Sūtra 7.1.21 (Proof of true Minuteness and true Shortness)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 7.1.21:

अविद्या च विद्यालिङ्गम् ॥ ७.१.२१ ॥

avidyā ca vidyāliṅgam || 7.1.21 ||

avidyā—false knowledge; Nescience. ca—moreover, and; vidyā-liṅgaṃ—mark or indication of knowledge.

21. False knowledge is, moreover, the (inferential) mark of (true) knowledge.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

It may be asked: If minuteness, or shortness as applied respectively to a jujube, an emblic myrobalan, etc., and to fuel-sticks, sugar-canes, etc., is not transcendental or real, (but apparent only), what then is the proof of them as transcendental?

Accordingly he says:

[Read sūtra 7.1.21 above]

‘The mark of knowledge’ is ‘false knowledge.’ The meaning therefore, is this: The cognition or consciousness of minuteness in respect of a jujube, an emblic myrobalan, etc., and the consciousness of shortness in respect of sticks for fuel, sugar-canes, etc., are all avidyā or false knowledge, inasmuch as real or transcendental minuteness and shortness do not exist there. Moreover, it is admitted by those who hold the doctrine of anyatha-khyati, illusion of the senses, that every where unscientific knowledge is just preceded i.e., presupposed, by scientific knowledge. So that true consciousness of minuteness, as well as true consciousness of shortness, should be inferred. This is the meaning. In like manner, secondary use of words being impossible without the primary use, minuteness and shortness, in the primary sense of the terms, must be thought of to be present somewhere.—21.

Commentary: The Vivṛti of Jayanārāyaṇa:

(English extracts of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana’s Vivṛti or ‘gloss’ called the Kaṇādasūtravivṛti from the 17th century)

But why should substance, in the form of the ultimate atom, be admitted, when it is not perceptible to the senses? On the other hand, substance which is perceptible to the senses, such as a tertiary atomic aggregate, etc., should be recognised.

To meet this objection he says:

‘Avidyā,’ i.e., unscientific knowledge, in other words, cognitions, such as “Earth is eternal,” Water is eternal,” etc., of which the objects are wholes made up of parts, is the inferential ‘mark,’ of ‘Vidyā,’ i.e., scientific knowledge, namely, that Earth is eternal, of which the object is (i.e., in respect of), the ultimate atom; because everywhere scientific knowledge, is preceded by unscientific knowledge, for nowhere it is possible for a man to have the erroneous idea that Earth is eternal, if he does not know what eternality is. This is an indirect proof. The method of proof of ultimate atoms as realities, which has been pointed out before, should be preferred.