Sūtra 2.1.1 (Characteristics of Earth)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 2.1.1:

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शवती पृथिवी ॥ २.१.१ ॥

rūparasagandhasparśavatī pṛthivī || 2.1.1 ||

rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśavatī—Possessed of Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch; pṛthivī—Earth.

1. Earth possesses Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

The subject-matter of the First chapter of the Second Book is the description of the nine Substances. Herein there are three sections: description of Earth, Water, and Fire; proof of God; and inference of Ether. Of these the anther states the characteristic of Earth which has been mentioned first of all.

[Read sūtra 2.1.1 above]

Manifold Colour such as blue, yellow, etc., belongs to Earth alone. Thus the characteristic is the possession of the ‘class’ pervaded by Substance-ness and co-extensive with blue colour. Similarly manifold Taste such as bitter, sour, etc., resides in Earth alone. Thus the (second) characteristic is the possession of the ‘class’ pervaded by Substance-ness and co-extensive with bitter Taste. In like manner other characteristics should be understood by the substitution or interpolation of the words ‘sour,’ etc. Smell is of two kinds, fragrant and non-fragrant. Thus the (third) characteristic is the possession of the ‘class’ pervaded by Substance-ness and co-extensive with Smell. It will be therefore seen that Earth is a Substance which is the substratum or location of ‘class’ which is co-extensive with Smell but not co-extensive with tn Attribute which is not co-extensive with Smell. It must not be objected that as Smell and Taste are not perceived in a stone, etc., therefore both of them fall short of being universal here. For, though Smell and Taste are not perceived there in the first instance, still they are found to be present in their ashes; and the very same parts which originate the stone do also originate its ashes. Hence there is no want of universality. How then is there such perception as “The air is fragrant,” “Water mixed with ‘Kāravella’ (Momardica carantia, Hairy Mordica) is bitter?” The question does not arise, because that Smell and Taste are due to the external condition formed by (particles of) Earth. Touch also which is neither hot nor cold and which is produced by the action of heat, belongs to Earth only. Thus the (fourth) characteristic is the possession of the ‘class’ pervaded by Substance-ness and co-extensive with Touch produced by the action of heat. And the quality of being produced by the action of heat, which is revealed by a distinctive peculiarity, belongs to the Touch of Earth alone; and ‘a distinctive peculiarity’ is very manifest in the peculiar Touch of the flowers of Śirīṣa (Acacia lebbec) and Lavaṅgī (clove-creeper); but it is not so in the Touch of Water, etc. Although in a whole made up of parts Touch, etc., are not produced directly through the conjunction of Fire, from heating, yet there too a particular heterogeneity should be recognised by the way of its being the product of a series of parts and wholes.

“But,” it may be objected, “this mark or characteristic is what is called a mark of disagreement or a negative mark which is the proof of its difference from others or of the mode of its treatment. Now, Earth is distinguished from others because it has Smell. That which is not different from others, does not possess Smell, e.g., Water, etc. And Earth is what has Smell which is the counter-opposite of the nonexistence of the pervader of the non-existence of the difference from others than itself. Therefore it is different from others than itself. Hero supposing that the major term, the quaesitum, namely, difference from others, is a well known object, if the mark of inference disagree with it, then the inference will have the fault of incommensurability, as the minor term will in that case fall outside the class of ascertained similar objects and of un-ascertained objects; and if it does not disagree, then the mark will be what is called a mark of agreement or a positive mark. On the other hand, if the major term is not well known, then the minor term will contain an unknown major term. In that case there can be no expectation, nor any desire for inference, nor again any inference in the shape of knowledge in particular about it. Moreover, absence of the mark: or the middle term and absence of the quaesitum or major term are universally related by agreement. Thus there will arise the contradiction that the absence of the major term will not have the characteristic of being the mark nor will the mark have the characteristic of being the absence of the major term. By this alone the futility of the minor premiss [premises?] is explained, but not the object, the universal relation of which has not been obtained. So it has been said: “The faults of an inference by disagreement or by the method of difference, are ignorance of the major term, contradiction, futility of the minor premiss, and proof by the method of agreement.” So also if the mark is intended to establish usage. Here the usage consists in being the object of reference of the word Earth, and that belongs also to the class of Earth-ness and therein the mark Earthness does not exist. Although therefore incommensurability may appear to exist here, yet there is no incommensurability, the quaesitum or major term being the characteristic of being the object of reference of the -word Earth, which is the occasion of the significance of Earth-ness. Or again Earth-ness being, as a class, proved in a general way, like pot-ness, to be the occasion of the significance of an accidental word, the word Earth contains the occasion of the significance of Earthness. If it contains the occasion of not signifying others—not-Earth-ness,—then as it appears together with that which is the occasion of the significance, it should be proved in the way. viz., ‘That which is not so, is not so.’ Thus here too there is surely the fault of ignorance of the quaesitum, etc.”

