Sūtra 3.1.14 (Marks of inference—continued)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 3.1.14:

प्रसिद्धिपूर्वकत्वादपदेशस्य ॥ ३.१.१४ ॥

prasiddhipūrvakatvādapadeśasya || 3.1.14 ||

prasiddhipūrvakatvāt—because preceded by (the recollection of) the ‘pervasion’ or universal relation; apadeśasya—of the mark.

14. (These are valid marks), because the characteristic of an inferential mark is that it is preceded by (the recollection of the) universal relation (of itself and of that of which it is a mark).

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

Now ho shows the importance or use of the above recapitulation:

[Read sūtra 3.1.14 above]

‘Prasiddhī’ means recollection of universal relation. ‘Apadeśa’ denotes a mark. Therefore the mark attended with the recollection of universal relation, is described by that member of an argument which states the mark, or by that member which states the deduction; so that the mark is, as has been stated, preceded by recollection of universal relation. Thus universal relation, (i.e., a true major premiss) exists-in all these cases of inference of an agent by the instruments such as the organ of hearing, etc., and of the Soul as their substratum by the attributes such as knowledge, etc.; whereas there is no universal relation in the inference by which you (i.e., the opponent) have sought to establish knowledge as a i attribute of the body, through the mark that it is an effect of the body. This is the import.

It may be asked, what is this universal relation? It is not merely inviolable relation; for, in the case of inference from cause to effect, it is not known that inviolable or invariable concomitance is the being not the ground of the co-existence of the absolute non-existence of that which has to be proved, and because inference from cause to effect it is impossible that invariable concomitance is the not being the seat of that which is not the seat of that which has to be proved, and also because smoke, etc., are the seat of that which is not the seat of that, whatever it may be, which has to be proved.

Nor is it inseparable existence, for that is either the non-existence -of the mark in the absence of that which is to be proved, or existence of the mark after deduction has been drawn from that which is to be proved. It cannot be said that because sometimes there is non-existence of smoke, also where no ass exists, and there is existence of smoke also where an ass exists, therefore uniform agreement and uniform difference are intended here; because the very same uniformity is the subject of enquiry.

Nor is it relation to a whole. If it be the relation of the whole of the major term to the middle term, such relation does not exist even in the case of smoke, etc., which are not equally pervasive as their corresponding major terms. Let it be relation of the whole of the middle term to the major term; but this is impossible, for there does not exist in the whole of the middle term relation to a single major term. Let it be relation of the whole of the major term to the whole of the middle term. This also is not valid, for it is nowhere possible that there should be relation of the whole of the major term to the whole of the middle term, inasmuch as the individuals denoted by the major and ths middle term are related each to each. And in the case of the terms being unequally pervasive, there would be a want of pervasion or universal relation.

Nor is the relation essential. For essence means either the nature or condition of a thing, or (condition in itself, or production by itself). Now, if the nominal affix which converts ‘essence’ into the form ‘essential,’ has the sense of production thereby, then the definition will be too narrow to apply to universal relation characterised as Combination. If the affix bears the sense of dependence upon it or residing in it, in that case also the definition will be too narrow to apply to Combination, for combination does not reside in, i.e., depend upon, anything whatever; and also because even Conjunction neither resides in, nor is produced by, smoke-ness, etc., which are the properties of the middle term.

Nor is the relation, non-accidental or non-coditional. For an upādhi, accident or external condition, itself is difficult to ascribe, and were it easy to ascribe, would be difficult to conceive. And were it easy to conceive, it would still involve ‘mutual dependence’ or ‘reciprocity’ or argument in a circle, for there being pervasion of the major term, the conception of the non-pervasion, etc., of the middle term would depend upon the conception of the universal relation.

Nor is universal relation mere relation. For, though variable relation also appears as universal relation, though its reference to particular place and particular time, yet, as the knowledge of it does not govern the inferential process, it is, therefore, required to determine that universal relation only which, by being known, will become the means of inference.

