soul (eg., it's nature, suffering and rebirth under the law of karma). This is sutra 2 (‘pleasure and pain are not forms of cognition’) contained in Chapter 1—Of the Attributes of the Soul—of Book X (of the differences of the attributes of the soul and of the threefold causes).
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 10.1.2:
संशयनिर्णयान्तराभावश्च ज्ञानान्तरत्वे हेतुः ॥ १०.१.२ ॥
saṃśayanirṇayāntarābhāvaśca jñānāntaratve hetuḥ || 10.1.2 ||
2. And the non-inclusion (of Pleasure and Pain) either in Doubt or in Certainty, is the mark that they are other than cognition.
Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:
It may be urged: Let pleasure and pain bo mutually distinct. But they may be non-different from cognition, like recollection and perception of sensation.
Accordingly the author says:
[Read sūtra 10.1.2 above]
The meaning is that non-inclusion either in doubt or in certaintv is the mark of inference that pleasure and pain are other than, i.e. different from, cognition. The idea is this; Were pleasure or pain a kind of cognition, it would either have the form of doubt, or have the form of certainty. It cannot be the first, as the two alternatives (which must be present in doubt) do not exist; nor can it be the second, as the single alternative does not exist (see Vivṛti—below). And the species or parts being thus excluded, the geuns or whole is necessarily excluded. For the species of cognition, are two only, the characteristic of doubt and the characteristic of certainty. And both of them are excluded from pleasure as well as from pain; hence the characteristic of cognition also finds no place in them.
The word, ‘ca’ and, adds on the exclusion of extern al sensation or perception. The perception of pleasure and pain is mental i.e., by the inner sense, in the forme, “I feel pleasure,” “I feel pain”; whereas perception of them does not take such shape of form as in “I know,” “I and doubtful,” “I am certain.”—2.
Commentary: The Vivṛti of Jayanārāyaṇa:
(English extracts of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana’s Vivṛti or ‘gloss’ called the Kaṇādasūtravivṛti from the 17th century)
* * * Neither pleasure nor pain has the form in which two repugnant alternatives are present together, that it should be probable that they have the nature of doubt, nor has either possession of a given form together with absence of negation of that form, that it should be likely that they have the nature if certainty. The supposition of a third form of cognition is chimerical like the horn of a hare. Consequently neither pleasure nor pain can come under knowledge.