Vaisheshika-sutra with Commentary

by Nandalal Sinha | 1923 | 149,770 words | ISBN-13: 9789332869165

The Vaisheshika-sutra 3.2.17, English translation, including commentaries such as the Upaskara of Shankara Mishra, the Vivriti of Jayanarayana-Tarkapanchanana and the Bhashya of Chandrakanta. The Vaisheshika Sutras teaches the science freedom (moksha-shastra) and the various aspects of the soul (eg., it's nature, suffering and rebirth under the law of karma). This is sutra 7 (‘above answered—continued’) contained in Chapter 2—Of the Inference of Soul and Mind—of Book III (of soul and mind).

Sūtra 3.2.17 (Above answered—continued)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 3.2.17:

न तु शरीरविशेषाद्यज्ञदत्त विष्णुमित्रयोर्ज्ञानविषयः ॥ ३.२.१७ ॥

na tu śarīraviśeṣādyajñadatta viṣṇumitrayorjñānaviṣayaḥ || 3.2.17 ||

na—not; tu—but; śarīra-viśeṣāt—perceiving the difference of bodies, Yajñadatta-Viṣṇumitrayoḥ, of Yajña-datta and Viṣṇumitra; jñānam—knowledge, thought; Viṣayaḥ, object

17. But the thoughts of Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra do not become objects of perception to them, while they perceive the difference of their bodies. (Therefore consciousness is not an attribute of the body).

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

By elaborating the solution he says:

[Read sūtra 3.2.17 above]

‘Jñānam’ implies sensible pleasure, pain, and other attributes of the Soul. As the bodies of Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra are mutually different, so are also their knowledge, pleasure, pain, and the like, different. Accordingly, as is this body of Yajñadatta, so also, though no knowledge, or pleasure, etc., be produced in Yajñadatta, will the knowledge, etc., “I feel pleasure,” “I know” “I will,” “I desire,” be objects (of perception); because the sensible body being an object of perception, knowledge, etc., which are (ex hypothesi) its properties, like its colour, etc., will have the possibility of being perceptible. But this is impossible. Therefore (such is the import), it should be said that the seat or subject of knowledge, etc., is something really different from the body. ‘Śarīraviśeṣāt’ means from difference of body. The fifth case-ending has been used in the sense of the infinitive. So that the meaning is that knowledge or thought is not an object of perception, while difference of body is being perceived.—17.

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