Sūtra 4.1.6 (Requisites of perception)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 4.1.6:

महत्यनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वात् रूपाच्चोपलब्धिः ॥ ४.१.६ ॥

mahatyanekadravyavattvāt rūpāccopalabdhiḥ || 4.1.6 ||

mahati—in respect of an object possessing magnitude; aneka-dravya-vattvāt—by means of its possession of what is composed of more than one substance; rupāt—by means of colour; ca—and; upalabdhiḥ—perception.

6. External perception (takes place), in respect of an object possessing magnitude, by means of its possession of that which is composed of more substances than one, and by means of its colour.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

It may he objected, “Well, if the ultimate atom exists, why is it not perceived by the senses? It is you who have proved that the possession of colour, the possession of touch, etc., are exciting causes of sensibility.” Hence he says:

[Read sūtra 4.1.6 above]

‘Mahati’ means in respect of a substance possessing magnitude, the affix, matup, denoting possession, among affixes denoting quality, being elided after the word, mahat, denoting measure. ‘Anekadravyatvāt’ means from the nature or state of containing that of which more substances than one are the substrata. This being so, Air also would be perceptible. Hence he says, “And by means of Colour,” i.e., as will be later on said, developed and uneclipsed or unobscured colour. “Upalabdhi” is complemented by the words, “by the external sense.” Therefore it goes without saying that there is no external perception of the ultimate atom, since it does not possess magnitude. “The possession of that which is composed of more than one substance” means either the being constituted by a compound of more than one substance, or the being the substratum of the magnitude which is due to a multiplicity of component parts.

It cannot Ie said that the possession of that which is a compound of more than ore substance, is rendered futile (as a condition precedent of perception), by the very possession of magnitude; since the reverse is also possible. Nor can it be said, “Futility of the producer is caused by the producible, but not that of the producible by the producer •” for the agreement and the difference of the producible and the producer being simultaneously apprehended, there is no futility, since otherwise it would follow that the futility of the staff, etc., will be caused by the whirling of it, etc. Nor can it be said that there is a development of or rise in, perceptibility at a distance due to development of, or rise in, magnitude; for a development of, or rise in, the possession of a compound of more substances than one being also possible, there can be no discrimination. Moreover, while a spider’s web measuring four cubits, etc., is not perceptible from a distance, the perceptibility of the spider itself is certainly due to a development of the possession of a compound of more substances than one, since a preponderance of magnitude exists in the web. So also it should be observed that while a piece of cloth, constituted by five yarns, is not perceptible at a distance, is in spite of a preponderance of magnitude in it, a club of a very small magnitude is perceptible there—6.