Nor is universal relation co-existence with the major term which is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence appertaning to that which contains the middle term, (i.e., the minor term) For fire also is the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence, present in that which has smoke, since it is not that in a kitchen hearth there is not the absolute non-existence of volcanic fire. In such an instance as “This has conjunction, because it is a Substance,” the definition would become too narrow, as the absolute non-existence of Conjunction would be co-extensive with the mark or means of inference. It cannot be said, Universal relation is co-extension with the major term which is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence which is co-extensive with itself and which is the contradictory of the counteropposite, because the absolute non-existence of conjunction falls short of being the contradictory of the counteropposite.” For the absolute non-existence of conjunction also is the contradictory of the counter-opposite; otherwise, it would be useless to imagine differences of delimiting circumstances for differences of delimitations are not imagined for the purpose of showing the states of being produced and non-eternal.

Nor is universal relation the not being the foundation or substratum of non-co-extension with the major term; for in the inference from cause to effect, there is not konwn any such non-co-extension with the major term. It is in fact another form of being the foundation of that which is not the foundation of the major term.

Nor is the universal relation of a thing the possession of the form which determines its relation to something else, for the characteristic of fire also has the function of determining relation to or the coextension of smoke. It cannot be sait that because of wider extension this is not the case; for it is obsevred that, that which determines the pervasion (e.g., fire) has a wider extension (iṇ. other words, fire exists-where there is no smoke), and the characteristic of Smoke also has a wider extension inasmuch as there exists smoke pendant on the surface of the sky e.g., in clouds). If therefore, a qualification be added for the purpose of excluding such instances, then it must be allowed thṇt, that which determines the characteristic of being the middle term (yyāpya) the same is intended to determine the characteristic of being co-extended, and hence there is the fallacy of self-dependence (ātmāśraya). The view also that two things are universally related, when the One possesses the form of determining the co-existence of the other in a common substratum, is fallacious in the same way.

In reply to the above objections, we may proceed to state as follows: pervasion or universal relation is a non-accidental relation; while by the being non-accidental is meant co-existence in the same substratum with a variably present sādhya or that which has to be proved (i.e., the major term which is predicated of the minor, in the conclusion), of all those in which the mark or middle term is sometimes present and sometimes absent, or co-existence in the same substratum with a sādhyd [sādhya?] co-existent with the absolute non-existence of the counteropposites of all those which are the counter-opposites of the absolute non-existence co-existing in the same substratum with the mark. The meaning of the two expressions is co-existence in the same substratum with the sādhya which is not pervaded by anything that does not pervade the sādhana or the middle term; in other words, it is the characteristic of being pervaded by all that which is pervasive of the sādhya. It may be said that this is difficult to understand from the relative compound which has been employed here. For this reason there is need of observation and argument also. In other words, pervasion, vyāpi, is co-existence in the same substratum with the sādhya which is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence co-existing in the same substratum with the sādhana. By absolute non-existence is intended that which possesses the counter-opposite determined by the genera of fire-ness, etc., Therefore, even though in the smoke of the kitchen hearth there is co-existence in the same substratum with the absolute non-existence of mountain fire, yet it is no fault, because there never arises the intuition that there is not fire in that which has smoke. Substanceness, however, is never co-existent in the same substratum with the absolute non-existence of the charateristic of being in conjunction, for we never have the intuition that substance is not conjunct, because, although conjunctions singly do not appear in that which is the subject of pervasion, yet the generic quality of being conjunct appears in that which is the subject of pervasion, and is itself pervasive.

Objection.—But the being non-accidental implies the absence of accident or adjunct, upādhi; and upādhi itself is difficult to obtain.

Answer.—It is not so. Because the characteristic of upādhi belongs to that which does not pervade the sādhana, i.e., the middle term, while it does pervade the sādhya, i.e., the major term. So it has been said, “upādhi is that which is dependent upon another upādhi, (for determining non accidentally), in the case of the sādhana, and which is not dependent upon another upādhi, (for determining non-accidentality), in the case of the sādhya.”

