Sūtra 2.2.20 (Above continued)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 2.2.20:

विद्याविद्यातश्च संशयः ॥ २.२.२० ॥

vidyāvidyātaśca saṃśayaḥ || 2.2.20 ||

vidyā-a-vidyāta—from science and nescience; ca—and; saṃśayaḥ—Doubt.

20. Doubt (arises) also from science and nescience.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

He says that the very common property of being (cognised or) the object of thought is the cause of Doubt:

[Read sūtra 2.2.20 above]

Internal Doubt really springs from science and nescience. For instance, an astronomer predicts correctly, and predicts incorrectly, eclipses of the moon, etc. Accordingly Doubt arises in his mind as to his knowledge, whether it be accurate or not. Or knowledge is sometimes science, and sometimes nescience, i.e., wanting in proof; and, consequently, Doubt arises with respect to something, whether, ivas [in-as?]-much as it is known, it be existent or non-existent.

The retention of the word, ‘Doubt,’ in the aphorism, indicates that here,too, Doubt arises only from the perception of the common property, and not from any other source. Thus the opinion held by some that he uncertainty or inconstancy of cognition and non-cognition alluded to in the definition of Gautama, “Doubt is deliberation in expectation of a differentia, due to the proof of the common properties as well as of the properties of similar and dissimilar objects, the non-proof of, or uncertainty as to, these properties, and also the uncertainty or inconstancy of cognition and non-cognition,” (Nyāya-Sūtras I. I. 22), is a different source of Doubt, is hereby refuted.—20.

Commentary: The Vivṛti of Jayanārāyaṇa:

(English extracts of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana’s Vivṛti or ‘gloss’ called the Kaṇādasūtravivṛti from the 17th century)

Here the affix ‘tasi’ in ‘vidyā-avidyātaś’ is used in the genitive sense. Therefore the expression means “of true knowledge and false knowledge.” And the doubt is whether it be true knowledge or false knowledge. From the word ‘ca,’ ‘and,’ it follows that Doubt as regards the object of knowledge also arises from the perception of the common property. Thus, ‘The mountain contains fire,’ ‘The lake contains fire,’ in these and other causes of true or false knowledge, the Doubt, whether such knowledge be true or false, arises from the knowledge of the common property of their both being knowledge. In like manner, after such Doubt, Doubt also arises whether the mountain contains fire or not, whether the lake contains fire or. not, etc., from the knowledge of the common property of their being objects of knowledge. Now, a contrary certainty, the proof of which has not been obtained, is opposed to Doubt, and the Doubt whether it be true knowledge or false knowledge operates to dispel such contrary certainty. And not that such Doubt of itself gives rise to Doubt about the object of knowledge.