Vaisheshika-sutra with Commentary

by Nandalal Sinha | 1923 | 149,770 words | ISBN-13: 9789332869165

The Vaisheshika-sutra 2.2.21, English translation, including commentaries such as the Upaskara of Shankara Mishra, the Vivriti of Jayanarayana-Tarkapanchanana and the Bhashya of Chandrakanta. The Vaisheshika Sutras teaches the science freedom (moksha-shastra) and the various aspects of the soul (eg., it's nature, suffering and rebirth under the law of karma). This is sutra 1 (‘sound—what?’) contained in Chapter 2—Of the Five Bhutas, Time, and Space—of Book II (of substances).

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 2.2.21:

श्रोत्रग्रहणो योर्ऽथः स शब्दः ॥ २.२.२१ ॥

śrotragrahaṇo yor'thaḥ sa śabdaḥ || 2.2.21 ||

śrotra-grahaṇaḥ—of which ear is the organ of apprehension; yaḥ—which, Arthaḥ, object; saḥ—that; śabdaḥ—sound.

21. Sound is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the Ear.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

Having thus elucidated the nature and characteristic of Doubt which is the first member of an examination, he now explains the object Sound which is the subject matter of examination, and says:

[Read sūtra 2.2.21 above]

‘Śrotragrahaṇaḥ’ means that of which ear is the organ or instrument of apprehension. ‘Arthaḥ’ means that which contains properties. So that the definition has not the defect of over-extending to Soundness, loudness, etc., Attribute-ness, Existence, and other properties residing in Sound and capable of being perceived by the ear. By the word ‘arthaḥ’ meaning that which contains properties, the possession of a class property is intended; hereby it is indicated that Sound called ‘Sphoṭa’ (i.e., by which the words of a sentence can convey a complete sense), inherent in Sound, does not exist.

It may be argued as follows; Sphoṭa must be postulated on the strength of the intuitions, ‘one word,’ ‘one sentence.’ for the intuition, of unity does not arise in a word composed of several letters, nor in a sentence composed of several letters. And the word sphoṭa forms a name or nominal on which the elucidation of the sense depends. The letters individually do not at all produce the intuition of the meaning of the whole sentence; their combination again is impossible, because they speedily disappear, being uttered by one speaker; therefore the intuition of the sense of the whole arises from sphoṭa only, because elucidation of the sense does not take place without the knowledge of it. And this sphoṭa, although it is present in one and all the letters standing as words, yet becomes manifest in the last letter.” We reply that it is not so. Conventional letters form words. Thus the sense being intuited from the word in virtue of convention alone, what is the use of sphoṭa? The use of the expression ‘one word’ is a pretence, intended to denote the one property of making up one sense, possessed by a largo number of letters. So also in the case of a sentence. If some inner meaning of the word, beyond that of its component letters, could be apprehended by perception, then the same might have been admitted to bo sphoṭa. Therefore the author of the aphorisms has overlooked this doctrine of sphoṭa as being of no consideration—21.

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