Vaisheshika-sutra with Commentary

by Nandalal Sinha | 1923 | 149,770 words | ISBN-13: 9789332869165

The Vaisheshika-sutra 9.1.10, English translation, including commentaries such as the Upaskara of Shankara Mishra, the Vivriti of Jayanarayana-Tarkapanchanana and the Bhashya of Chandrakanta. The Vaisheshika Sutras teaches the science freedom (moksha-shastra) and the various aspects of the soul (eg., it's nature, suffering and rebirth under the law of karma). This is sutra 0 (‘“the water-pot does not now exist in the room”’) contained in Chapter 1—Of Ordinary Perception of Non-Existence and of Transcendental Perception—of Book IX (of ordinary and transcendental cognition...).

Sūtra 9.1.10 (“The water-pot does not now exist in the room”)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 9.1.10:

नास्ति घटो गेहे इति सतो घटस्य गेहसंसर्गप्रतिषेधः ॥ ९.१.१० ॥

nāsti ghaṭo gehe iti sato ghaṭasya gehasaṃsargapratiṣedhaḥ || 9.1.10 ||

na—not; asti—exists; ghaṭaḥ—water-pot; gehe—in the room; iti—such; sataḥ—existent, Ghaṭasya, of water-pot; geha-saṃsarga-pratiṣedhaḥ—negation of association with the room.

10. The water-pot does not exist in the room—such is (the form of) the negation of association of the existent water-pot with the room.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

[Full title: The perception, “The water-pot does not (now) exist in the room,” explained]

It may be objected: The non-existence of the water-pot in the room is not absolute non-existence, because of the existence of the water-pot there at some time or other. Nor is it either antecedent non-existence or consequent non-existence, for they appear only in combinative causes. Nor is it absolute non-existence undergoing production and destruction, for the expression ‘absolute non-existence undergoing production and destruction’ involves a contradiction in terms. Nor is it a fourth kind of saṃsarga-abhāva or non-existence of association, since in that case the three-fold division of the non-existence of association would be disproved.

To meet this objection, he says:,

[Read sūtra 9.1.10 above]

(‘Geha-saṃsarga-pratiṣedhaḥ’ means) the negation or privation of the association or conjunction of the water-pot with the room. And it would be simply absolute non-existence, if the water-pot do not exist at any time whatever; antecedent non-existence, in the case of the water-pot which will exist; and consequent non-existence, in the case of the water-pot which had its existence in the past.

Objection.—That being so, the cognition should have been in this form that connection of the water-pot does not exist in the room.

Answer.—What is meant by ‘the cognition should have been’? If it means ‘the cognition of which the actual object or content is the connection of the water-pot, should have been,’ and so conveys the sense of inclusion, then what is desired is obtained. If, on the other hand, it means ‘(the cognition) which refers to or suggests that (i.e., connection of the warer-pot),’ then (we reply that), it is the reference to the substratum, viz., in the room, which leads to, and results in, the reference to the connection, inasmuch as it is the being the substratum that appears in the form of connection of the property (or conjunction of the contained.)

Objection.—Does then the water-pot really exist there?

Answer.—What do you mean by ‘really exist’? Is it combined or conjunct? It cannot be the first since there is in the room non-existence, of the water-pot as combined with it (that is, since the room is not the material cause of the water-pot). Nor the latter, since there is denial of conjunction.

Objection.—It would then follow that the water-pot, etc., are always present, inasmuch as there is everywhere denial only of the one or the other of their conjunction and combination.

Answer.—This would not follow, since the denial itself of both of them is identical with the denial of the water-pot. Are then the water-pot and its conjunction one and the same thing, whereby denial of conjunction of the water-pot would be the denial of the water-pot? Are then the water-pot and its combination one and the same thing, whereby the admission itself of its combination would be the admission of the water-pot? For, there is not presence of the water-pot there where both of them (conjunction and combination) are denied, whereby the water-pot might be in constant agreement. Thus it is the denial or negations of the admission or affirmation of something, that constitutes the denial or negation of that thing.

Or, it may be that there is really absolute non-existence of the water-pot in the room in the relation of being in combination, and that it is this (absolute non-existence) that is the object of the cognition that the water-pot does not exist in the room; as for example, (there is absolute non-existence of the water-pot) in the potsherd in the relation of being in conjunction.

Objection.—Such being the case, the water-pot would be non-existent, being the counter-opposite of the constantly present absolute non-existence.

Answer.—It would be so, were it everywhere non-existent under the joint characteristics of being in conjunction and being in combination.—10.

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