by Nandalal Sinha | 1923 | 149,770 words | ISBN-13: 9789332869165
The Vaisheshika-sutra 9.1.4, English translation, including commentaries such as the Upaskara of Shankara Mishra, the Vivriti of Jayanarayana-Tarkapanchanana and the Bhashya of Chandrakanta. The Vaisheshika Sutras teaches the science freedom (moksha-shastra) and the various aspects of the soul (eg., it's nature, suffering and rebirth under the law of karma). This is sutra 4 (‘reciprocal non-existence or absence of identity, explained’) contained in Chapter 1—Of Ordinary Perception of Non-Existence and of Transcendental Perception—of Book IX (of ordinary and transcendental cognition...).
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 9.1.4:
सच्चासत् ॥ ९.१.४ ॥
saccāsat || 9.1.4 ||
sat—the existent; ca—and, also; a-sat—non-existent.
4. The existent also is non-existent.
Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:
Antecedent and consequent non-existences being proved, the p resent aphorism is laid down with the purpose of proving mutual or reciprocal non-existence:
[Read sūtra 9.1.4 above]
Where a really existent water-pot etc., are spoken of as being non-existent, there non-existence of identity is perceived. For there arise such cognitions “The horse is non-existent by the nature of the cow,” The cow is is non-existent by the nature of the horse,” “A piece of cloth is non-existent by the nature of a water-pot,” “A piece of cloth is a not-water-pot,” “A cow is a not-horse,” “A horse is a not-cow,” etc. Now, “A cow possesses reciprocal non-existence with a horse,” “A water-pot possesses reciprocal non-existence with a piece of cloth,”—it is this reciprocal non-existence, otherwise called absence of identity, that appears in the above cognitions. Here identity is that which determines the counter-oppositeness or contrariety (of absence of identity). And this (reciprocal) non-existence has the same substratum, or denotation or extension as its counter-opposite (i.e., identity); for there is such cognition as that the water-pot is not the ground (on which it lies). It is also eternal, for it is impossible that there should be at any time identity between a water-pot and a piece of cloth.—4.