Sūtra 3.2.1 (Mark of the existence of Mind)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 3.2.1:

आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षज्ञानस्य भावो ऽभावश्च मनसो लिङ्गम् ॥ ३.२.१ ॥

ātmendriyārthasannikarṣajñānasya bhāvo 'bhāvaśca manaso liṅgam || 3.2.1 ||

ātmendriyārthasannikarṣe—on contact of the Soul with the senses and their objects; jñānasya—of knowledge; bhāvaḥ—existence, production, appearance; abhāvaḥ—non-existence, non-production, non-appearance; ca—and; manasaḥ—of the Mind; liṅgam—Mark.

1. The appearance and non-appearance of knowledge, on contact of the Soul with the senses and the objects are the marks (of the existence) of the Mind.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

Distinction of real and fallacious marks is the subject-matter of the (preceding) chapter. Now, going to bring the examination of the Soul to a close, the author, by a transgression of the order of enumeration (of the Substances) (vide I.i,5), introduces the examination of the Mind, and says:

[Read sūtra 3.2.1 above]

He will say that the movement of the Mind is the mark (of the Soul). If, therefore, Mind is found on examination to be the instrument or means of knowledge, and as being dense, moulded, or ponderable (mūrtti [mūrti]), then it becomes proved that the Soul is that, being directed by which, the Mind comes to be connected with the sense apprehensive of the desired or agreeable object, rather than with any other sense. This is the reason of the violation of the order of enumeration. The meaning is that the Mind is that which, while there is contact of the soul with the sense and its object, being connected with the sense, there is production of knowledge, and which not being so connected with the sense, there is non-production of knowledge.

Objection.—Mind is all-pervading or universal. Nevertheless, non-simultaneity of knowledge can be inferred from this alone that Mind possesses the property of an instrument. Moreover, Mind is universal because, like Time, it is a substance void of any distinctive attribute; because, like the Soul, it is the substratum of Conjunction which is the non-combinative cause of knowledge; and because, like Ether, it possesses the absolute non-existence of Touch; and there are similar other proofs of its universality.

Answer.—It is not so. If Mind were universal or all-pervading, then as it would be connected with all the senses, there would be only one cognition including all the senses (i.e., omni-sensuous). If it be replied that (objection') such is not the case, because there is a contrariety amongst the effects; we deny this, (answer) for a complete cause does not take notice of contrariety and non-contrariety whereby it might be apprehensive of the contrariety of the characteristics of belonging to perception by the eye, organ of taste, etc. It cannot be said, (objection) “Or, it (cognition) may be of a variegated form like variegated colour, as it is in the case of eating some pudding,” (where perceptions of taste, flavour, etc., take place all together); for (answer) even there attention or attachment to a particular object (i.e., taste or flavour, etc.,) is observed. Nor can it be asked, (objection) “How then does the complex belief arise, viz., ‘I perceive Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch simultaneously’?”; for, (answer) it is merely a sense of simultaneity in respect of the five cognitions, produced by the swiftly moving Mind and presented in memory. It cannot be objected that attention to particular objects is also dependent upon the property of the instrument, for the answer has already been given. If it be maintained (objection) that attention depends upon the desire to understand; we deny this, for, (answer) on that supposition, it would follow that when there was a desire to understand all, there would be a total presentation of all objects, whereas the only result of a desire to understand is connection of Mind with the sense percipient of the object desired. Inasmuch, therefore, as non-simultaneity of cognition is otherwise impossible, the Mind is proved to possess a minimum of divisibility. Consequently, the marks of universality are obstructed by proof which comprehends or infers the subject. Moreover, if the Mind were all-pervading, then there would not be such local character of pleasure, etc., as in “pleasure in my foot,” “pain in my head,” etc.; for, the effects of ‘universal substances’ uniformly appear in places delimited by their non-combinative causes. It cannot be said that in our view also it follows that pleasure, etc., are confined to the place of the atom ; for, the rule is that a non-combinative cause really produces an extensive effect at its own place, so that there is no opposition to their production even beyond the limits of their instrumental causes, e.g., sandalwood, etc. It cannot be urged, “Mine too is request for remoteness from the instrument causes for, it would entail a breach of the above uniformity. Further, how will there be conjunction of the universal Mind with the Soul? It cannot be replied that it is without beginning, for then disjunction will also necessarily become beginningless. It cannot be said that owing to the difference of their limitations (i.e., substrata wherein they take place), both of them remain uncontradicted; for, the difference of the limitations of conjunction and disjunction depends upon their own causes, whereas in the case of the difference of things which have no beginning, such dependence does not exist. This is the direction.—1.

Commentary: The Bhāṣya of Candrakānta:

(English translation of Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra’s Bhāṣya called the Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya from the 19th century)

Candrakānta reads the words ‘bhāvaḥ’ and ‘abhāvaḥ’ in a compounded form as bhūvābhāvaḥ.’