Chapter 2.6 - Pramanas in Carvaka System

The metaphysical conception and theoretical knowledge are interdependent in philosophy. Carvaka admits four elements viz., earth, water, air, and fire. All the vouchers of these elements undergo perception. Therefore, according to Carvaka school, perception is the only authority or valid source of knowledge. Carvakas divide perception into two categories; external and internal. External perception comes through the contact of external senses with the object. Internal perception is the perception of mental states like pleasure pain etc. It depends upon external perception. Inner actions of the mind are based upon materials received through external perception. For them, that which is perceived is the only reality.^[1]

Carvaka philosophy repudiates other sources of knowledge. They refute inference saying that in Nyaya philosophy inference depends upon vyapti (invariable concomitance). For them vyapti is impossible on two grounds; a) it is not purely based on perception and b) it deduces imperceptible from the perceptible one. The smoke as an inevitable concomitant of fire cannot be inferred from seeking smoke with fire at some odd place. Carvaka argues that a general rule can be formed only after checking all the occurrences of that type. Unless witnessing fire of all times past, present and future and at all places, one cannot vindicate the rule that fire is always invariably accompanied by smoke. Since it is not possible, they are not ready to accept vyapti as an evenhanded criterion to prove something through inference.

Vyapti cannot be established by inference either, because the inference will also depend on Vyapti and perception will again be required to prove the vyapti. Vyapti is based on inference and vice versa. So they suffer from the fallacy of inter-dependence. Vyapti cannot be known by verbal testimony, because the authority of the latter is also based on inference. Similarly, if inference is based on verbal testimony everybody will have to depend somebody’s words so as to infer something which will stretch long way to an unknown end. It will again lead to inter-dependence.

The validity of causation cannot be established through perception alone. Jati or samanya is not subject to both external or by internal perceptions. The Naiyayikas try to establish the inevitable relationship between fire and smoke not knowing whether the allied objects will be so at all times. Perception of all kinds of smoke is required to know smokiness. It being patently infeasible, smokiness can be equated only with those objects with which smoke is perceived. Evidently smokiness’ is not something inevitable and it cannot lead to vyapti of any kind.

Vyapti cannot be established on the basis of comparison too. Comparison depends upon the universal relation between the words and the objects signified by them. This again goes back to the tale of perception. Vyapti is unconditional. But the conditions of an inference are difficult to understand. Pratijna and upanaya are closely related to wait on any condition. The knowledge of condition must necessarily continue the knowledge of its absence. The knowledge of all conditions being impossible, one cannot know the absence of them and hence cannot be certain of vyapti. ^[2]

Like all the western philosophers Hume is also of the opinion that the Carvakas do not believe in causation as well as universality, which also depends upon vyapti. The regular occurrence of two make one believe that they invariably go together. The supposition of causal relation between fire and smoke own to their allied nature, at times will cheat the observer as and when one observes the wetness of wood giving rise to smoke. The relationship of cause and effect cannot be established after knowing all conditions and the conditions cannot be known with the help of inference or testimony because they themselves are not valid. The accidental conjunctions of an antecedent and a consequent are not a proof of vyapti. So inference cannot be immune from doubts.

Though Carvakas claim that they accept no other source of knowledge than perception, they, as Buddhists say, deal with certain objects, the existence of which is proved by other philosophers with the help of inference. So, in a way the Carvakas accept inference, the refutation of which will only be possible through another inference.^[3]

While interrogating the validity of inference, the Carvakas depend on a discursive method which itself turns into a type of inference. In fact, Carvakas find it difficult to prove their own theories without the help of inference. ^[4]

The main argument raised against vyapti (invariable concomitance) by the Carvakas is that it cannot be ascertained in all the conditions. This argument is applicable only when it is valid in all the cases. Even if it is not so, vyapti cannot be proved to be invalid. The Carvakas do not accept any argument without conditions. Thus their own argument becomes self-contradicted, as it is not without conditions.

According to Udayana, a leading Naiyayika, life depends not on probabilities and presumption but on the definite knowledge of presence or absence. According to him wherever there is doubt there is inference and the absence of doubt conclusively proves the latter. Regarding vyapti as upadhi (with condition), the Carvakas point out the probability of its exception in future or at remote places. This argument itself is based on inference, because the future and remote places depend not on perception but on inference. As a matter of fact, after the start of an action definite knowledge replaces doubt and presumption.

According to Carvakas, the words of reliable person are authoritative in the case of perceptible things. These words are also known by perception. However, with regard to imperceptible things, even the Vedas are no authority as the Carvakas believe that the imperceptible things have no existence. According to the Carvakas the knowledge gained through words is also based on inference. The word of all reliable people are valid, is the general rule on the basis of which one indicates faith in these words. But inference itself is not valid. How can, then, the word based on it be valid? Words also come to be true casually, just like the inference. But it does not indicate the view that the word is necessarily and invariably an instrument of authoritative knowledge.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Dr. K.S.Radhakrishnan, Bharatiya Darsanam, Mathrubhumi printing and publishing company, Ltd., Kozhikkod, 1996, p.253.

[2]:

Sarvadarsana Samgraha, Chapter. 1

[3]:

The Philosophy of ancient India. p. 25

[4]:

Nyayamanjari, p.119