by Nandalal Sinha | 1923 | 149,770 words | ISBN-13: 9789332869165
The Vaisheshika-sutra 10.1.1, English translation, including commentaries such as the Upaskara of Shankara Mishra, the Vivriti of Jayanarayana-Tarkapanchanana and the Bhashya of Chandrakanta. The Vaisheshika Sutras teaches the science freedom (moksha-shastra) and the various aspects of the soul (eg., it's nature, suffering and rebirth under the law of karma). This is sutra 1 (‘pleasure and pain are two different things’) contained in Chapter 1—Of the Attributes of the Soul—of Book X (of the differences of the attributes of the soul and of the threefold causes).
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 10.1.1:
इष्टानिष्टकारणविशेषाद्विरोधाच्च मिथः सुखदुःखयोर्थान्तरभावः ॥ १०.१.१ ॥
iṣṭāniṣṭakāraṇaviśeṣādvirodhācca mithaḥ sukhaduḥkhayorthāntarabhāvaḥ || 10.1.1 ||
iṣṭa-aniṣṭa-kāraṇa-viśeṣāt—in consequence of the difference of causes, (in the forms of) desirables, and undesirable; Virodhāt on account of opposition. ca—and; mithaḥ—between them, towards each other, mutual; sukha-duḥkhayoḥ—between pleasure and pain; artha-antara-bhāvaḥ—relation of different objects.
1. In consequence of the difference of (their) causes, in the form of desirables and undesirables, and on account of (their) mutual opposition, Pleasure and Pain stand in the relation of objects different from each other.
Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:
Tho purpose of the tenth book is the exposition of the differences of the attributes of the soul according to their causes. Now, in the aphorism of Gautama, which enumerates or classifies the provables or objects of certitude, viz., “Soul, Body, Sense, Object, Understanding, Mind, Activity, Fault, Metempsychosis, Desert, Pain, and Emancipation are the provable” Nyāya-Sūtra, I. i. 9.), there being no mention of pleasure, tho error may arise that pleasure is really not different from pain. With the purpose of dispelling this possible error, the author first of all points out the difference of pleasure and pain themselves.
[Read sūtra 10.1.1 above]
‘Sukha-duḥkahay oḥ,’ (between pleasure and pain there exists; ‘mithaḥ,’ mutual, ‘artha-antara-bhāva,’ distinction that is to say heterogeneity. Whence (does this distinction arise)? To this question the author replies, ‘iṣṭa-aniṣṭa-kāraṇa-viṣeśāt’ i.e., in consequence of ‘viśeṣa,’ distinction or difference, of their causes which have, in the one case, the form of ‘iṣṭaṃ,’ desirable objects such as garlands, sandal-paste, women, etc., and, in the other case, the form of ‘aniṣṭa,’ undesirable objects such as snakes, thorns, etc. For heterogeneity of effect necessarily follows from heterogeneity of cause. He lays down another principle of distinction, viz., ‘virodhāt,’ on account of opposition characterised by non-dwelling together. For pleasure, and pain are not experienced in one and the same soul at one and the same time. The word, ‘ca,’ and, brings forward the difference of the effect of pleasure and pain as a further means of distinguishing betwean them. Thus, graciousness, the embrace, clearnesss of the eyes, etc., are the effects of pleasure, while despondency, a sullied countenance, etc., are the effects of pain; hence on this ground also pleasure and pain must differ from each other. Accordingly it has been stated by Professor Praśasta-deva, “Pleasure has the characteristic of agreeable feeling. In the presence of garlands and other desirable objects, from the contact of the senses and objects in the recognition of something desirable being produced, and from the conjunction of the soul and the mind and dependent upon dharma or merit and the like, that which is produced and is the cause of complacence, embrace, and kindliness of the eyes, etc., is pleasure.”
In the case of garlands, sandal-paste, etc., enjoyed in the past, plearure arises from smṛti, reminiscence, and, in the case future objects, it arises from Saṇkalpa, desire or appetency or imagination or will.
The non-enumeration of pleasure in the aphorism of Gautama is in order to promote indifference or dispassion, in other words, to teach that dispassion would arise in one who should account even pleasure as pain. (Cf. Nyāya Sūtra, IV. i. 58,—“duḥkhavika[?]pesukhābhimānā[?]ca”—, The idea of pleasure takes place in an alternative form of pain).—