The validity of Anumana (inference) in Nyaya system

by Babu C. D | 2018 | 44,340 words

This thesis is called: The validity of Anumana (inference) in Nyaya system. It tries to establish the validity of Anumana through citing its application either consciously or unconsciously in every sphere of human life. Anumana in Nyaya system is the knowledge of any object not by direct observation but by means of the knowledge of a liṅga or sign ...

Chapter 4.2.2 - The Prakaranas (b): Tarkikaraksha by Varadaraja

Varadaraja is reported to have been from Andhra or Telangana and belong to 1150 A.D. He is known for his work on logic ‘Tarkikaraksha or “protection of Logic.” He is considered the pioneer writer to deal with all the sixteen categories of Nyaya and includes the Vaisheshika categories in the second category of prameya. He is also the author of the commentary on Udayana’s Nyayakusumamjali called Sarasamgrahatika.

The Tarkikaraksha consists of three chapters. While, the first chapter deals with 14 categories of Nyaya viz., pramana, prameya, samshaya, prayojana, dristanta, siddhanta, avayava, tarka, nirnaya, vada, jalpa, vitanda, hetvabhasa and chala, the second chapter elaborates on the fifteenth category Jati and the third elaborates on the sixteen category i.e., nigrahasthana. Varadaraja incorporates in Tarkikaraksha six Vaisheshika categories in prameya. They are dravya, guna. karma, samanya, vishesha and samavaya. It could be observed here that the categories of the Vaisheshika and objects coming under prameya of the Nyaya overlap each other.

For Varadaraja, anumana or inference is the knowledge derived through its invariable concomitance with another thing.[1] Invariable concomitance also known as inseperableness (avinabhava) is devoid of condition (upadhi).[2] He considers the definition by Buddhists as untenable and says one can infer the form of an orange from its taste, though there is neither causal nor relation of identity in essence exists between the taste and the form. In explaining the seventh category viz., Avayava part of a syllogism, Varadaraja says that according to Mimamsaka, a syllogism which consists of three parts may either begin with an example or end with the same as follows:—

All that is smoky is fiery; as a kitchen,
The hill is smoky.
Therefore, the hill is fiery.

Or

The hill is fiery
Because it is smoky
All that is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen.

In Lakshanamala, sign (linga) is defined as that which is in invariable concomitance with the major term freed from any condition (upadhi). For instance, smoke is the sign of fire, but fire is not necessarily a sign of smoke unless it is nourished by wet fuel.

The sign, reason or middle tern (hetu) which is in vyapti with the predicate or major term (sadhya) has five features:

  1. Pakshadharmata: the existence of the sign in the subject or minor term the hill has smoke
  2. Sapaksha sattvam; existence of the sign in homologue. E.g., that which has smoke has fire as a kitchen
  3. Vipakshasattvam: non-existence of the sign in heterologous e.g., that which has no fire has no smoke, as a lake.
  4. Abadhita visayatvam: the object of the sign not being incompatible. e.g., there is no incompatibility for smoke abiding in the hill
  5. Asatpratipakshatvam: there being a counter balancing sign, e.g., there is nothing else which counter balances smoke in respect of proving fire.

Sarasamgraha (summary of essences) by Varadaraja himself, Laghudipika (a light lamp) by Jnanapurna and Niskantaka (thornless) by Mallinatha are considered to be the significant commentaries on Tarkikaraksha.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Tarkikraksha, p.64

[2]:

ibid, p.65

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