Vaisheshika-sutra with Commentary

by Nandalal Sinha | 1923 | 149,770 words | ISBN-13: 9789332869165

The Vaisheshika-sutra 9.2.13, English translation, including commentaries such as the Upaskara of Shankara Mishra, the Vivriti of Jayanarayana-Tarkapanchanana and the Bhashya of Chandrakanta. The Vaisheshika Sutras teaches the science freedom (moksha-shastra) and the various aspects of the soul (eg., it's nature, suffering and rebirth under the law of karma). This is sutra 3 (‘cognition by sages siddhas, how produced’) contained in Chapter 2—(? Inferential cognition)—of Book IX (of ordinary and transcendental cognition...).

Sūtra 9.2.13 (Cognition by Sages Siddhas, how produced)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 9.2.13:

आर्षं सिद्धदर्शनं च धर्मेभ्यः ॥ ९.२.१३ ॥

ārṣaṃ siddhadarśanaṃ ca dharmebhyaḥ || 9.2.13 ||

ārṣaṃ—sagely; Of advanced sages. siddha-darśanaṃ—vision of the Perfected Ones; ca—and; dharmebhyaḥ—from dharma or merits.

13. Cognition of advanced sages, as also vision of the Perfected Ones, (results) from dharma or merits.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

It may be objected: The cognition (of objects beyond the reach of senses), by advanced sages, also appears in the very same form in which other cognitions, having a common substratum with the former, take place. It is again not produced by the senses, inasmuch as it cognizes objects which are not in contact with them. Nor is it produced by means of inferential marks, as it is produced in the absence of any investigation of such marks. Hence it follows that there is a third form of proof (besides perception and inference) which is the instrument of such cognition.

In view of this objection, he says:

[Read sūtra 9.2.13 above]

Ārṣa’ or sagely cognition is the cognition of sages such as Gālava, etc-, having for its object things past and yet to come. ‘Siddha-darśana’ means the vision by those who have attained success in the direction of cognition apprehensive of objects remote as well as screened from view, by means of mantra or incantation, herbs, eye-salve prepared from cocoort, etc. Both of them arise from dharma or merit, such that there is cognition of objects, in their true light. The author of the Vṛtti observes that this cognition is not a different kind of vidyā or scientific knowledge, as it is included in Yogic or ascetic perception. Sagely cognition is really the fourth kind of vidyā, and it occurs to sages as well as to worldly people. And it is simply a form of mental perception, being produced by the mind accompanied with inattention (to internal and external objects), or produced by inferential marks such as faithful observances of the rules of conduct. The cognition of pervasion which is the ground of inference is here solely dependent upon or due to Saṃskāra, or impression having its origin in a former state of existence i.e., in the same way as is the pervasion or universal concomitance of sucking the breast and the cognition that this is the means of securing what is desired, (in the case of the instinctive application of the baby to sucking the breast.)

The revered Professor Praśastadeva, however,says that ‘Siddhadarśana,’ cognition of the Perfected Ones, is not a different form of cognition. His reasoning is as follows: If it is said that cognition, by the Perfected Ones, of objects remote and hidden from view, takes its rise from conditions brought about by means of eye-salve prepared from cocoon, and the like, then it is nothing but perception. If it be, on the other hand, cognition which apprehends objects belonging to the earth, the region lying between the earth and the vault of heaven, and the space beyond it, and which is dependent upon the conditions or inferential marks such as the movements, etc., of planets and the lunar mansions (nakṣatras), then it is nothing but inferential cognition, inasmuch as pervasion, or universal concomitance of the thing to be inferred and the mark of inference, is determined by the observation of such accompaniment.—13.

Here ends the second chapter of the ninth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

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