Sūtra 7.2.7 (Unity and Separateness of one do not exist in effect and cause)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 7.2.7:

कार्यकारणयोरेकत्वैकपृथक्त्वाभावादेकत्वैकपृथक्त्वं न विद्यते ॥ ७.२.७ ॥

kāryakāraṇayorekatvaikapṛthaktvābhāvādekatvaikapṛthaktvaṃ na vidyate || 7.2.7 ||

kārya-kāraṇayoḥ—of or in effect and cause; ekatva-ekapṛthaktva-abhāvāt—in consequence of non-existence of identity and heterogeneity; ekatva-ekapṛthaktvaṃ—Unity and Individuality; na—not; vidyate—exists.

7. Effect and cause are neither the same nor similar (in being equally distinguished from all other things); therefore, Unity and (single) Individuality do not exist in them.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

Effect and cause, e.g., threads and cloth, possess Unity and single Individuality. Single Individuality also belongs to them for the very same reason for which Unity belong to them. For it is not possible that a thing can be separate from itself. For when a piece of cloth is torn asunder and the threads are drawn out one after another, a piece of cloth different from them is not observed. Were a piece of cloth different from the threads, then it should be observed under the characteristic of being different from them, like a water-pot. In like manner, a water-pot also is nothing but identical with the two potsherds (which compose it), since a water-pot also being broken, nothing over and above the two potsherds is observed. Accordingly it has been said, “A whole made up of parts is nothing else than the parts.”: This is the view of the Sāṃkhya thinkers. And for the purpose of controverting it, he says:

[Read sūtra 7.2.7 above]

Effect and cause—these two are not one. Why? So he says: from non-existence of ‘ekatva,’ i.e., from non-existence of non-difference and because co-existence of plurality and unity in the same substratum is not therefore, possible, as would be required by the proposition that the very same thing which is the effect, is also the cause, e.g., that threads are a piece of cloth.

Objection.—But there is as a matter of fact such co-existence in the same substratum, seeing that the term, waters, is applied to a drop of water only, and also seeing that the term, wives, is applied to a single woman.

Answer.—Such is not the case. For such applications can be possible by reference to multiplicity of constituent parts. In the case of the ultimate atom of water, however, such application takes place, according to some thinkers, by means of multiplicity of colour, etc., naturally belonging to it; while, according to others, it is due to the characteristic force of sound or language which should not be found fault with. Nor do fibres present in a Salvinia cucullata and honeycomb obtain the application of cloth. Nor do threads singly prevail to contain and to drag anything.

Nor, again, can the two, effect and cause, become the substratum of single Individuality, for it is s??? that they become the limits of each other. How? So he says, ‘eka-pṛthaktva-abhāvāt,’ i.e., in consequence of the non-existence of ‘eka-pṛthaktvaṃ,’ or non-heterogeneity or non-difference in property; in other words, because, of effect and cause, difference in property is observed, for it is universal among mankind that the notions of thread and cloth, as well as of water-pot and potsherds, are embraced by different acts of understanding.

Objection.—Why, then, are not Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, cognised by their difference (or separately from one another, i.e., one after another always)?

Answer.—Because of the absolute similarity of their forms, i.e., modes of manifestation. And when sometimes, as in a piece of cloth of variegated colour, etc., separate cognition also takes place, it is because the differences of Number, Measure or Extension, etc., are most manifest there.—7.