Vaisheshika-sutra with Commentary

by Nandalal Sinha | 1923 | 149,770 words | ISBN-13: 9789332869165

The Vaisheshika-sutra 2.2.17, English translation, including commentaries such as the Upaskara of Shankara Mishra, the Vivriti of Jayanarayana-Tarkapanchanana and the Bhashya of Chandrakanta. The Vaisheshika Sutras teaches the science freedom (moksha-shastra) and the various aspects of the soul (eg., it's nature, suffering and rebirth under the law of karma). This is sutra 7 (‘causes of doubt or disbelief’) contained in Chapter 2—Of the Five Bhutas, Time, and Space—of Book II (of substances).

Sūtra 2.2.17 (Causes of Doubt or Disbelief)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 2.2.17:

सामान्यप्रत्यक्षाद्विशेषस्मृतेश्च संशयः ॥ २.२.१७ ॥

sāmānyapratyakṣādviśeṣasmṛteśca saṃśayaḥ || 2.2.17 ||

sāmānya-pratyakṣāt—from the perception of the Genus or general property; viśeṣāpratyakṣāt—from the non-preception of the Species or special property or differentia; viśeṣasmṛteḥ—from the recollection of particulars, i; e., alternatives. ca—and; saṃśayaḥ—doubt.

17. Doubt arises from the perception of (the object containing) the general property, the non-perception of the differentia, and the recollection of the alternatives, all at once or in one act of thought.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

It has been already established that the characteristics, e.g. Colour, etc., of the four ‘elements’ are essential, if they are preceded by like Attributes in their causes, and if not, then they are conditional or accidental. The marks of the ‘universal substances’[1] which are devoid of any distinctive Attribute, have also been stated. Now, the mark of Ether, i.e., Sound, should bo examined. And here we meet with the contradictory conclusions of the Tāntrikas. Some say that Sound is a Substance, and some call it an Āttribute. Even when they call it an Attribute, it is eternal according to some, while according to others it is non-eternal. Others, again, distinguish even in Sound another Sound, which they call by the name, “Spoṭa.” Accordingly, to begin the examination of Sound, he first of all establishes Doubt itself, which is the first element or member of an examination, by its characteristic and cause, and says:

[Read sūtra 2.2.17 above]

‘Sāmānyapratyakṣāt’ means from the perception, i.e., apprehension, of the object which possesses the general property, the affix ‘matup,’ signifying possession, having been elided. ‘Viśeṣāpratyakṣāt’ means from the non-perception or non-apprehension of the property which is the means of mutual differentiation, e.g., crooked, hollow, etc., and also head, hand, etc. ‘Viśeṣasmṛteḥ’ means from the recollection of the particulars, i.e., the alternatives characterised as a trunk and as a person. Recollection also includes apprehension by sense, because, in some instances, bodies which are being perceived also become the alternatives. The word ‘ca’ brings together adṛṣṭa (invisible consequences of voluntary conduct) etc., which are also the causes of Doubt.

It has not been said that an individual or particular property is the source of uncertain knowledge. Nor has it been said that a particular or special property, being the means of discrimination, is such a cause, and that this differenciation [differentiation?] from similar and dissimilar objects is really the common property. Contradiction, again, consists of two propositions arising from two opposite conclusions; one being ‘Sound is eternal,’ and the other being ‘Sound is non-eternal.’ Both of them as well as both the forms of knowledge produced by them, do not together become the source of Doubt, since they do not exist simultaneously. Hence it has not been separately stated that there the cause of Doubt is either the non-common property, such as Soundness, or the common property, such as the being existent, the being the subject of proof, etc.

Uncertain knowledge finds no place in the kindred system of Gautama (i.e., Nyāya Philosophy), and so a non-common property has been mentioned there as a cause of Doubt. Contradiction, i.e., two opposite propositions, containing as a rule a positive and a negative statement, has been mentioned as a cause of Doubt. In the commentary on Nyāya, Doubt has been described as five-fold, according as the fact that something is being perceived, or the fact that something is not being perceived, is the cause of Doubt. Thus Doubts may arise whether what is being perceived be existent, whether what is being perceived be non-existent, whether this thing which is being perceived be existent or non-existent, whether what is not being perceived be existent, such as a radish, a latch, etc., and whether what is not being perceived be non-existent, as a lotus in the air. But all these are really of the same kind, being explained in the very same way by the expression ‘from the perception of the common property.’ Again, the three-foldness of Doubt, according to differences in its cause, as taught in the Nyāya-Vārttika, is also not possible, as the three, viz., common property, etc., themselves cannot be causes on account of their variability. For heterogeneity should not be supposed here, like heterogeneity in fire produced from grass; a strike-stick (araṇi) (i.e., where fire is kindled by striking two sticks against each other), and a gem, because ex hypothesi the causality consists of the common property of producing an effect defined by the characteristic of Doubt. The heterogeneity which is said to appear in the form of referring primarily to the positive alternative, or primarily to the negative alternative, etc., does not serve the purpose of a differentia, as it is not sufficiently extensive, or wide.

Thus Doubt is neither three-fold nor five-fold, but is of one kind only. The writer of the aphorisms, however, will himself explain its two-foldness in another respect.

It may be objected, ‘Doubt is knowledge which produces the desire to know.’—This is not the definition, as it overlaps uncertainty. Doubt is knowledge which does not produce impression (saṃskāra).’—This too is common to unmodified or undifferentiated knowledge or state of consciousness; for, if it is a concrete knowledge, then Doubt also produces an impression. Again though it is a ‘class,’ yet the quality of Doubt is not a characteristic, for as the quality of Doubt does not reside in the object containing the property (the perception of which is the occasion of the Doubt), the ‘class’ also does not appear there, since it is not found that a ‘class’ appears elsewhere than in what it classifies.” To this our reply is that from the definition of Doubt it follows that Doubt is knowledge of diverse and contradictory forms in respect of one and the same object.—17.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

‘Universal Substances’ are Ether, Space, Time, and Soul.

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