Sūtra 9.1.8 (He shows that reciprocal non-existence is an object of perception)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 9.1.8:

एतेनाघटो ऽगौरधर्मश्च व्याख्याताः ॥ ९.१.८ ॥

etenāghaṭo 'gauradharmaśca vyākhyātāḥ || 9.1.8 ||

etena—hereby; a-ghaṭaḥ—not-water-pot; a-gauḥ—not-cow; a-dharmaḥ—not-dharma; ca—and, also; vyākhyātaḥ—explained.

8. Hereby also are explained ‘not-water-pot,’ ‘not-cow,’ not-dharma.’—334.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

Extending to antecedent non-existence the mode in which consequent non-existence is an object of perception, he says:

[Read sūtra 9.1.8 above]

‘Etena’—by this term he extends (the causality of) the recollection of the counter-opposite, apprehension of the substratum, and the argument stated before. Non-apprehension of the apprehensible is the same in all cases. The word, ‘ca,’ also, has the object of bringing forward what has been stated before. ‘A-dharmaḥ’: By saying that the reciprocal non-existence of dharma, merit, though it is supersensible, is an object of perception in its substratum, e.g., pleasure, knowledge, etc., he suggests that in the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence, apprehensibility of the counter-opposite is not the governing condition, but that only the apprehensibility of the substratum is the governing condition. How otherwise could the reciprocal non-existence of a fiend, in the form that the pillar is not a fiend, be apprehended in the pillar? For, the non-apprehension of a fiend as being coincident or identical with the pillar is the cause of the apprehension of the reciprocal non-existence of a fiend (in the pillar), and, it is again impossible, were the pillar identical with a fiend, that there should be such non-apprehension (of a fiend in the pillar), since such non-apprehension is contradictory to, or contravened by, the existence of the entity (e.g., a fiend) which is the counter-opposite (of its nonexistence.)

Objection.—Identity with a fiend is not in this instance the counteropposite. Is it then a fiend *? But it may be that though it is present in the pillar, yet, like its gravity, it is not apprehended. Hence its non-apprehension would not be contradictory to the existence of the entity which is the counter-opposite, (viz., a fiend.)

Answer.—It is not so, for, like the non-apprehension of the counteropposite, the non-apprehension of that which determines the characteristic of being the counter-opposite, also causes the apprehension of non-existence.

Objection.—The apprehension of reciprocal non-existence is dependent upon the apprehension of counter-opposite-ness, and counter-oppositeness is of the nature of the absence of reciprocal non-existence; and hence it follows that the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence is really dependent upon the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence.

Answer.—This is not the case; for, as has been already stated, it is a property which is cognised as being not present in any given substratum, that determines the characteristic of being the counter-opposite, but the apprehension of that property also as that which determines counter-opposite-ness, is not the governing condition (of the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence.)—8.

Commentary: The Vivṛti of Jayanārāyaṇa:

(English extracts of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana’s Vivṛti or ‘gloss’ called the Kaṇādasūtravivṛti from the 17th century)

The causes of the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence are determination (or possession of attribution, or intrinsic form) in relation to the senses,—indriya-sambaddha-viśeṣaṇatā,—non-appre-hension of the counter-opposite, and cognition of the counter-opposite. The difference, however, is this that the perceptibility of the counteropposite is the condition of apprehension of Saṃsarga-abhāva or relational non-existence, whereas it is the perceptibility of the substratum that is the condition of apprehension of reciprocal non-existence. Thus, in spite of the super-sensibility of dharma or merit, there is no impediment to the perception of its reciprocal non-existence in the sensible substratum thereof, e.g., pleasure and the like. Whereas some have taught that perceptibility of both the counter-opposite and the substratum is the condition of apprehension of relational non-existence, this is inaccurate; for, were this the case, since the perception of nonexistence of fragrance in a stone, of non-existence of bitterness in treacle, of non-existence of colour in air, and of non-existence of touch as well as sound in ether would be impossible their respective substrata would not be perceptible to the several senses cognisant thereof respectively. It is from this consideration that Pakṣadhara Miśra has maintained that the perception of the destruction (or cessation) of the touch of air is produced by the determination or qualification thereof by time conjoint with the skin.