Sūtra 4.1.5 (The theory that atoms are not eternal, is erroneous)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 4.1.5:

अविद्या ॥ ४.१.५ ॥

avidyā || 4.1.5 ||

avidyā—ignorance, error.

5. (It is) an error (to suppose that the ultimate atom is not eternal).

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

It may be objected as follows: The ultimate atom is not eternal, since it is corporal of ponderable, like a water-pot. Similarly, the possession of colour, the possession of taste, etc., may be, one by one, adduced as so many reasons. So also by simultaneous conjunction with six (other ultimate atoms), an ultimate atom has six parts; so that from its possession of parts, and from its being the substratum of the conjunction appearing in objects which it cannot pervade, (we may infer that the ultimate atom is not eternal). Moreover, if there be Ether within an ultimate atom, then being porous, it must have parts; if there be no Ether inside it, then it would follow that Ether does not penetrate every where. Further, (the ultimate atom is not eternal), because it casts shadow, and possesses circulation. Again, the non-eternality of the ultimate atom follows also from the inference which establishes transiency, e.g., the inference, that all that exists is momentary. If then there be such a series of inferences, how can it be maintained that the ultimate atom is eternal?

To meet these objections, he says:

[Read sūtra 4.1.5 above]

Every inference, which has for its subject the non-eternality of the ultimate atom, is ignorance, i.e., is of the form of error, since it springs from a fallacy, This fallacy is occasionally obstruction or opposition to the proof which comprehends the subject; always absence of the characteristic of being pervaded (or being the mark), due to want of evidence preventive of its existence in the vipakṣa (i.e., in which the non-existence of that which has to be proved, is sertain); sometimes unproof by itself; and others which should be learnt from the kindred system (i.e., the Nyāya-Sūtra of Gautama).—5.

Commentary: The Bhāṣya of Candrakānta:

(English translation of Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra’s Bhāṣya called the Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya from the 19th century)

Candrakānta reads IV.i.3, 4, and 5 as two aphorisms only, viz., kāraṇa-bhāvāt kāryabhāvo, nilya iti’, and Viśeṣataḥ pratiṣedhabhāvo ‘vidyā’, and interprets them to mean, respectively, “The nature of the effect, (though) following from the nature of the cause (which is eternal) is non-eternal” and “It is an error to suppose that because things (e.g., atoms) exist as effects (e.g., compound bodies), therefore they cannot exist in the causal (or atomic) state”,—in order to explain the application of the word “non-eternal” in, I. i. 8 where the reference is to things which are products.