Objection.—But the definition does not include an upādhi which is only non-pervasive of the sādhya. For example, Air is perceptible, because it is the substratum of touch which is perceptible. Here the possession of developed colour is such an upādhi. So also is the characteristic of being produced by eating herbs (which might produce blackness), in, “He is black, because he is the son of Mitrā” (a low-born woman). For, the possession of developed colour is not pervasive of perceptibility, since it does not exist in the perception of the Soul as well as of Attribute and Action; nor is the characteristic of being produced by eating herbs pervasive of blackness, since it does not exist in the case of the blackness of the black crow, cuckoo, cloud, black-berries, etc.

Answer.—The objection is not valid. For, that which is non-pervasive of the sādhana, while it is pervasive of the sādhya as finally determined,—the same is intended as the upādhi. And a sādhya becomes finally determined, when it is determined by a property, by determination by which the pervasiveness of the upādhi remains unbroken. In the instances given the possession of developed colour is pervasion of perceptibility by the determination or limitation of external substantiality, and is apprehended by agreement and difference. As regards the second instance, it has been ascertained in the works of Caraka, Suśruta, and other medical writers, that the characteristic of being produced by eating herbs is pervasive towards the sādhya determined by the blackness of a person, which can be produced (artificially). Other cases should be similarly understood.

Objection.—Still it is not the meaning of the word, upāphi. An upādhi is something the property of which shines in another object, e.g., a China rose, etc., in reference to a crystal, etc. In the case of an unequally pervaded upādhi., there being absence of the characteristic of that which can be pervaded, its property cannot shine in the approved sādhana.

Answer.—This is true. The primary use of the word, upādhi, is only where it is equally pervaded (as the sādhya), e.g.,in the possession of fire produced from moist faggots, (for wherever there is such fire, there is smoke, and vice versa). In other places, its use is secondary. The secondary sense infers variation, or deviation, according to the rule that, that which deviates from the pervader of something, also deviates from that thing. And there exists sādhana which deviates from the upādhi which is pervasive of the sādhya. Hence, that the sādhana deviates from the sādhya, and that, that which is not pervaded by that which pervades an object, is also not pervaded by that object, together infer that there is no proof of the characteristic of being pervaded, or brings forward a contrary argument, satpratipakṣa,^[1] there being proof of the non-existence of the sādhya from the non-existence of the upādhi, which is pervasive of the sādhya, in the pakṣa, i.e., the subject, which is the minor term). So it has been said, “The disputant may bring forward an upādhi, governing the sādhya finally determined, even though it be divorced from the rule or determination of the sādhya maintained by the speaker, such upādhi being equally (a means of discrediting the conclusion, or) a source of satpratipakṣa.” And such upādhi is brought forward by arguments adverse to the absence of arguments in favour of bādha obstruction, (í. e., the certainty of the non-existence of the sādhya), and deviation (i.e., the non-co-existence of the sādhana with the sādhya).

It has been held that by the non-co-existence of which the non-co-existence of the sādhana with the sādhya arises, the same is upādhi. But here the instrumental case-ending is used to express neither instrument, nor means, mode, nor mark. Nor is the construction to be completed thus, By the non-co-existence of which being known, the non-co-existence of the sādhana with the sādhya becomes known; for the definition, not applying to an unknown upādhi, would not apply to upādhis in obvious cases of non-co-existence. It is diffcult to ascertain it (i.e., upādhi) significatively [significantly?] or by its significance, since it is impossible to formulate or invent, an upādhi without (first) establishing the characteristic of being the means of the inference of non-co-existence. The characteristic of being other than the pakṣa (or the subject of the conclusion), again, though suffering from the characteristic of an upādhi, is yet not an upādhi; for, it would involve obstruction to itself, e.g., dubiousness and not-one-pointedness in the pakṣa. For if there is no doubt about it, then it is not a pakṣa if it is a pakṣa, then doubt is necessary, and consequently, dubiousness and not-one-pointed-ness become certain. That which remains to be said on this topic, may be sought in the Mayūkha.—14.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

satpratipakṣa. has been defined as “an argument which contains a counter-mark capable of demonstrating the non-existence of that which has to be proved,” (vide Tarka-saṃgraha).