Sūtra 3.2.14 (Above answered)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 3.2.14:

अहमिति प्रत्यगात्मनि भावात् परत्राभावादर्थान्तर प्रत्यक्षः ॥ ३.२.१४ ॥

ahamiti pratyagātmani bhāvāt paratrābhāvādarthāntara pratyakṣaḥ || 3.2.14 ||

aham—I; iti—this; pratyag-ātmani—in the in-going or individual Soul; bhāvāt—because it exists; Paratra, other-

where. Abhāvāt, because it does not exist. Arthāntara-pratyakṣaḥ, (Intuition) wherein the individual soul is the object of perception.

14. Because the intuition ‘I’ exists in one’s own soul, and because it does not exist otherwhere, therefore the intuition has the individual Soul as the object of perception.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

He solves the doubt:

[Read sūtra 3.2.14 above]

‘Arthāntara-pratyakṣaḥ’ is that intuition in which ‘arthāntaram,’ i.e., the Soul itself, is the percept. The meaning is as follows: Since tho intuition ‘I’ arises in respect of ‘pratyagātma,’ i.e., one’s own Soul, and since it does not arise ‘paratra’ i.e., in respect of other Souls, therefore it is proper to regard the reference to ‘arthāntaram’ or one’s own Soul as the primary reference. If, on the other hand, the primary reference were to the body, then the intuition would be produced by the external senses, for the body is not an object of mental perception, and the intuition ‘This is I’ is mental being produced even without the operation of the external senses, since the mind takes in as its object the Soul as modified by appropriate particular attributes in the form of ‘I am happy,’ ‘I know,’ ‘I will,’ ‘I desire,’ This intuition is not inferential, as it is produced even without seeking any mark of inference. Nor is it verbally communicated, since it is produced even without the apprehension of any authoritative text. Therefore it is only mental; further because the mind, as it is not an independent agent outside its own sphere, does not apply into the body and other external objects. Moreover, if it be urged that, if it referred to the body, it would refer to the bodies of others, and if it referred to one’s own Soul, it would also refer to the Souls of others, we deny this, for the Soul of one man is beyond the senses of another, since its particular attributes have no fitness for or relation to, them, and since its fitness for or relation to, them arises from the taking on or super-imposition of appropriate particular attributes. Nor is this the nature of the Soul only, but of every Substance. For Substance? becomes perceptible only by the taking on of appropriate particular attributes. If it is said that Ether also should, for the same reason, become perceptible by the accompaniment of Sound, we reply that such would be the case, if the ear were capable of apprehending Substance, or if Ether possessed colour. If it is rejoined that the Soul also is equally devoid of colour, we reply that it is in the case of external Substances only that possession of colour is a requisite with regard to perceptibility. The word ‘pratyag,’ in-going, points out divergence from others.—14.