Sūtra 3.2.9 (Objections answered)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 3.2.9:

अहमिति शब्दस्य व्यतिरेकान्नागमिकम् ॥ ३.२.९ ॥

ahamiti śabdasya vyatirekānnāgamikam || 3.2.9 ||

aham—I; iti—this; śabdasya—of the word; vyatirekāt—exclusion, non-application, divergence, abhorrence; na—not; āgamikam—Scriptural, Proved by Revelation.

9. (The proof of the existence of the Soul is not solely) from revelation, because of the non-application of the word ‘I’ (to other designates or objects).—144.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

To this objection of the first party, set forth in the three foregoing sūtras, the upholder of the doctrine of inference replies:

[Read sūtra 3.2.9 above]

Revelation alone is not the proof of the existence of Soul ; but the Soul is proved also by the inference that the word ‘ I,’ or the word ‘Soul,’ must have some designate (or objective reality corresponding to it), because it is a word, like the word, water-pot, etc. Lest it might be said that it is Earth, etc., which are its designates, so he says, “Because of non-application,” in other words, because of the non-application or divergence of the word ‘I’ from Earth, etc. For, there never arises any such use of language or intuition as “I am Earth,” “I am Water,” “I am Fire,” “I am Air,” I am Ether,” “I am Time,” I am Space,” “I am Mind.” If you object that such intuition or use arises with respect to the body, we reply that it does not, for it would then entail such intuition or use with respect to the bodies of others; if, that it arises with respect to one’s own body, we reply that it is not so, for ‘one’s own’ or one’s self, as different from the Soul, has no meaning or is not proved by etymology, and because the intuition, “ My body,” proceeds upon a difference of substrata. It cannot be said, (objection) “Well, but this too is an inference by analogy which however does not and with a particular thing, and is therefore defective ; ” for, (answer) in the word ‘I,’ I-ness or Soul-ness itself forms the specification or distinction. So that on the strength of the property of its being an attribute of the subject of the argument (pakṣa), it follows that I-ness is the cause of the inference of Soul, and as it is not common to any other object, therefore the particular object (or the Soul in particular) is proved. Similarly, there is proof of the particular object, from the analogous inference or commonly observed mark accompanied with the exclusion of other possibilities. The objection which has been made, namely, “From ‘hearing’ alone results realization or intuition of the Soul; what is the need of all this proof?”, is not sound. For, without reflection or intellection, the dross of unbelief in wavering minds cannot be purged away; without this purification, there can be no aptitude in them for constant meditation; and without constant meditation, there can be no realization of truth or intuition of the Soul, which is capable of uprooting false knowledge together with desires or appetencies, as it is from habit only that a sad lover suddenly comes to have a mental realization of his beloved lady, and because verbal or inferential knowledge is not capable of uprooting false knowledge, as is seen in the case of delusion in respect of direction in Space, etc. This is the import.

If it be asked, “Still how can a sign or indication (of its existence) be apprehended in the Soul which is imperceptible we reply, “Who has ever said that the Soul is not perceptible? On the contrary, the Soul is apprehended by its proximity through or in the form of conjunction, to the Mind. Otherwise, how can there be such intuitions as ‘I am happy,’ ‘I know,’ ‘I desire,’ ‘I will,’ ‘I feel pain,’ etc? For these intuitions are neither unsubstantial nor of doubtful substantiality, because like that of the perception of blueness, their substantiality is undoubted. Nor are they inferential or derived from marks, for they arise even without any knowledge of marks. Nor again are they derived from verbal information or authority, for they do not follow upon enquiry for that.” If it be urged that they are appearances of perception (and not true perceptions), we reply that they must have then for their object something which is not apparent (i.e, real), for it will be shown in the sequel that that which is not object of certain knowledge, cannot be applied by metaphor to or superimposed upon, another object.—9.

Commentary: The Vivṛti of Jayanārāyaṇa:

(English extracts of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana’s Vivṛti or ‘gloss’ called the Kaṇādasūtravivṛti from the 17th century)

The sūtra is illustrative. It should be known that inferences, as described above, by the marks of knowledge, etc., are also proofs of the existence of the Soul.