It is not so, the author replies, difference of others such as Water, etc., being manifest in the pot itself, because the difference, i.e., the mutual non-existence of Air, and other super-sensuous objects also is proved by sense-perception itself in the pot, etc., in as much as only the fitness for the location or ground or substratum governs the apprehension of mutual non-existence, as is seen in cases like “The column is not a piśāca (a ghost-like being).”

It should not be said. “This is not the case. Let then the pot only be the analogue or example. What is the use of a negative mark? Who will prove in a roundabout fashion a conclusion arrived at in a straight way?” If the non-negative mark be not a mere simulacrum, then this path too is unobstructed to him who is described as arguing in a round-about way; because with the removal of the fault of ignorance of the quaesitum, all other faults which arise out of it, are also removed. There is no contradiction, because the positive pervasion or the relation in agreement is apprehended along with the negative relation or because the positive pervasion is inferred by the negative pervasion. Nor is there futility of the minor premiss, because the very mark of which the pervasion has been obtained, is proved in the minor term; as has been said: “Whatever relation of the determinable and the determinant subsists between two existences, just the reverse of it is to be understood in the ease of the corresponding non-existences.” Usage again follows from the teaching “Earth possesses Smell.” in the same way as what possesses a narrow, twisted neck, etc., is the object of reference of the word ‘pot.’ Thus that by which, anywhere and everywhere, in the case of clarified butter, etc., clay, etc., the being the occasion of the force of the word Earth is derived, from the above teaching, in Earth-ness by means of the indication, namely, the possession of Smell, also operates as a negative mark in this way that that which is not this, is not this, because everything which possesses Smell is the object of reference of the word Earth, through its possession of Smell, by means of Earth-ness which is the occasion of the force of the word.

The objector cannot say “Ln the case of the negative mark or pervasion which will prove difference, the difference must be either difference in property, or difference in nature, i.e., otherness, or mutual non-existence. Now it cannot be the first two, because they are known by sense perception itself. Nor can it be the third, because when tho difference of non-existence also comes to bo the quaesitum, its mutual non-existence is not present there, and therefore the difference of that which is other than non-existence coming to be the quaesitum the quaesitum is not found.” For mutual non-existence, of which the counter-opposite is non-existence, is also a quaesitum. So that if it is something additional then it verily exists; if not then being reduced to itself, it is in reality something different, because its difference in property is pervaded by its mutual non-existence. And here there is unsteadiness or want of no finality, because the non-finality remains only so long as there is perception or cognition, whereas in other cases finality is obtained by perception.

It is also said that thirteen kinds of mutual non-existence well known in thirteen cases are jointly proved in Earth. This is nonsense, because the knowledge of every one of them being not in point, the knowledge of them jointly disappears. Whereas mutual non-existence with counter-opposition determined by non-odorousness should be proved, because the difference of non-existence by means of the difference of that which determines counter-opposition is necessary and because it has been already said that this difference of non-existence is proved by sense-perception in the pot etc., also.

If it is asked “What is the solution in the case of Ether, etc.,?” the author replies that Ether is different from others than itself, by being the seat of Sound. Although in “That which is not thus, is not thus,” and cases like this, where the minor term is one-sided, the quaesitum, i. e., the major term, is not well known, still that which possesses difference in property from something else, possesses the mutual non-existence of which that something is the counter-opposite. So that by virtue of the pervasion brought into play in this general way, the mutual non-existence the counter-opposite of which possesses the absolute non-existence of being the seat of Sound, having been already proved, here it is only shown as being connected with the minor term, like fire being connected with the mountain. This is our other conclusion, its difference in quality being pervaded by its mutual non-existence. If it is said that only the possession of the absolute non-existence of being the seat of Sound is not found in objects of the unascertained class, then the being the seat of Sound is neither the definition nor the description, because it is attacked with the fear of belonging to unascertained objects.—1.

Commentary: The Vivṛti of Jayanārāyaṇa:

(English extracts of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana’s Vivṛti or ‘gloss’ called the Kaṇādasūtravivṛti from the 17th century)

The revered Śaṅkara Miśra himself knows what the necessity was of carrying the investigation here, leaving aside the possession of Smell, up to the possession of the ‘class’ pervaded by Substance-ness co-extensive with Smell.